Daily Report

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CONTENTS

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An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Foreign Ministry Spokesman's 11 March Briefing *[TASS]* 1
'Importance' of Baker Visit Noted 1
Visit of Turkey's Ozal Previewed 1
Moiseyev in Poland, Damascus Declaration 1
TASS Commentary Reviews Baker Trip Prospects 2
Deputy Foreign Minister on Post-War Gulf Scene *[IAN PRESS RELEASE 5 Mar]* 2
Obminskiy on Trends in Foreign Economic Ties *[PRAVDA 7 Mar]* 3

PRIMAKOV ON GULF DIPLOMACY

'The War Which Might Not Have Been' 7
Part I *[PRAVDA 27 Feb]* 7
Part II *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* 12
Part III *[PRAVDA 1 Mar]* 16
Part IV *[PRAVDA 2 Mar]* 22

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Reports Preview Baker's Upcoming Moscow Visit 29
Post-War Gulf Settlement Eyed *[IZVESTIYA 12 Mar]* 29
Visit With Yeltsin Not Planned *[Moscow TV]* 29

Near East & South Asia

Bahrain Defense Minister Favors Improved Ties *[TASS]* 29
Egyptian Envoy Comments on Soviet Mideast Role *[Moscow International]* 29
Iraqi Businessman Interviewed on Soviet Stance *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 8 Mar]* 30
Reports Follow Arab Coalition Talks in Damascus 31
PRAVDA Notes Postwar Agenda *[9 Mar]* 31
Cooperation Noted *[IZVESTIYA 9 Mar]* 32
Iraq's Defeat, Consequences, Lessons Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 8 Mar]* 33
Regional Arab Alliances May Replace Arab League *[IZVESTIYA 11 Mar]* 35
Korniyenko Criticizes Shevardnadze Gulf Stand *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 9 Mar]* 36
TASS Reports Clashes With Kurds in Iraq 38

East Europe

Moiseyev Meets With Polish Foreign Minister *[TASS]* 39
Hungary's Defense Minister Interviewed on Security *[Moscow International]* 39

West Europe

Turkish President's Moscow Visit Reported 40

Interviewed on Eve of Visit *[TASS]* 40
Expectations Noted *[TASS]* 42
Leaders Discuss Postwar Ties *[TASS]* 42
'Total Understanding' Noted *[Ankara Radio]* 42
Friendship Treaty Signed 12 Mar *[TASS]* 43
Bessmertnykh Receives Turkish Foreign Minister *[TASS]* 43
Joint FRG Agreements on Troop Provisions Reported *[TASS]* 43

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

Gorbachev 7 Mar Speech to Supreme Soviet *[PRAVDA 8 Mar]* 44
USSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings 11 March 46
Issues Decision on Referendum *[TASS]* 47
Resolution Assails Yeltsin *[Moscow Radio]* 48
Security Council Membership Debated 7 March *[IZVESTIYA 9 Mar]* 48
Militia Law, Referendum Debated 6 March *[IZVESTIYA 8 Mar]* 50
Discussion of Treaties With Germany Analyzed *[PRAVDA 2 Mar]* 51

Political & Social

Martial Law Seen As Stabilizer *[PRAVDA 11 Mar]* 52
Pavlov, Prokofyev Address Moscow Meeting *[TASS]* 53
Centrist Bloc Roundtable Fails *[Moscow TV]* 54
Referendum May Deepen Political Divisions *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 9]* 54
PRAVDA Article Stresses Need for Unity *[PRAVDA 9 Mar]* 55
Analyst on Antagonistic Political Forces *[TASS]* 56
"Vremya" Considers 10 Mar Rallies' Tone *[Moscow TV]* 57
Selective TV Treatment of Rallies Questioned *[IZVESTIYA 26 Feb]* 57
Shevardnadze on Foreign Policy Group *[NEW TIMES No 8]* 58
CPSU Assesses Orenburg Party Organization *[PRAVDA pp 1-2]* 61
Primakov Charges of Bias Countered *[IZVESTIYA 5 Mar]* 62
'Democratic Russia' Meeting Reported *[IZVESTIYA 11 Mar]* 62
Shortages Top List of Citizens' Concerns *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 6 Mar]* 63

Economic

Reportage on Continuing Kuzbass Miners' Strike 63
Appeal for 'Indefinite' Strike *[TASS]* 63
Strikes Continue at 60 Mines *[Moscow International]* 63
Striking Miners Seek Pavlov Meeting *[Moscow TV]* 63
Yeltsin Receives Striking Miners *[TASS]* 64
Miners Threaten 15 Mar General Strike *[PRAVDA 11 Mar]* 64
Reasons for Strikes Explained *[TASS]* 64
IZVESTIYA Reports on Strikers' Demands *[8 Mar]* 64
Striking Chervonograd Miners' Committee Demands *[Kiev Radio]* 65
Joint Venture Set Up With CSFR Truck Firm *[Moscow TV]* 65

Military

Moiseyev Interviewed on Military Reform *[SOVETSKIY PATRIOT No 1]* 65
Shlyaga Attends Academy Party Conference *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Mar]* 66
Moscow Garrison Rallies for Single Army, Union *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Feb]* 66
Gen Batenin Favors All-Professional Army *[NEW TIMES No 8]* 67
PRAVDA Carries Army Gen Shkadov Obituary *[20 Feb]* 69

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Estonia Appeals to Gorbachev on Referendum *[Moscow TV]* 70
Estonian, Danish Foreign Ministers Sign Protocol *[Moscow TV]* 70
Estonia's Savisaar Interviewed on 1991 Issues *[Tallinn Radio]* 70
Pro-Referendum Conference Conducted in Riga *[PRAVDA 8 Mar]* 70
Lithuanian Presidium Sees 'New Provocations' *[Radio Vilnius]* 71
Officer, Cadet Attacked by Vilnius 'Hooligans' *[Moscow Radio]* 71

RSFSR

Media Continues To Assess Yeltsin 9 Mar Speech 71
Radio Rossii Broadcasts 'Text' 71
Words 'Annoyed' Public *[Moscow International]* 74
Remarks 'Reminiscent' of 1930's *[PRAVDA 11 Mar]* 75
War Remarks Not 'Slip of the Tongue' *[Moscow TV]* 76
Radio Rossii Criticizes Vremya's 'Nervous Tic' 77
Radio Rossii Commentator Views Anti-Yeltsin Drive 77
Pro-Yeltsin Demonstration Held in Obninsk *[Radio Rossii]* 78
Prime Minister Silayev Addresses Lyubertsy Workers *[Radio Rossii]* 78
Russian Communists Call for Peace in Georgia *[TASS]* 80
Pithart Ends Visit to Russian Republic, Departs *[Prague CTK]* 81
Bashkir Plenum Views RSFSR Referendum *[IZVESTIYA 8 Mar]* 81
Questions on Kamchatka Referendum Ballots Reported *[IZVESTIYA 8 Mar]* 81

Western Republics

Committee Breaks From Moldovan Communist Party *[TASS]* 81
Moldovan President Views Republic's Problems *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 28 Feb]* 81

Caucasus

Armenia Reportedly Lifts Power Use Restrictions *[Yerevan International]* 82
Paper Explains Union Gas Supply Cut to Georgia *[Moscow TV]* 82
Georgia's Gamsakhurdia Addresses Abkhaz People *[Tbilisi Radio]* 82
Georgia's Gamsakhurdia Views Ethnic Conflict *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 11 Mar]* 83
'Catastrophic' Shortages Reported in Tskhinvali *[TASS]* 85
Georgian Militia Attacked in Ossetian Village *[Tbilisi Radio]* 86

Central Asia

Uzbek President on 'Civil War,' Union Treaty *[DIE ZEIT 8 Mar]* 86

Foreign Ministry Spokesman's 11 March Briefing

'Importance' of Baker Visit Noted

LD1103144991 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—The Soviet side attaches considerable importance to the visit of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to the Soviet Union, fixed for March 14-16, Vitaliy Churkin, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, told a briefing here today.

He said in this connection that intensive preparations for talks with a U.S. delegation are being continued. Specifically, he told reporters that Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and James Baker had a telephone conversation Sunday evening.

Asked by reporters to comment on the Middle East settlement, Churkin said this theme would be thoroughly discussed during the forthcoming talks with the secretary of state. He said the Soviet side expected to be told the United States views of this problem in detail and was going to set out its own approaches to the Gulf problem and, in a broader respect, to a Middle East Settlement.

Churkin said that post-crisis settlement in the Gulf and possible approaches to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict at the present stage as well as disarmament problems would be the main themes of the forthcoming talks with James Baker in Moscow. He said it was hoped in Moscow that the drafting of a treaty on strategic offensive arms would soon be completed.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman did not rule out that the theme of conventional armaments may crop up during the talks with the U.S. secretary of state, in view of problems that arose in this area.

"This certainly does not mean that other topics usual for the agenda of Soviet-American talks, for instance, bilateral relations, regional, transatlantic and other problems, will not be discussed," Churkin said.

Visit of Turkey's Ozal Previewed

LD1103144291 Moscow TASS in English 1338 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—The Soviet people believe that the official visit to the USSR by Turkish President Turgut Ozal, which will begin today, will give "new powerful impetus to the development of friendly cooperation between the USSR and Turkey" and will raise relations between the two countries to a higher level, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing today.

He noted that the USSR and Turkey are confidently developing good-neighbourly relations and advantageous cooperation, accumulated rich experience in economic, scientific, technical and cultural exchanges and strengthened the contractual basis for bilateral relations of friendship and good-neighbourly contacts.

Churkin said that the Soviet Union and Turkey fruitfully cooperate within the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in settling urgent international problems.

He noted that Moscow and Ankara maintained active contacts on the Gulf crisis "from close positions". The two countries have much in common in their approaches to other issues of inter-state cooperation, he added.

The Soviet leadership shares the idea of establishing a Black Sea zone of economic cooperation put forth by Ozal.

During the visit, Churkin said, the two countries will sign several documents, which will expand Soviet-Turkish cooperation in various spheres.

In addition to Moscow, the president will visit Kiev, Alma-Ata and Baku, Churkin concluded.

Moiseyev in Poland, Damascus Declaration

LD1103174291 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Igor Peskov]

[Excerpt] Moscow March 11 TASS—[passage omitted] Asked about the purposes of the trip to Poland by Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, Churkin said that the trip is being made "within the context of a regular round of Soviet-Polish talks on the transit of Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany and on the discussion of matters connected with the stay of Soviet troops that remain on Polish territory for the time being". A regular round of Soviet-Polish talks on these issues will be held in Moscow on March 19-20, Churkin announced.

Commenting at journalists' request on the "Damascus Declaration" signed recently by the foreign ministers of eight Arab states, Churkin said that Moscow continues to seriously study the declaration, just as other initiatives and statements concerning a settlement of the Mideast problem.

Already now it can be said that the Damascus Declaration "has some provisions that are consonant with our ideas about the problems touched upon it," Churkin noted.

TASS Commentary Reviews Baker Trip Prospects

LD1103155491 Moscow TASS in English 1524 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS international analyst Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—One and a half weeks have elapsed since the cease-fire was announced in the Gulf region and processes leading to a peace settlement are becoming increasingly discernible there. But they have run up against serious difficulties from the very outset, which, as a matter of fact, was to be expected.

A meeting of foreign ministers of countries-members of the Cooperation Council of the Arab Gulf states, Egypt and Syria with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker ended in Riyadh on Sunday with a joint communique, saying that the Arab foreign ministers "regard an international peace conference on the Middle East, held under UN aegis, as an acceptable instrument to end the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and guarantee the national rights of the Palestinian people in keeping with corresponding UN resolutions".

Political analysts have noted right away that Baker did not reject such a conference, though previously the United States was rather cool to the idea. Furthermore, he assessed this document as a "signal that should be heeded by Israel". Noteworthy is the positive assessment of Riyadh negotiations by the Syrian minister, a country that previously vehemently opposed all American actions.

Of course, the wording of the communique seems rather vague, which was apparently done deliberately. This refers primarily to the Palestinian issue. The London GUARDIAN expresses apprehensions, and not without reason, that this problem may be lost in the search for a peace settlement. Such apprehensions are far from groundless. Much can be said in Arab capitals and in Tel Aviv about the need for an efficient regional security system, for economic cooperation and strict control over arms sales, but all this will remain idle talk if the crux of the Middle East conflict—the problem of the Palestinian people—is not resolved.

It is worth noting that all the aspects of the Middle East conflict are so closely intertwined that only a complex approach will be able to unravel the knot.

Secretary of State Baker will go to Israel today after his visit to Egypt. This will be the most difficult part of his Middle East trip. The Israeli leadership, beginning with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, adheres to an extremely tough stand on all the aspects of the Middle East issue and its settlement.

The U.S. secretary of state will have to explain to the Israelis the simple truth that diplomacy involves the art of compromise, and this is particularly true of Middle Eastern diplomacy.

Speaking about the prospects for a Middle East settlement, it ought to be said that the main Arab nations and the United States have agreed on the principal directions of their further efforts, but they differ conspicuously on the ways and means for achieving the set goals. In any case, it is obvious that an "American-type peace" in the region, if Washington tries to foist decisions suiting it on the Arabs from positions of strength, will prove to be unacceptable, which was clearly stated by UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar.

This is why Arab statesmen will closely follow Baker's talks in Tel Aviv. The future of the Middle East depends on their outcome.

Deputy Foreign Minister on Post-War Gulf Scene

PM1103151891 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English 5 Mar 91

[Interview with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov by Vladimir Markov on 3 March; place not given: "Aleksandr Belonogov on the Gulf Settlement"]

[Text] "The Soviet Union wants Iraq to follow all resolutions of the UN Security Council to the letter, and the Council to be active in the post-crisis Gulf arrangement. We greet the outcome of the meeting between spokesmen of the coalition and Iraqi commands and are glad to have helped its organisation," Aleksandr Belonogov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, told Novosti's Vladimir Markov on 3 March.

[Markov] What precisely did Soviet diplomats do to assist the meeting in the south of Iraq?

[Belonogov] Until now, the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad mediates all contacts between the Iraqi leadership and the world—in particular, New York City and Washington DC. Whatever information we get in Baghdad for, say, the Security Council Head or the Iraqi representative at the United Nations, we pass on via Moscow.

[Markov] Thirteen Soviet Embassy employees stayed in Baghdad at the most dangerous time. What does Moscow think of their work?

[Belonogov] They did an excellent job, and did all they could. We were never short of reliable information from Baghdad. These thirteen people will get what they deserve.

[Markov] What policy is the Soviet Union pursuing at the Security Council at the current stage of the Gulf settlement?

[Belonogov] We wanted the UN to lead the settlement effort from the start. Now that the hostilities are over, the Security Council has come into the foreground, with the unique opportunities it has thanks to the unity and cooperation of its five permanent members, which took shape in the crisis. We want this cooperation to go on.

[Markov] Which issues would the Soviet Union like to see in the later Security Council resolutions?

[Belonogov] The main thing is to give a permanent status to the Gulf cease-fire and rule out a renewal of the hostilities. This is the goal of Resolution 686, the first taken after the military phase of the crisis was over. Now Iraq must comply with all its provisos as it officially pledged.

Surely, one resolution could not include the whole gamut of issues concerning the emergent situation. The council may have to adopt several more as it evolves.

The UN embargo on food and medicine supplies to Iraq will have to be reconsidered with its population's plight.

[Markov] What do Soviet diplomats think of the United Nations' role in the post-crisis arrangements?

[Belonogov] The Gulf states will surely play first fiddle. Their security is at stake, and it's up to them to decide which regional arrangements will best promote it. At the same time, no arrangement will be safe enough unless it has efficient multiform support from without. We think the Security Council can guarantee the most reliable support.

[Markov] Soviet and U.S. stances differed at some stages of the crisis. Can these differences give rise to future Gulf rivalry?

[Belonogov] I don't think they can if the region arrives at the status quo before August 2, 1990, in which the Soviet Union and the United Sttes never confronted each other.

Within the last years, America thoroughly changed its opinion of the possible Soviet part in Mid-East affairs. Fairly recently, for instance, when Dr. Kissinger was Secretary of State, the administration was out to undermine the Soviet position in that part of the world.

Now America has a new view of the Soviet Union and its foreign political tactics and goals. It sees that our country is playing a constructive part in the Middle East to promote local, American and other national interests.

Obminskiy on Trends in Foreign Economic Ties

PM1103160591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with USSR Deputy Foreign Minister E.Ye. Obminskiy, doctor of economic sciences, conducted by Yevgeniy Shashkov; place and date not given: "Economic Diplomacy and the 'Parade of Sovereignties'"]

[Text] [Shashkov] The problem of combining global interests with local self-interest and the national economy with the world economy is prominent in the sphere of foreign economic relations today. Given the present major transformation of all the USSR's social and economic structures, an enormous number of questions in need of solution have appeared here. Problems of foreign economic ties lie at the epicenter of the struggle of interests surrounding republics' sovereignty. This is most clearly manifest in the activity of republic parliaments. Ernest Yevgenyevich, won't sovereign republics ultimately become foreign countries to one another, cut off by customs barriers?

[Obminskiy] Today's difficulties are the product of the past, for all the structures, including foreign economic structures, were essentially created on the principles of a unitary state, without consideration of republics' sovereign rights. The foreign economic gamut of the republics has undoubtedly expanded. Unfortunately, the reaction that quite often occurs here is one of rejection of union structures. But that is another illusion. And it may be necessary to go through very severe trials before these illusions are dispelled. Or else energetically explain to people that the experience of total destruction is not worth repeating.

I admit that the prospect of patient, back-breaking work does not suit many people. But the national economy and foreign economic ties are not a game of chess where all the pieces can be cleared away from the board with a "let's start a new game." That won't happen. The idea of optimizing union functions should not and cannot be realized according to the principle of "the fewer, the better." Serious arguments are needed. As a rule, a pretty standard move is made: The center is allegedly antimarket, while those who favor separation are en route to the market. If that were so, it would be a big argument in favor of indeed "breaking away" from a structure which does not want to create a new competitive economy in the country. That would then be understandable and warranted. But the whole point is that the center does favor going over to the market and the above move does not work.

[Shashkov] But proposals are nevertheless being made?

[Obminskiy] It is basically proposed that purely parallel bureaucratic structures be created. But why do local bureaucrats think that they can do a better job than the central ones? Why do they think that only they will be able to correctly dispose of the national product?

As far as the foreign economic sphere is concerned, the question could be put this way: Which actions help increase our gross national income and which obstruct it? In the West only a unified economic space can be advantageous. The question is merely how it should look. Here we have environmental separatists, apologists of autarkic ghettoism who claim that, once separated, they will rapidly launch an effective economy of their own. But when the crunch comes, precisely the opposite happens.

The powers now given the republics enable them, in my opinion, to cooperate very effectively both with the center and among themselves. Unfortunately, they often instead seek an enemy in the shape of the center. I think that if there had been no center, the opponents of a unified economic space would have invented it, since

there would no longer be anyone upon whom to pin the blame for their own failures and miscalculations, particularly in the foreign economic sphere. Are those who advocate the creation of their own currency and the formation of their own "two-bit" foreign economic policy really unaware that they could in the upshot lose even the market which they have and could come to lag way behind the industrially developed countries?

In my view, separatism and national isolationism today are extremely detrimental to the progress of the market economy. For example, the constructive comparison of union and republic draft laws or even laws could in principle be beneficial, but everything in our country is done contrariwise—with the intention of scoring points rather than achieving the optimal solution. After all, it is dead easy to say that the Union gives, say, 130 rubles [R] in pension, while we will allocate 150, engineering and technical personnel receive 140, while here they'll get 160. All this is more reminiscent of a kind of auction than a conscious, deliberate policy. Ultimately even accords among republics—on which hopes were pinned—regarding reciprocal supplies and cooperation become legally worthless scraps of paper. And all this because the declarations have no serious underpinning. The conclusion of certain bilateral agrements between republics without material underpinning conjures up scenes from the signing of agreements on socialist competition—again you have the flags, the rostrum, the embraces. And the "outcome" is the same: The enterprises do not work, because when they signed the agreement they were not thinking about becoming autonomous but about subordinating themselves to the structure. As a result new regulating tiers come into being, causing confusion.

[Shashkov] You broached another contentious issue, I am thinking of the relations between the bodies involved in foreign economic activity and the authorities at various levels. Many foreign businessmen are confused today: They do not know whom to contact in the USSR today, whom it is possible to do busines with. In the past, foreign economic relations were concentrated in the hands of the state and its specialized bodies. How are these questions to be tackled today?

[Obminskiy] I have no wish at all to try to justify the centralized system which existed in the past. And today departments quite often propose just one thing to a Western entrepreneur: You give us the currency and we'll think about what to spend it on. Sector ministries as a rule have a distorted idea about the new forms of cooperation with foreign capital. They still do not make use of the new economic instruments provided them by legislation and do not support enterprises' initiative.

The other side of the coin is that the power structures on the periphery, in the republics, and in the regions, anticipating that Western entrepreneurs could bring their capital and technology with them, are urgently separating their ties with them from the whole remaining structure of the country's national economy. The upshot is that a kind of "Africanization" of the economy of the regions and republics is taking place. We now have new centers of linkage forming between our enterprises and Western companies, while the interunion points of contact are completely ignored. And this artificial and selfish trend will continue to appear natural, as it were. And it could consequently happen that an invisible barrier, a kind of no man's land which no one will need because one oblast will already be committed to one place abroad, while another is committed to somewhere else in the West, will gradually develop among the Soviet regions and the oblasts. Some as suppliers of timber, others as exporters of some other resource, still others dealing in various handicrafts or custom-made equipment. And all this will leave our country without any link with the domestic market. In short, when our industrial and agricultural centers inside the USSR are deprived of interest in creating close ties among themselves, offers from elsewhere inevitably arise instead. A very dangerous trend tearing the country and the domestic market to pieces could appear. Unified republic markets, as some would like, will not be retained either. Zones of economic failure will inevitably develop. It is terrible to think about the social upheavals this could bring.

It is also striking that this prospect is not realized in all republics or regions, despite the fact that it is well understood in the West. The business world is warning us—You do not know what you are doing: You are destroying the country's unified economic space.

[Shashkov] Ernest Yevgenyevich, but perhaps this is due to a somewhat puzzled reaction by the Western press to certain speeches by Soviet representatives at the recent international conference in Davos, the World Economic Forum?

[Obminskiy] Indeed the Western organizers of the Davos conference were unhappy that a vision of the current realities of the Soviet economy was absent in the speeches and that, in their opinion, no seriously validated economic options were proposed. But the choice of guest-speakers was purely the hosts' prerogative. And in general it is not a bad thing for us all to understand that the "withering" phrase won't surprise anyone abroad. That time is past. Serious dialogue working toward specific, mutually beneficial accords is required.

[Shashkov] But won't serious representatives of the Western business world get the impression that utter confusion, including in the sphere of foreign economic ties, has set in within the USSR? After all, the West has demonstrated perfectly well that it can exist without extensive economic cooperation with the USSR. There are more than enough examples, take Japan or the United States. Perhaps this explains the constant reservations now being voiced in the West. Previously it did not want to finance our perestroyka or our reforms, because it was thought that would bolster up our outmoded command structures. Today they no longer work, but there is still no advance beyond intentions. The West basically restricts itself to vague promises. That is how it

was at the G-7 conference in Houston last July and at the October and December meetings of the European Council of EEC Heads of State and Government. Has it turned out that there is no advance beyond verbal solidarity with perestroyka?

[Obminskiy] A distorted idea of the kind of work and effort required to effect the transition from a centralized structure to a market structure prevails in the West. The West still does not appreciate this, although it has come right up against similar problems in the East European countries, where the situation is in many respects similar. It is necessary to put more and more effort and resources in here to support the new structures that are coming into being. And they are continually malfunctioning. I have repeatedly had to point out that the West's wait-and-see approach will result in it itself being placed in a difficult position if social upheavals occur in the USSR.

I have to talk about one more very serious factor. Separatist forces in our country are trying to hinder the formation of USSR cooperation with the West. They try to make the West face a choice: With whom does it side? With the harassed minorities and republics or the ruthless center, which "oppresses everyone?" The press and various international conferences and symposiums are used for such activity, where "advice" on cooperation is handed out undreamed of by even the most vehement enemy of the USSR in the West. Particularly as the separatists come up against opponents extremely rarely. And that is a pity! I think that our esteemed economic managers, occupied as a rule with pressing domestic affairs, should not ignore the international rostrum but should cogently expound their views on the mechanism of union-republic economic collaboration.

Recently the dispute between the center and the republics on the specific routes, scale, and pace of market transformations has been augmented by rivalry, including public rivalry, for the right to receive Western aid and investments. It is no wonder that our Western partners have been prey to even greater concern. The business world is resolutely against participation in radical political experiments. It is interested in precise order and the steady functioning of an economic mechanism, and the more chaotic the situation in our country, the more cautious respectable partners become.

[Shashkov] Clearly it is no coincidence either that the people looking toward us now are to a large extent the representatives of speculative capital, who have nothing special to lose. And consequently deals like the "transfer" of R140 billion become possible. Does it not seem to you that some of the blame for this also lies with the departments responsible for our state's international ties? If only for the fact that they are not always generous with the information at their disposal?

[Obminskiy] Western private businessmen are received virtually with open arms in our country. People have faith in them because they produce the goods, they get things done, they change things, but all this within the rules. As far as our businessmen are concerned, the man in the street most often says: They still haven't brought the country prosperity yet, but their sharp practice has already been repeatedly noted. Moreover, they are also involving individual representatives of Western business circles in this. Soviet businessmen in our country must meanwhile be extremely scrupulous in respect of the moral aspect of their conduct. I am not trying to exonerate anyone, but I do think that respectable partners of ours would not have embarked upon transactions such as the "R140 billion deal." But, of course, there are enough people in the West not averse to fishing in troubled waters and exploiting the confusion caused by the "parade of sovereignties." Moreover, the temptation is considerable when the representatives of particular power structures act as sponsors of speculative financial deals. In my view,, it is the latter who should be held to strict account rather than those beyond our jurisdiction.

We work badly with Soviet private businessmen, and that is the main defect of our foreign economic structures. Businessmen taking their first steps are constantly dismissed as tiresome irritations. And yet the majority of them are honest entrepreneurs and managers who suffer from unscrupulous colleagues who think about just one thing—grabbing a million and then "lying low." So perhaps an initial stocktaking of private enterprise is necessary to check who's who. It is essential to deliver honest businessmen and upright entrepreneurs from this scum. But enforcement organs cannot be engaged in this all the time. The main burden should rest with associations of businessmen themselves and corresponding financial control bodies. We will thereby support the healthy kernel of Soviet enterprise.

[Shashkov] What role should the USSR Foreign Ministry play in this?

[Obminskiy] Our functions exist on very many planes. I will not even list all the areas of our work connected, for example, with our entry to the GATT, the IMF, the World Bank, and so forth. The USSR Foreign Ministry's activity in the foreign economic sphere is geared toward easing the trade and economic conditions for Soviet economic organizations' participation in this process and at creating a free economic space and equal terms for all. To this end we are actively working with Western foreign policy departments. The USSR Foreign Ministry is sponsoring the largest economic agreements between the Soviet Union and foreign countries. For example, together with the U.S. State Department, we concluded a whole package of recent economic accords, ranging from a trade agreement to agreements on civil aviation and shipping. I could cite many other examples.

[Shashkov] Do you not think that our partners in the West, by reacting inappropriately to certain internal events in the USSR, essentially sometimes reverse our burgeoning cooperation virtually to those infamous times when a "stick and carrot policy" was used vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

[Obminskiy] Unfortunately, I do. I will quote a specific example. It was recently announced that the Common Market would allocate the USSR 400 million ECUs in consultation aid for 1991. That is roughly $500 million. The whole sum was to be spent on creating market structures in the Soviet Union. A good thing. We do not want our people to be the odd ones out in business. The creation of market structures, exchanges, and auctions of various associations, furnishing them with modern equipment, and the skill to use it—it is impossible to get into the world market without all this. But after the events in the Baltic, the Common Market made a decision to delay the allocation of resources until the situation clarifies. It stopped the talks which were already far advanced on this question.

I have had to meet with Common Market representatives to explain the true state of affairs and to tell them that linking economic cooperation with transient political events is a myopic policy, since it is ultimately prejudicial to those in favor of establishing a market economy in the USSR. Talks have now been resumed again with the EEC and the situation seems to be clearing up. Moreover, I would like to inform PRAVDA readers that the EC opened an office in Moscow in mid-February. But the city authorities could not find suitable premises even for such a high-powered organization, and hotel rooms currently serve as its office.

Although I represent a political department, the main task of the USSR Foreign Ministry today is not to put politics into the economy, but, on the contrary, to do everything to ensure that current political considerations do not hinder the strategic line of developing international coperation, including economic cooperation.

'The War Which Might Not Have Been'

Part I

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[First part of article by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov under "Persian Gulf" rubric; first three paragraphs are PRAVDA introduction: "The War Which Might Not Have Been"]

[Text] Iraq committed aggression against Kuwait 2 August 1990. The world community condemned the invasion. After the expiry of the UN Security Council deadline for the Iraqi troops' withdrawal from the territory they had occupied, methods of influencing Baghdad involving the use of force were set in motion 17 January this year. A sea of fire from missiles fired by U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf and aviation belonging to the United States and their its in the multinational coalition rained down on Iraq and the Iraqi troops in Kuwait. A large-scale ground operation against Iraq began in the night of 24 February.

At all stages the Soviet Union did everything it could to prevent the escalation of the crisis and to make Iraq withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait by political means—as the UN Security Council decisions demanded. Of course, the Iraqi leadership bears the main, fundamental blame for what happened in the Persian Gulf zone. But triumphal military marches played in a number of Western capitals drowned out the calls to utilize the available opportunities to find a peaceful solution in this, let us be blunt, difficult situation.

We are beginning publication of parts of Academician Ye.M. Primakov's manuscript.

Iraqi troops invaded Kuwaiti territory 2 August 1990. A few days later this small UN member state was first annexed and then proclaimed the 19th province of Iraq. The overwhelming majority of the world community was unanimous in demanding the interventionists' unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of its sovereignty. The relevant UN Security Council resolutions were adopted "without demur," without the protracted agreements and diplomatic convulsions customary in such instances—even such extraordinary decisions, moreover, as the introduction of the most stringent economic sanctions against Iraq.

However, the Security Council line, hardening with each resolution, failed to produce the anticipated results. On the contrary, Iraq's illegal actions escalated. Saddam Husayn's psychological peculiarities most probably made their mark. Maybe he thought—and I am not ruling this out—that he still had a lot of time left to maneuver and that he should begin with the toughest stance.

There Was an Alternative

Parallel with the work of the Security Council there took place the massive redeployment of troops from the United States and certain other countries—Arab countries, included—to Saudi Arabia, which, fearing that it would be the next victim of Iraqi armed actions, had asked for Washington's help.

The tough economic sanctions and the military demonstration on such a scale—paradoxical as this may sound—left "scope" for seeking a peaceful way out of the deadlock to which Saddam Husayn had reduced the situation. First of all the Arabs took the political center stage—that was natural since the conflict initially concerned two Arab states and the Arab world was split, which was perceived pathologically, or maybe even tragically, from the viewpoint of the perennial confrontation with Israel. High-ranking representatives of North African countries and Jordan and PLO leaders were frequent visitors to Baghdad.

The stage of "Arab mediatory activity" can be reduced to a desire to find an "Arab" solution. One method might be a call to "link" the Iraqi troops' withdrawal from Kuwait with steps toward a political solution to the Palestinian problem. In its most rigid form—once again the psychological peculiarity characteristic of Saddam Husayn—this idea resounded in his 12 August speech. He spoke of his readiness to discuss all problems straightaway, simultaneously—both the "Kuwaiti" problem and the problem of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories and of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

The proposal was calculated to produce an internally targeted political propaganda impact—within the Arab world sympathies for Iraq, which was seen as the "only real fighter for the resolution of the Palestinian problem," increased. I must be blunt and say that among the Arab masses the occupation of Kuwait could be seen as a justifiable price to pay for resolving the Palestinian problem.

However, there was virtually no chance of Saddam Husayn's "formula" being accepted in its initial form. Approval of this proposal might mean rewarding and ultimately encouraging aggression. The world had already retreated from the "cold war." At the same time memories of the "hot" war—World War II, the road to which was paved by "appeasement" of the aggressor in Munich—were still fresh in people's minds.

Husayn's 12 August proposals were rejected by the overwhelming majority of the world community. But the dual question remained open: Why not try all the same to exploit the Arabs' acute interest in resolving the Palestinian problem to make Iraq leave Kuwait? Why at the same time not gamble on exploiting a political settlement of the crisis that had arisen over Kuwait as an impetus to progress in resolving another highly important problem with respect to the security of the region—the Arab-Israeli problem?

M.S. Gorbachev returned to this subject several times in August during conversations with his advisers while formulating a version of Soviet political actions geared to the peaceful settlement of the situation around the Kuwait crisis. It was then that the idea first arose of sending the USSR president's personal representative to Baghdad to talk to Saddam Husayn. This idea was not put into effect straightaway, another channel was activated—Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz was received in Moscow at Saddam Husayn's request. However, the shortcomings of this means of dealing with Iraq made themselves apparent at once. Like the other members of Saddam Husayn's entourage, Tariq 'Aziz was unable to make decisions independently. He was only the "interpreter" of the Iraqi position, and only within a strictly defined framework at that—he was effectively a "courier" conveying messages.

Meeting in Helsinki

A Soviet-U.S. "summit" meeting took place 9 September in Helsinki. It was initiated by U.S. President G. Bush.

At that moment—and I must say this most definitely—the opinion prevailed in Moscow that it would not come to war, that the employment of the entire arsenal of political and economic means and the military shows of force would produce the desired result. Moscow was also perfectly well aware of something else. Following the end of the "cold war" there had begun to be laid the foundation of a just world order precluding military diktat, aggression, and interference in other states' internal affairs. Of course, as yet one can only speak of a tendency that is carving its way with difficulty through the debris left by the accretions of the period of rigid confrontation, the ideologization of interstate relations, and the "export" of revolution and counterrevolution. But the new political thinking which the Soviet Union offered the world after April 1985 and the subsequent development of events on the international arena reinforced the conviction that the idea of a just world order is a feasible objective.

President Gorbachev came to Helsinki with these "strategic" ideas. During a conversation with his advisers that lasted long after midnight on the eve of his meeting with Bush attention was once again drawn to the question of whether the resolution of the Palestinian problem should not be stepped up now in order to force Iraq to leave Kuwait by political means. In other words, while stipulating Iraq's unconditional withdrawal, at the same time to say definitely that this would open up a vigorous quest for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. There was thus no question of accepting Saddam Husayn's clearly unacceptable 12 August "package." After all, had the United States agreed to our formulation of the question, Saddam Husayn would have assumed the grave responsibility of blocking the Palestinian problem with his refusal to withdraw his troops from Kuwait.

M.S. Gorbachev included this issue in his conversation with Bush. It was also reflected in the Soviet-U.S. joint statement, which said that there must be vigorous efforts to settle the conflicts in the region. Specifics may have been lacking here—the United States went no further than a vague formula. However, I believe that it did open up considerable opportunities for political activity.

During Gorbachev's conversation with Bush stress was laid on avoiding a military clash in the Persian Gulf zone. This possibility could not be totally ruled out. In the final analysis an extraordinary amount—everything even, some people believed—depended on Saddam Husayn. But from the very outset we were aware of the possible "cost" in the event of military operations.

The USSR president was accompanied to Helsinki by his adviser—Marshal of the Soviet Union S.F. Akhromeyev. A most prestigious military specialist, he told Americans in Bush's entourage that a military outcome in the region would bring tremendous devastation and human casualties; that it would not prove possible to end the war with a one-shot air attack to fully disable Iraqi control centers; and that losses in the event of a clash between the two sides' ground forces were inevitable.

Giving his impressions of his conversation with Bush, President Gorbachev stressed that he considers one of the main conclusions from the meeting to be the U.S. President's inclination at that moment to resolve the Kuwaiti problem by political means. In an effort to fortify Bush in this position Gorbachev told him that the redeployment of troops to the Persian Gulf zone and the active policy in the UN Security Council had already resolved a whole series of strategic tasks: Iraqi armed operations had not spread to other countries of the Arabian peninsula; the oil crisis which threatened the world economy after both Kuwait and Iraq, through force of circumstances, had ceased oil exports had been averted; the line against aggression had won most extensive international support, including at state level. After all this additional political efforts were now needed.

Here is another conclusion drawn from the conversations in Helsinki. The United States expected strict compliance with the UN Security Council decisions on economic sanctions against Iraq to produce speedy results and compel Saddam Husayn to leave Kuwait. The Soviet Union confirmed its commitment to abide by these decisions.

During the talks there also arose the question of the duration of the U.S. troops' stay in the Persian Gulf zone. During a joint news conference this problem was touched on once again. Bush stressed the temporary nature of their stay in this region.

A dinner took place following the talks involving members of the two delegations and the one-on-one conversation between the USSR and U.S. presidents. At the table I sat between Mrs. B. Bush and General B. Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser. Doubtless knowing that I had specialized on the Near East for many years and am personally acquainted with the leaders of many Arab states, Scowcroft asked me

when I had last met Saddam Husayn. I thought the general wanted to know whether I had visited Baghdad since the start of the current crisis. "No, I haven't been there yet," I replied.

A Little Bit of History

My long-standing acquaintance with Saddam Husayn was no secret.

As PRAVDA's Near East correspondent in the sixties I wrote about my trips to northern Iraq and my meetings and conversations with Mustafa al-Barzani, the well-known leader of the Kurdish insurgents. His relations with our country went back a long way. After World War II and the defeat of the Mahabad Kurdish republic on Iranian territory al-Barzani emigrated to the USSR and lived here for 12 years. He returned to Iraq after the 1958 revolution which overthrew the monarchy and Britain's protege—Nuri al-Sa'id. At one time he was 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim's vice premier, but then circumstances took shape in such a way that he left for the north and raised the Kurdish tribes against Baghdad.

The Soviet Union was interested in peace and in stabilizing the situation in Iraq. We began to construct ramified relations with Baghdad and had good ties with the Kurds, too.

I first met Saddam Husayn in 1969. He was not yet president but was already one of the most influential members of the Iraqi leadership. Something of particular importance for me, involved as I was in the efforts to bring the sides to the negotiating table, was the fact that Saddam Husayn "was responsible" for the Kurdish problem and played a key role on the Baghdad side in the settlement process with the Kurds. Also at that time I became quite closely acquainted with Tariq 'Aziz, who was chief editor of AL-THAWRAH.

It was an unsettled time. The wing of the Ba'ath Party of which Saddam and Tariq were members had just come to power. Submachineguns stood in the corner of both their offices. At that stage I was struck by many features of Saddam Husayn's character which were preserved and even subsequently developed when he led Iraq—a hardness which frequently develops into brutality, a will verging on willful obstinacy, a readiness to attain his objective at any price and regardless of obstacles, and all this combined with dangerous unpredictability.

I will cite two different episodes. At the beginning of 1970 a negotiating mechanism with the Kurds had already been set up. The moment came when a peace agreement could have become a practical possibility. Suddenly Saddam said: I cannot sign, are there any guarantees that the Kurds won't begin a war again?

"There are no such guarantees," I replied. "But if the Kurds violate the agreement while Baghdad complies with its conditions, they will begin a war without any support from the Soviet Union and many other peace-loving forces. Does that really mean nothing to you?"

After pausing for thought, Saddam accepted these arguments.

The agreement was signed 11 March 1970. But the tension persisted, gradually becoming a rigid confrontation which in 1974 ultimately evolved once again into a war begun by the Kurds.

Here is another episode. When the situation in northern Iraq had deteriorated yet again I again met with Mustafa al-Barzani in my capacity of deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations. He told me about an attempt on his life. Shaykhs were visiting him. One had an explosive device planted on him. A driver, who was outside the house, detonated the device by remote control. Al-Barzani only escaped injury because at the moment of the explosion someone was bending over him offering him tea. This was Saddam's doing, al-Barzani said with conviction.

I met Saddam many times in the 1970's and 1980's during his trips to Moscow and my assignments to Baghdad. I believed that we had the kind of relationship where I could talk to him frankly, without the diplomatic niceties, and with consideration for his psychological peculiarities. (I want to point out that, when dealing with Arabs and with oriental politicians in general you must not in any circumstances abstract yourself from their psychology, particularly such traits as their heightened sensitivity as regards loss of honor or dignity).

My relationship with Saddam Husayn was obviously taken into consideration when President Gorbachev instructed me and I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to leave for Baghdad.

En Route to Iraq

We were faced with two tasks: first, to reach agreement on the unhindered departure from Iraq of those of our specialists who had expressed a desire to do so, and, second, to show Saddam Husayn during our talks with him that it is totally futile to refuse to obey the UN Security Council demands, and at the same time to try to reveal opportunities to secure the Iraqi forces' withdrawal from Kuwait by political means. We were accompanied to Baghdad by R.V. Markaryan, assistant member of the Presidential Council, and adviser V.I. Artemov (they both accompanied me on all my subsequent trips), along with V.I. Kolotusha and S.V. Kirpichenko from the Foreign Ministry and V.F. Mordvinov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations.

Our aircraft first landed at Amman Airport. This was not a technical landing. The day preceding our flight to Baghdad was set aside for an exchange of opinions with King Husayn and other Jordanian leaders, along with PLO leaders, headed by Yasir 'Arafat, who, having learned earlier that we would be in Amman, had arrived there from Tunis. Both the king of Jordan and the Palestinians in particular supported Saddam Husayn's stance and considered themselves his allies. The attempt

to use first of all those who supported him to urge Iraq onto the path of a political settlement made sense. The idea was that this was to facilitate our discussion with Saddam.

I must say that the Jordanian leaders were clearly aware of the highly dangerous turn that events might take, but they felt as it were powerless to escape the current which was carrying them unchecked toward a most dangerous whirlpool. At any rate it was quite clear that King Husayn was prepared to do everything in his power to promote albeit minimal political flexibility in the Iraqi leader. (Jordan is a country a considerable proportion of whose population are Palestinians; it borders on Israel and has fought the latter twice in the last 45 years; and, last, its economy is closely linked with Iraq's).

King Husayn greeted the incipient Soviet mission in an unequivocally positive manner and promised to bolster our steps with parallel efforts both on his own part and in conjunction with other Arab countries with whom he was in constant contact.

Our meeting with the Palestinians was by its very nature somewhat different. As usual it began with rhetoric, which in general was psychologically explicable: More than anyone else the Palestinians would like to ensure that double logic—one logic for Kuwait, another for them—does not prevail in the Near East. But the discussion soon took a different track. Not only 'Arafat but also many other sufficiently mature, restrained Palestinian leaders such as Abu-Iyad (who died at the hand of a hired assassin a few days before the war in the Persian Gulf began), Abu-Mazin, and 'Abd-Rabbuh displayed undisguised concern at a military end to the Kuwaiti crisis. Things ended with 'Arafat ordering his aircraft to be made ready for takeoff in order to enable him to arrive in Baghdad before us and, as he said, "do everything to ensure" that our meeting with Saddam Husayn was "productive." I have no doubt that he did exactly what he said. 'Arafat tried to the extent of—I must be frank—his limited capabilities in the case in question to influence Saddam Husayn to adopt a constructive stance.

In Baghdad

We arrived in Baghdad from Amman 4 October. We were met at the airfield by Tariq 'Aziz. He asked whether I wanted to talk to him first or to Saddam Husayn straightaway. I said that I would like to exchange opinions with him first.

I will not relate our entire conversation, which lasted several hours—it was manifestly the most difficult of all the conversations I have had with Tariq 'Aziz, and with Iraqi representatives in general. My interlocutor concentrated completely (as he had, strictly speaking, a month before in Moscow) on demonstrating "that Kuwait belonged historically, politically, and economically to Iraq." He cited dates, figures, events, and people. He presented a one-sided view of history in order to show that the Iraqi troops' entry into Kuwait was lawful and valid.

The theme of displeasure and dissatisfaction with the Soviet stance and the policy pursued by the Soviet Union, which "should have behaved differently, since it has an appropriate treaty with Iraq," was voiced sharply during Tariq 'Aziz's monologue. But Tariq avoided answering when asked the following question: Why did the other contracting party not at least inform Moscow when planning and then implementing its intervention in Kuwait?

I recalled Tariq 'Aziz arriving in Moscow—where I had a meeting with him—in September 1980 on the third day following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war. Then too he assured me that even if Iraq had been the first to open fire, it was supposedly a preventive measure, a means of "self-defense" given that Iran had fully completed its preparations for war. Then too I asked Tariq 'Aziz: "Why did the Iraqi leadership, since it has a treaty with the USSR, not consult us beforehand?"

On the very first day and at our first meeting with Tariq 'Aziz both Igor Sergeyevich Belousov and myself spoke very bluntly of the need to give all Soviet citizens—who so desire—the chance to leave Iraq and return home. At that time roughly 5,000 Soviet specialists were working throughout Iraqi territory. Some had their wives with them, although the majority of the members of their families had already been taken back to the Union.

Also in Iraq were something in the region of 150 Soviet military specialists who had gone there before the start of the Kuwaiti crisis to repair military hardware sold by us. The question of our military specialists in Iraq has been intensively inflated in the West. Some have been described as "military advisers" and "combat operations developers." This problem was also raised in Helsinki during the meeting of the USSR and U.S. presidents, but Bush and his colleagues were satisfied with our explanations from which it was clear that the Soviet military specialists had arrived in the country long before the Soviet Union voted in favor of the UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against Iraq and decided on a complete halt to shipments of military hardware and spare parts to Iraq. The Soviet military specialists' stay there was limited to the duration of their contract. Specialists from certain other countries were in a similar position.

By the time we arrived in Baghdad there had been plenty of unsuccessful demarches to secure the withdrawal from Iraq not only of military specialists whose contracts were coming to an end but also of all other USSR citizens working here on the construction of various installations with our technical assistance. The Iraqi side did not refuse outright, but it also failed to resolve the question. Matters reached the point where several scheduled Aeroflot flights to Baghdad were canceled since they would be returning empty to Moscow.

By this time Iraq had already thrown down the gauntlet to all and sundry by detaining a large group of foreigners—Americans, Europeans, Japanese—and placing

them deliberately and demonstratively at strategic installations which might come under attack in the event of war. President Gorbachev tasked us with raising without fail this question of the "human shield."

Every opportunity must be utilized to shift Baghdad from its inhuman and utterly irrational position. Any progress in this direction, the USSR president said, will undoubtedly ease the quest for a political settlement.

Straight Talking

My talk with Saddam Husayn took place 5 October. V.V. Posuvalyuk, USSR ambassador to Iraq, was also present on our side, with, on the Iraqi side, Tariq 'Aziz and Taha Yasin Ramadan, the first deputy prime minister. The talk took place in the presidential palace, where Saddam Husayn usually met with foreigners. One of the Iraqis stressed that we were the first since 2 August to be received by him in the accustomed place.

Absorbed in reading the message that was handed to him from President Gorbachev (it had been translated into Arabic beforehand at the USSR Foreign Ministry), Saddam Husayn did not react directly to the rather tough phrases on the need for immediate withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of that state's sovereignty. At the beginning of the talk, the atmosphere was strained.

When Saddam Husayn had repeated everything about Kuwait that we had heard before from Tariq 'Aziz, Igor Sergeyevich and I raised in urgent terms the question of our specialists. You could tell that he was ready for this, and immediately responded unequivocally: Everyone who wants to can leave, but in the next two months Iraq will restrict the numbers to 1,000, so as not to hamper the work and stop the projects.

"We can't agree to that," I.S. Belousov said quietly.

Knowing that our embassy had received roughly 1,500 applications for exit permits, I proposed that a timetable be drawn up for 1,500 specialists to leave in the course of one month. Have it your way, S. Husayn said in the end.

The mechanism, however, got moving only haltingly—whether the Iraqi president's subordinates wanted to be "more royalist than the king," or whether some kind of game was being played, with Husayn himself taking part. I.S. Belousov met with the Iraqi minister of oil (the majority of our specialists who had applied to leave were in the south of the country—at the oil fields or building the gas pipeline), but he claimed not to be in the know about the accord that had been reached, and proposed that the timetable and numbers of those leaving be determined on the basis of "economic expediency for Iraq." Clearly this would again have frozen the exit process.

And later, when we were back at the embassy, a worrying call came in from I.S. Belousov, who had met with Tariq 'Aziz on the same issue. The latter asserted that the president had in the end returned to the "quota"—1,000 people over two months. I had to talk with Tariq 'Aziz by phone. Obviously sensing our uncompromising determination, he said he would "check with his tapes of the talk with the president." Confirmation came 10-15 minutes later: 1,500 people within a month.

But let us return to the talk with Saddam Husayn. Having gotten through the "official" phase of the conversation, on the subject of how Kuwait belongs to Iraq, he moved on to other topics. According to him, as soon as Iraq had secured military success over Iran, it became the target of a "multilateral conspiracy"—neither the United States nor Israel, of course, could "tolerate the existence of an Iraq that had flexed its military muscles." This "conspiracy," Husayn said, also involved Saudi Arabia and certain emirates in the Persian Gulf zone.

According to him, economic levers were also brought into play. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates violated the oil export quotas set by OPEC for each country, and consequently prices fell from $21 to $11 a barrel, which "heralded economic collapse for Iraq."

I do not want to go into the nature of the accusations he made—some of them were true, some, of course, were invented, the fruit of an imagination overheated by suspicion. But I can tell you that, in my assessment, he really did believe it.

"Don't you think you've developed a Masada complex, like the Israelis?" I asked Saddam. (Footnote) (Masada was the name of the last fortress held in the [first century] Jewish Wars. Its defenders, realizing the hopelessness of their position, declared their readiness to die rather than surrender.) He nodded affirmatively.

"But in that case your actions will largely be determined by the logic of the doomed?"

It seemed to me that Saddam agreed with that too—at least, he said nothing in reply.

We moved on to a discussion of the possible consequences of refusal to withdraw Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the world reaction to the Kuwait crisis. I particularly wanted to raise these two topics because I realized that Saddam might not be in possession of all the information. Undoubtedly they reported to him primarily the things that would prompt positive feelings: for instance, support for Iraq in the Arab world, antiwar demonstrations in the West, the first "stirrings" of differences between the allies in the anti-Iraq coalition. But as for bad news—well, that might have to be paid for...

Saddam heard our opinion on the nature of the war that lay in store for him if he would not leave Kuwait. It is common knowledge that during the hostilities with Iran, Iraq had air supremacy and considerable technical superiority on land. Now, in the event of a clash with an international coalition whose chief nucleus consists of the U.S. armed forces, the situation would be reversed. The coalition's superiority in the air was quite obvious,

and so was its overall military-technical advantage over Iraq. Of course, in this respect the exposition given by I.S. Belousov, a major specialist in the sphere of military hardware, was of particular significance.

Saddam was also told how far the intervention in Kuwait had isolated Iraq in the world community. Sufficient evidence of this was provided merely by the general atmosphere at the UN General Assembly session, which was in session at that time.

I asked Husayn if we could hold the remaining part of the talk one on one. Saddam asked if I would mind if Tariq 'Aziz stayed, on the Iraqi side. On our side, there was S.V. Kirpichenko, who has an excellent knowledge of Arabic and is generally one of the best of the younger generation of Arabists. He interpreted the conversation.

"Unless you withdraw your troops from Kuwait,"—that was my first phrase—"you will inevitably be the target of a strike. You realize, of course, that the purpose of my visit is not intimidation. But there is certainly no way out of the situation except to evacuate the Iraqi troops."

Saddam Husayn's reaction was, I felt, twofold. He said that if there is a military denouement he will use all the means at his disposal, and will certainly extend the war to other countries, particularly Israel. "If I face only that dilemma—to go on my knees and capitulate, or to fight—I will choose the latter."

At the same time Husayn observed (and here I want to convey what was said with almost stenographic accuracy): "As a realist I can imagine that in certain circumstances it would be possible to agree to withdraw the troops. But I cannot do this unless this departure is conditional on the resolution of the region's other problems. I have already put forward this idea, on 12 August."

Saddam also touched on the topic of withdrawing the troops from Kuwait indirectly, as if he was talking about something else. You understand, he said, that after I renounced, on 15 August, all the results of the eight-year war with Iran and restored the situation to what it was before the war started, the Iraqi people will not forgive me if I withdraw the troops from Kuwait unconditionally. "What about the access to the sea?", they will ask me.

"If the Iraqi people accepted unconditionally that you simply gave up all the results of the bloody war with Iran, they will agree to your decisions on Kuwait too," I countered.

I also told Saddam Husayn frankly that the so-called "human shield" of foreign hostages forcibly held by him at military and other strategic targets would not avert a U.S. strike in the event of refusal to withdraw the troops from Kuwait. By these actions he had finally turned the entire world against him. Saddam said nothing, but started thinking...

In October a "liberalization" of the policy with regard to certain groups of foreign hostages began. This subject was clearly outlined during our 28 October meeting. And in November and early December he allowed all foreigners to leave the territory of Iraq and Kuwait without hindrance.

That night, in the Soviet ambassador's office, we exchanged opinions on the subject of the cable that had to be sent to Moscow concerning the outcome of the discussion in Baghdad. First and foremost we were glad that the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists had been resolved. By that time a timetable for the next month had already been agreed at working level, allowing for additional Aeroflot flights to Baghdad, and events showed that the Iraqis observed this timetable strictly.

Everyone was unanimous that glimmers of hope for a political solution could be seen. In the morning I drove to the airport with Tariq 'Aziz in his car. He told me: Saddam is counting on concrete proposals. We await continued contacts.

"Tariq, would you repeat all that to our ambassador at the airport?" I asked.

"Why?"

"Because after all, we are flying, your statement is important, it would be best to duplicate it in an encrypted cable to Moscow. That would be safer."

Tariq agreed, and carried out my request.

Part II

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[Second part of article by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov: "The War Which Might Not Have Been"]

[Text] Having returned to Moscow in the evening of Saturday, 6 October, on Sunday I reported in detail to President M.S. Gorbachev on the meetings in Baghdad. Before this the president had familiarized himself with all the information coming to us from Baghdad. He said that in general he agreed with the assessments of the situation and gave instructions to prepare proposals pertaining to the continuation of the mission. M.S. Gorbachev thought that the proposals should first be discussed with U.S. President G. Bush and definitely with Presidents F. Mitterrand of France, H. Mubarak of Egypt, H. al-Asad of Syria, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and then there should be another meeting with Saddam Husayn. When discussed in a larger group this idea was supported by N.I. Ryzhkov and V.A. Kryuchkov. E.A. Shevardnadze and I were instructed to prepare the proposals.

A couple of words about the proposed approach and, if one may put it this way, the philosophy of reaching a

settlement. Having been approved by President Gorbachev, all the heads of state had already been informed of it and it was possible to meet with them within a few days. The discussion was about making sure—in the face of all the difficulties—that the Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait and at the same time it was about avoiding a military outcome. That is, in no case should the aggressor be "rewarded." This was quite obvious. But the "non-reward" could be ensured in two ways: by a military rout, which in any event would mean a blow to the people, or by political means, forcing the aggressor to leave Kuwait without applying force.

The Soviet Union firmly adhered to the course of using all political means.

In broad outlines, the proposed approach consisted of ensuring the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait by political means, having informed Husayn that after these and not "linked" to them—I wish to emphasize this aspect especially—there would follow certain actions intended to contribute to resolving the disputes and to stabilizing the situation throughout the Near East.

Taking into account, on the one hand, the apprehensions of Iraq's neighbors (which were not without grounds since his aggressive behavior in past years depended on his rapidly increasing military potential) and, on the other hand, the misgivings of Saddam himself, who was sure that he would remain a "target" even if his troops withdrew from Kuwait, it was necessary to think seriously about a system of strategic security in the region.

It was quite clear that one of the main elements in this security system should be settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is what Husayn was trying to play upon when he linked the withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait to this problem. Such a linkage was quite unacceptable. But without a general Near East settlement it was impossible even to establish borders between the countries of the region, not to mention guarantee them, or to create even elementary conditions for the safe existence of the states and peoples located there. A consideration of the Arab-Israeli conflict within the framework of a regional security system would undoubtedly have had its advantages because of increasing the interest of all parties in resolving the problem, including Israeli public opinion.

When I was preparing to leave Moscow for Paris, a telegram arrived from our ambassador in Rome, A.L. Adamishin, which said that Prime Minister G. Andreotti, who was also chairman of the European Community, wanted to meet with me in Rome. A number of ambassadors accredited in Moscow had requested meetings.

The efforts of the Soviet Union were broadly publicized in the Western press. On the whole the responses were positive, although sometimes one could sense a certain nervousness, obviously caused by fears that Saddam Husayn would receive a "false signal" either of "insufficient firmness" or "the existence of a split" in the coalition that had been formed against him. This idea could also be perceived in the commentaries: The Soviet Union might be playing some kind of "game" behind the United States' back. I wish to fully dispel such suspicions at the outset.

Nor did our press pass up the chance for multifarious reaction, to put it mildly. To a certain extent this was a reflection of society's views on the situation in the crisis zone. I cannot rule out the possibility that there were subjective motives in some of these responses. And certain of them, for example, the statement of the APN [NOVOSTI Press Agency], which I will discuss in greater detail, could be called, at best, an all-out drive for sensationalism. The former NOVOSTI Press Agency released to the whole world a report, referring to "individuals accompanying the president's representatives on his trip," that Saddam Husayn had suggested keeping two Kuwaiti islands and the al-Rumaylah oil fields, maintaining his armed forces there. It is quite clear how Kuwait reacted to this. There was also an extremely negative reaction from Baghdad which, for quite understandable reasons, would not be conducive to fruitful contacts with Iraqi leaders. I was forced to invite the Iraqi ambassador to come and see me and to ask him to convey to Baghdad that neither I nor anyone "around" me had anything to do with the disinformation and, moreover, that we were disturbed about its appearance. There was a positive reaction to this maneuver and all discussions in Baghdad generated by the APN report came to a halt.

The situation is much more complicated with respect to another kind of publication which deliberately asserted that the mission in Baghdad had "failed" and that the situation with respect to the departure of our specialists had been falsified. This commentary was published in IZVESTIYA. As the newspaper's editor in chief told me, the article had escaped his attention. In one way or another, the semi-official organ (which is precisely what IZVESTIYA is) commented on the results of the trip by representative of the USSR president without trying to find out about the conclusions and impressions from the primary source, as they say. Instead, they referred to Western press organs and then only to show that we should not even try to call things by their real names and settle the conflict by political means.

The commentary I mentioned pertained to me but to some extent it reflected a certain line in the coverage of the crisis in the Persian Gulf region. On the pages of IZVESTIYA later, after the war had started, there was a piece of correspondence which asserted: If the Soviet Union does not participate in the "victorious coalition" against Iraq, it will in general forfeit the right to participate in the political processes of settlement. In this connection I must say quite definitely: The question of sending our troops to the Persian Gulf region was not only never resolved; it was never even on the president's agenda. And a couple of days later another issue of IZVESTIYA said that President Bush, who could not wait another half year to see if a military victory would be achieved over Iraq, would have no other option than

to apply nuclear weapons. One is surprised at how easily, even recklessly, certain of our newspapers write about things affecting the lives of thousands and thousands of people. Not to mention their thoughtless attitude toward our country's foreign political interests.

Of course, when mentioning the tendencies of certain articles I by no means have in mind the entire collective of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, whom I definitely respect deeply. Incidentally, it has published and is publishing excellent articles on this problem as well—by Stanislav Kondrashov, Konstantin Geyvandov, Vitaliy Kobysh, and others. They are also distinguished by the profundity of their analysis and the responsibility of their assessments...

In West Europe

On 16 October we flew to Rome. We went straight from the airport to a meeting with Prime Minister Andreotti. Interested in the details of the discussion with Saddam Husayn, Andreotti supported the settlement ideas presented to him. One had the feeling that Italy was very disturbed about the possibility of a military solution, especially given the prospects for aggravation of the situation both in North Africa and in the Mediterranean regions as a whole, that is, the area where Italy has special interests.

And, the main thing, the prime minister of Italy thought that even before the political possibilities were exhausted, "objective circumstances" could push the United States and others to begin armed activities. Among these circumstances he included weather conditions (in March there are sandstorms in the Arabian desert which make military operations difficult), and the season of pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina which begins in June: Each year up to approximately 1.5 million Muslims from various countries make a hadj there. According to Andreotti's predictions, the war could have become a reality in the near future.

"If Washington accepts the approaches to political settlement which you have proposed," Andreotti concluded simply, "we will undoubtedly support them."

One had the feeling that they regarded more active USSR involvement as one of several feasible alternatives to slipping into the abyss of war, whose depths he understood clearly.

Our ambassador in Rome, with whom I have been friends for a long time, said that Minister of Foreign Affairs De Michelis had asked that we come to his residence late in the evening in order to discuss the situation in the Persian Gulf "in a very small group." De Michelis concentrated attention on the "post-crisis" period, emphasizing the need to create a system of strategic security in the region "following the Helsinki type of agreement."

Italy had put this idea forth long ago. It contains much that is interesting but, naturally, (and De Michelis would agree with this) there could be no talk of simply superimposing a "Helsinki matrix" on the Near East—the two regions were too different from one another. The main difference was that the Helsinki system fixed the postwar borders in Europe and guaranteed their inviolability while in the Near East the question of the inviolability of borders could not be raised until the borders were determined. The Arab-Israeli conflict is still the main obstacle here. But there are also border disputes among the states of the Arabian peninsula and in North Africa. Perhaps it is in more muffled form, but this problem exists in the eastern part of the Arab world as well.

But all this does not prevent us from taking advantage of the experience of the achievement of the Helsinki Agreement and certain of its elements in the Near East. We agreed with De Michelis to continue to exchange opinions on this problem.

On the morning of 17 October we flew from Rome to Paris. In the afternoon there was a meeting with French President Mitterrand. He too proved to be a supporter of the policy of utilizing all possibilities "before it was necessary to resort to extreme measures." But like Andreotti, the French president had no doubt that we were on the threshold of war. While supporting the efforts of the USSR to avoid the most dangerous military outcome, F. Mitterrand told about what France itself had been doing in this area. At the same time Mitterrand emphasized the great advantage to be derived from coordinating the lines of the two powers who are permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Perhaps more than any other Western leader, President Mitterrand felt the need to advance a solution to the Palestinian problem, including in order to settle the Kuwaiti crisis. He shared the opinion that this could be the "core" settlement but he expressed doubt about the notion that a change carried out in any form would find support in Washington. F. Mitterrand waited for his forthcoming meeting with M.S. Gorbachev in which, as he said, a great deal of time would be devoted to the discussion of the two countries' approaches to the crisis in the Persian Gulf region, which had "become the most serious test for the world community in the past decade."

Meetings in the United States

On 18 October, immediately upon arriving in Washington, meetings with U.S. leaders began. Jumping forward, I will say that there was clear interest in these meetings on the part of the Americans—some of them emphatically admitted that in the "bad old times" it would have been impossible to have such a frank exchange of opinions with Soviet representatives on one of the most earth-shaking problems, in whose solution the United States was involved in the most direct way. Our desire to share information and ideas about how to get out of the crisis situation was regarded—I have no doubt about this—as evidence of a high degree of confidence in Soviet-U.S. relations and a new spirit in international affairs.

The first meeting was with Secretary of State J. Baker. D. Ross, who is actually the head State Department specialist in the Near East, participated in it. Our ambassador in the United States, now Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, A.A. Bessmertnykh, participated actively in this and in all the other discussions in Washington.

It was felt that Baker did not attach special significance to this first meeting since he understood that the main discussion would be with President Bush. But D. Ross, in preparing for this main discussion, obviously had been given the task of clarifying the details of our position and to this end we went to the Soviet Embassy where we talked for several hours.

What struck me immediately? Interested in details, Ross—this was written on his face and reflected in his reactions—accepted my explanations in a restrained if not negative way. He clearly rejected the idea of letting it be known to Iraq that we were ready to work on Arab-Israeli relations in order to solve the Palestinian problem immediately after the withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

"Israel will not go for that," Ross declared unceremoniously.

Actually, little that was new was introduced at the next meeting with the assistant to the president for national security, General B. Scowcroft. Present at the meeting were: Scowcroft's deputy, R. Gates, and a special assistant to the President for questions of the Persian Gulf crisis, K. Rice (previously a brilliant graduate student at Princeton University, she was noticed and invited to work in the National Security Council where she dealt with questions of Soviet-U.S. relations).

Perhaps Rice, in any case this is the way it seemed to me from preceding conversations, understood that there was at least a "useful kernel" in the Soviet proposals. But at the meeting with Scowcroft she remained silent just as Gates did. And General Scowcroft was more interested in our view of the situation in Iraq than in our proposals for emerging from the crisis.

The meeting was enlivened by the unexpected arrival of the President who, running from his private residence through the pouring rain, had dropped in for a minute, soaking wet, in order to shake our hands. "I could not fail to stop by since I knew you were with Scowcroft," he said. One must admit right out that these human qualities of Bush's are very striking.

"I am impatiently awaiting our meeting tomorrow morning," we heard from President Bush.

On the morning of 19 October we were received in the White House by U.S. President G. Bush. Baker, Scowcroft, White House staff leader Sununu, and other close associates of the President were already there. The fact that M.S. Gorbachev had sent his personal representative to Washington to obtain information on the mission we were undertaking in the Near East was emphasized and valued highly by American President Bush, and he returned to this subject several times.

Vitally interested in our impressions from our discussion with Saddam Husayn, G.Bush questioned us: Can we really regard his words to the effect that he is a "realist" as a readiness to withdraw from Kuwait? He was interested in the psychological peculiarities of Saddam Husayn and the history of our relations with him, he asked questions for clarification, and he made notes on his pad. In general, one got the impression that G. Bush was still fluctuating as to whether or not to make the final decision to attack Iraq. He not only did not rule out but actually spoke in favor of our second meeting with Saddam Husayn, emphasizing its limited purpose: "to inform Husayn of the uncompromising position of the United States." But, and this is also typical, Bush immediately added: "If there is a positive signal from Husayn, we will listen to him."

"You have said much that is interesting," Bush said in conclusion. "On the whole a number of your ideas were new to me. But I must consult with my assistants. Do you intend to stay in Washington?"

I said that I was ready to do that if I needed to.

"I will give you an answer in two or three hours," Bush concluded, giving us a warm farewell.

The answer came sooner. It seems that immediately after our departure many of G. Bush's close assistants became much more active than they were during the conversation. Whatever happened, it did not take two or three hours. In 45 minutes, at a dinner arranged by J. Sununu, R. Gates told me: "The President asked me to tell you that you can leave whenever you want to." I understood that the conversation would not be continued.

His colleague from Saudi Arabia, Prince Bandar, called our ambassador and asked to meet with us. By that time our permanent representative to the United Nations, Yu.M. Vorontsov, had arrived in New York. I had been friends with him since we were in the same class at the naval preparatory institute. And, naturally, I was very glad to see him on a personal level. Participating in the conversation with Bandar were A.A. Bessmertnykh, Yu.M. Vorontsov, and myself. The meeting was very curious: It was as though we managed to look from the inside at one of the White House's significant sources of information about the development of the crisis in the gulf region.

Bandar categorically disagreed that the military option could lead to grave consequences. "Your words are clearly an exaggeration," he said. "I am a military pilot and I can say with authority that in the event of an attack if, of course, Iraq refuses to withdraw its troops, everything will be over in a couple of hours. Do not overestimate the possible number of casualties. The operation will be supported by the most modern electronic equipment and will be 'surgical in nature.'"

At that time I already knew, and at subsequent meetings with Prince Fahd and other Saudi leaders I became convinced, that far from all members of the ruling family were as categorical as Prince Bandar had been. But he was the ambassador to the United States...

True, Bandar did not reject a political solution and even said that only the USSR was "capable" of favorably influencing the Iraqi position.

Many of our American friends came to visit us in the embassy. Among them: Pamela Harriman—the widow of the outstanding political figure and a fairly outstanding figure in the social life of the United States. With her was Judith Kipper, a fellow at the well-known Brookings Institute who has an excellent understanding of the situation in the Near East. Meeting with them was also important because it reflected the attitude of a considerable part of the U.S. intelligentsia.

"The Soviet Union," said Harriman, "should by no means abandon its efforts to prevent a military outcome. It seems to us that some of the representatives of the U.S. 'establishment' are wearing blinders and cannot see where we might be led if we let things go."

After I had sent Moscow detailed information about the meeting with the U.S. officials, A.A. Bessmertnykh, Yu.M. Vorontsov, and I exchanged our general impressions. We came to the same conclusion: to continue Soviet-American interaction in order to achieve the main fundamental goal—Iraq's departure from Kuwait. And the USSR's efforts within the framework of the mission that was undertaken by no means contradicted that.

Literally a couple of hours were left before we were to depart for Moscow when we had to change our route. We had received instructions from President Gorbachev to fly first to London to meet with Prime Minister Thatcher, who had requested this. Similar communications came from the Governments of Japan and Canada. But, assuming that it would be necessary to make another trip to the Near East, we had to decline to fly to Canada and Japan.

With the "Iron Lady"

Our ambassador in London, L.M. Zamyatin, emphasized that the prime minister rarely receives visitors in her suburban residence of Checkers. Still it seems to me that this honor was bestowed upon me for the simple reason that it was Saturday, the "weekend," which M. Thatcher preferred to spend outside the city. After an hour's car ride to the heavy gates of the old English manor house on a perfectly smooth road covered with gravel, we were met by Margaret Thatcher.

The prime minister received us in unofficial surroundings. She, her aid C. Powell, the ambassador and I, and R.V. Markaryan sat in old chairs in front of the fireplace. It seemed that everything foretold a peaceful conversation. Nothing put us on our guard. The prime minister listened attentively, without interrupting, to all the information presented to her.

But after that for a good hour she did not stop her monologue, which expressed in the most concentrated form a line which was gathering more and more force: to not stop at the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait but to deal a crushing blow to Iraq, to "break the back" of Saddam Husayn, and to eliminate all of this country's military and possibly also industrial potential. Thatcher did not mince words. "We must not stand in the way of a solution to this problem," she said. "Saddam Husayn should not have a shadow of a doubt that the world community will not back off and will achieve its goals. Nobody should even try to help his regime escape the blow."

"Does this mean that you do not see a single option other than military?" I managed to wedge in with difficulty.

"No," she answered.

"When will the military operations begin?"

"That I cannot tell you since they are to begin unexpectedly for Iraq."

The "Iron Lady" also lived up to her name when she touched on issues of the post-crisis structure in the Near East. In her words, the economic sanctions against Iraq were to be continued even if he were to leave Kuwait.

...The conversation with Thatcher had already lasted more than two hours. Feeling that it was getting more and more heated, I suggested stopping here, noting how useful the conversation had been for clarifying positions.

And for one moment the "Iron Lady" again became a kind, pleasant hostess and suggested changing settings and moving to the library to get away from work for a while.

She saw us again to the threshold of the old manor house Checkers.

Part III

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[Third part of article by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov under "Persian Gulf" rubric: "The War Which Might Not Have Been"]

[Text]

To the Near East Once Again

Upon arrival in Moscow, I reported the results of the trip to President M.S. Gorbachev. The main conclusion was as follows: the barometer of the situation was clearly showing a military solution. The supporters of a large-scale military assault against Iraq were aiming not

simply at expelling Saddam Husayn from Kuwait but at eliminating the country's military-industrial potential. In this interpretation their prescribed mission went beyond the framework of the UN Security Council resolution.

This conclusion was not, of course, identical to the assertion that there was in the anti-Saddam coalition unity of approach to a solution of the Kuwait crisis. This showed up in particular contrast in comparing the positions of French President Mitterrand and Italian Prime Minister Andreotti on the one hand and British Prime Minister Thatcher on the other. Specific aspects of the situation, however, could be seen in the fact that France and Italy, like many other West Europeans also, while obviously gravitating toward a circumspect policy, nonetheless realized that unless a political solution were found, they would find themselves involved in hostilities in one form or another.

President Bush was still hesitating and temporizing and was not conclusively sure of the soundness of the military option. But, to judge by everything, he was coming in for increasing pressure both from inside and outside.

I reported to M.S. Gorbachev that the Soviet Union's policy, which was geared to the search for possibilities for a peaceful solution of the crisis, with regard to the need for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, had naturally encountered extensive support among practically all those interested in an alternative to war being found. The leaders of all the countries with whom I spoke expressed a plain interest in the continuation of our contacts with them in connection with the development of the situation in the Persian Gulf.

Having listened to all this, President Gorbachev instructed me to go to Cairo, Damascus, Riyadh, and Baghdad. In the capitals of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia the president instructed me to additionally discuss one possibility or another to stimulate the "Arab factor" in order to compel Iraq to withdraw its forces without the use of military force, but without "rewarding" it either.

President Gorbachev recommended that at the meeting with Saddam Husayn I paint a full picture of the situation which would be encountered in the event of a refusal to comply with the demands of the world community. I was instructed also to return to the question of the evacuation of Soviet specialists from Iraq. Although the timetable for the departure of the 1,500 persons in accordance with the previous arrangement had been observed, new complications had appeared on the horizon. The Iraqi authorities were refusing to examine the question of the departure home of our people over and above the agreed ceiling. There was a complication also in the situation concerning the departure of military specialists whose contracts had expired. Practically none of them was being allowed to leave Iraq. Even those who had officially registered their papers for departure had been taken directly off the aircraft.

M.S. Gorbachev said that the question of the foreign hostages, who continued to be held at Iraqi military and other strategic facilities, was to be raised in sharp terms also. He simultaneously instructed me to use the trip to the Near East as preparation for a stimulation of the policy of searching for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In describing our mission in detail I by no means want readers to get the impression that it was some independent branch or was in opposition even virtually to some parts of the Soviet Union's common efforts to achieve a political settlement. This mission was organically combined with other negotiations, visits, meetings, and talks, of which there were many. All this was being undertaken from different sides—some openly, others, secretly. But the particular import of our mission, perhaps, was that it was practically the sole channel for direct contact with Saddam Husayn.

I would like to make special mention of the Soviet ambassadors in the Arab countries which we visited. V.P. Polyakov in Egypt, Yu.S. Gryadunov in Jordan, A.I. Zotov in Syria, V.V. Posuvalyuk in Iraq, and V.I. Kolotush, former ambassador in Lebanon and chief of administration of the Foreign Ministry—they are all different, but all true professionals and shrewd politicians, well versed—and not by hearsay—in the state of affairs in the Arab world. They are all Arabists who know the language and who are doing everything for friendship with the peoples of the countries where they are stationed and for the support of Soviet interests. I am connected with all of them by personal friendly relations also. The conversations with our ambassadors, their assistance in arranging meetings and their help played a tremendous part in the advancement of our mission.

We left Moscow once again on 24 October. The airplane was bound for Cairo.

En route from the airport to the city I struck up a conversation with Butros Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs. He was seriously worried by the consequences of war. Clear concern at the development of the situation was manifested also on the part of my old friend, shrewd analyst U. al-Baz, who heads Mubarak's political office.

The perception of anxiety which I caught during my lengthy discussion with him was born, to judge by everything, not only of the fact that Egypt had its soldiers making up part of the multinational force but also the fact that it had hundreds of thousands of workers in the Gulf countries which could become a military theater. He had an unvarnished idea also of the post-crisis situation, specifically, the possible prospect of a strengthening of Islamic fundamentalism. And this despite the fact that Saudi Arabia, whose king is the guardian of the main Muslim holy places, was on the other side of the barricades from Iraq.

Two "glitches" emerged. The first was of a "technical and organizational" nature. President Mubarak was on a

tour of Gulf countries and was prepared, according to U. al-Baz, to cut short his time there and meet us in Cairo, but only the next day—the 26th. The second "glitch" was of a political nature rather. U. al-Baz, who was in direct contact with Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal, said that the latter was asking us to go first to Baghdad and only then to Riyadh. Judging from a telephone call from the Iraqi ambassador in Cairo, Baghdad wanted the visit to the two countries to be in a different sequence.

Having pondered all this, we concluded that we should, for all that, accept the "Saudi version" since, given a favorable development of events, this would make it possible to go from Baghdad to King Fahd at least not entirely empty-handed.

We requested that the meeting with Syrian President H. al-Asad, scheduled for earlier, be postponed until the 25th. An affirmative response was received quickly, and early in the morning of the 25th the aircraft touched down in Damascus.

President al-Asad has a somehow special way of listening closely to his partner. Having supported our approaches to the search for a way out of the Kuwait crisis, al-Asad proposed an interesting idea.

"What if we were to convene an Arab 'summit'?" he said. "Such a conference could appeal to Saddam Husayn to withdraw his forces from Kuwait in the interests of the whole Arab nation. This appeal should also say that such a withdrawal would open the way, as Arabs hope, to a solution of the Palestinian question."

"Could such a 'summit' be convened?"

"There could also be other forms of Arab initiative like, for example, a message to Saddam Husayn signed by the heads of Arab states, not even all of them."

According to H. al-Asad, the USSR had, by virtue of the situation which had taken shape, unique opportunities and was, perhaps, the sole state even capable, in contacts with Saddam Husayn, of preparing an "Arab solution."

On the 26th we were once again in Cairo, where a meeting with President Mubarak was held.

Here also we heard emphatically no interest in a war. But a fear lest steps toward a political settlement give S. Husayn the wrong impression of contradictions in the coalition and lest he take advantage of them to reject the demand for a withdrawal of his forces was manifested more distinctly here. Mubarak also supported the Soviet initiative and, in turn, enriched the proposed plan with the following offer: If Husayn agrees to leave Kuwait, he could be given assurances concerning the creation of conditions conducive to his further negotiations with Kuwait. Mubarak replied unhesitatingly to a question which had been put directly: I can give assurances in advance.

"But what about Saudi Arabia?"

"I can promise you firmly that Saudi Arabia would subscribe to such assurances also."

At the same time H. Mubarak treated with greater skepticism than H. al-Asad the possibility of organizing an Arab "summit." But our views coincided fully on such questions as the existence of boundaries between "rewarding" Iraq for what it had done and it being accorded an opportunity to leave Kuwait with dignity.

Following the meetings in Damascus and Cairo, it seemed that optimism had grown a little. Although, of course, the key to the success of the mission was in Baghdad, and the journey there had suddenly been placed in jeopardy. Tariq 'Aziz had summoned our ambassador, V.V. Posuvalyuk, and conveyed to him that the Iraqi leadership had an extremely negative attitude toward the adoption of a new UN Security Council resolution demanding that Iraq pay compensation for the damage done to Kuwait. According to 'Aziz, this resolution would hang as a sword of Damocles over Iraq practically indefinitely since claims could keep on appearing and snowball even. 'Aziz maintained that the Soviet Union was "actively pushing the resolution and working to toughen its wording." The arrival in Baghdad of a representative of the USSR president could hardly be productive in such an atmosphere, Tariq [name as published] concluded.

Having been notified of this conversation, we contacted our representative at the United Nations, Yu.M. Vorontsov, at night by telephone for clarification of the overall picture. It transpired that the resolution would be passed either this day, Friday evening (with regard for the time difference), or on Saturday before noon. But the resolution had been harmonized in "moderate form" and imbibed many elements of proposals from Yemen and Cuba.

"Is there any need for the passage of yet another Security Council resolution with such immediacy?"

Judging by the response, it could be understood that the U.S. and British representatives were insisting on this.

Following this telephone conversation, a telegram was sent from Cairo to Moscow requesting that our representative on the UN Security Council be given instructions to hold consultations for the purpose of postponing passage of the resolution for two days.

I simultaneously telephoned Baghdad and dictated for presentation to Tariq 'Aziz a note with approximately the following content: It is puzzling, to say the least, that at a crucial moment, when Moscow is doing everything in its power to find a political way out of the situation, the Iraqi side is placing obstacles on this path. Under these conditions my coming to Baghdad will be possible only in the event of my receiving a repeat invitation. If no response from Baghdad is forthcoming before noon the next day, the trip will be canceled.

Our ambassador in Baghdad performed his assignment at once, and Tariq 'Aziz also responded at once: Iraq is prepared to greet the representative of the USSR president at the highest level.

I am describing this apparently fleeting episode in a fair amount of detail because it shows Iraq's interest in our mission. The reply received from Baghdad also removed the question of the sequence of trips to Baghdad and Riyadh. The next day we landed at Baghdad airport. Meanwhile our representative at the United Nations had contacted his Security Council colleagues and requested a two-day postponement of passage of the resolution—that is, until news was received concerning the talks in Baghdad. The capitals of the countries on the UN Security Council approved this postponement. What awaited us in Baghdad?

Return to Baghdad

The second meeting with Saddam Husayn was just as lengthy as the first and was also in two parts—initially in the presence of others, then head to head discussions. It was significant that Saddam had summoned to the meeting practically the entire Iraqi leadership. All were dressed identically—in military uniform.

"I have summoned my leadership colleagues specially," Saddam said. "Let them listen to our conversation for among them are both 'hawks' and 'doves'."

It cannot be ruled out that this was said intentionally to show that there was certain room for maneuver. But I had no doubt, nonetheless, that one man decided everything. The "free-thinking" was expressed in the fact that some of those present at the meeting would nod their heads particularly fervently in agreement with Saddam Husayn's words. Others would do so with less enthusiasm, but did so all the same.

The second meeting with Saddam Husayn was of interest primarily from the standpoint of its comparison with the first. There had, for all that, been certain changes in the three weeks. Whereas, as already mentioned, on 5 October S. Husayn put the main emphasis on Kuwait being "historically a part" of Iraq, he did not touch on this subject at all on 28 October. S. Husayn was now no longer negative in his reception of my words to the effect that his forces should be withdrawn from Kuwait "as a first step toward any other actions." And he even evinced a desire to speak, albeit in allegorical form, about the specific conditions of such a withdrawal. In face-to-face conversation (but again in the presence of S.V. Kirpichenko, who interpreted the conversation) Saddam Husayn observed: "How could I announce a withdrawal of my forces unless I have been notified how the question of the pullout from Saudi Arabia of U.S. forces will be decided, whether the UN Security Council sanctions against Iraq will remain in force or will be canceled, how my country's interests in respect of an outlet to the sea will be secured and whether some form of linkage between a withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait and a solution of the Palestinian problem will be proposed?"

During the meeting (I had direct instructions from the USSR president on this score) I stated insistently the need for a solution of all questions connected with the departure of Soviet people from Iraq. In my presence Saddam Husayn summoned his secretary and instructed him to report to him personally each instance of Soviet specialists wishing to return home being detained in Iraq.

An instruction was given in respect of military specialists also: All who had completed their contracts were authorized to return home immediately. As confirmation of this, 36 military specialists arrived in Moscow on an Aeroflot flight in the morning of 2 November. A new, supplementary, timetable for the departure before the end of November of a further 1,000 Soviet citizens was drawn up. This figure was higher at that time, incidentally, than the applications for departure submitted to Soviet organizations in Iraq by our specialists. S. Husayn emphasized once again that all would depend solely on the desire of one specialist or another to leave Iraq.

But I would like to make special mention of one Soviet specialist. For two years and six months the Iraqi authorities had been holding a driver from the Kama Truck Plant from Kiev because of a traffic accident, as a result of which several local inhabitants had died. Twice an Iraqi court had found our driver, who was working in Iraq on contract, innocent, but nonetheless he was not allowed to leave the country, his case being sent back for further investigation time after time. The man was finally worn out. He was living by himself, without his family. He was on the brink of despair. On Mikhail Sergeyevich's instructions I made a special issue of this matter during my discussion with the Iraqi president. Consent to a positive outcome followed immediately. The appropriate papers were put together in a single night. Beside himself with joy, our man flew out together with me, first to Saudi Arabia, it is true, then, to Cyprus, and only then to the Soviet Union. He had suffered so much, poor man, that even in these countries he was afraid at first to leave the aircraft. But then realized that nothing threatened him any longer.

One further impression—Husayn's readiness, as distinct from the first meeting, to conduct a conversation in quite specific categories about a solution of the problem of foreign hostages in Iraq.

Husayn demonstrated an interest in the idea of Arab activity in a settlement. I, naturally, relayed to him the discussions which I had had in this connection with Presidents al-Asad and Mubarak. What was noteworthy? Saddam Husayn distinguished Saudi Arabia as the main and, possibly, sole Arab negotiating partner. He emphasized that he was prepared to himself meet or send any of his associates for a meeting with the appropriate Saudi representatives at any time and in any place.

But it has to be said that Saddam did not pronounce a definite "yes" on the main question. When we were left head to head, I observed:

"You have known me a long time and have obviously seen for yourself that I try to tell you the truth. So an assault against Iraq, a powerful one at that, is inevitable unless you announce your withdrawal from Kuwait and implement it."

In response Saddam reiterated that he could no nothing "just like that," not knowing the answers to the questions mentioned earlier. "This would be suicidal for me," Saddam emphasized. "And it is not just a question of me. Were I to announce a withdrawal of forces from Kuwait without an answer to these questions, Iraq would be committing suicide. It is for this reason that I hope for a continuation of contacts."

Not having received from Saddam a direct signal on a readiness to leave Kuwait, on Monday the members of the UN Security Council voted for the corresponding resolution. But I did not, for all that, believe that we were going to Riyadh "entirely empty-handed."

While we were flying from Baghdad to Riyadh, the presidents of the USSR and France were in Paris holding a joint news conference. The agencies were reporting (and we were notified in more detail upon our return to Moscow) that all the nuances of the meeting with Saddam Husayn were being discussed in detail by M.S. Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand and were being reflected in the answers to journalists' questions also.

On Saudi Soil

The main meeting in this country, which I was seeing for the first time, was held in Jiddah, where all the leading members of the Saudi ruling family headed by King Fahd were assembled at a rectangular extended table, quite like those in boardrooms in our country. Crown Prince 'Abdallah, Defense Minister Prince Sultan and Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal were here also.

Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Saudi Arabia, which had been broken off in the 1930's, were restored only recently. Having no experience of direct political contacts with us, the Saudi leaders wanted to know, of course, more and in more detail about our approaches and overall view of the situation. When I said that the Soviet Union, not retreating one step, proceeds from the indisputable need for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the restoration in Kuwait of the situation which pertained on 2 August, but is endeavoring to use everything to achieve this goal by political means, King Fahd broke into applause. The Saudis generally win people's affections with their directness and natural approach. Perhaps the Bedouin character—benevolent and gentle, generally—is reflected here also.

The king and his entourage treated with understanding the idea of an "invisible package" for discussion with Saddam Husayn. But at the same time there could be discerned in them, as in the Americans also, a serious concern: Would not these proposals be perceived by Saddam as a reason to spin out the time to strengthen his positions in Kuwait. They were worried by Iraq's policy of abrupt demographic changes in the captured country aimed at supplanting the indigenous population. There were, obviously, also those in the royal family who were in favor of an immediate switch to military action since time was on Saddam's side. Nonetheless, I believe that King Fahd held a more balanced position. The nature of the conversation with us—emphatically open and warm—testified not only to traditional Saudi hospitality. King Fahd, I venture to maintain, sincerely hoped that it would, after all, be possible to compel Iraq to quit Kuwait by nonmilitary methods.

Relations with Iraq were a "painful subject." Grievances were expressed at the fact that Baghdad had not appreciated the extensive assistance and support, particularly financial, rendered it by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates during the war with Iran. There were grounds for such "digressions into the past." But Riyadh's attitude toward Baghdad was dictated by far from just emotional factors. Iraq had always been and had recently become even more a "power center" in the Persian Gulf opposed not only to Iran but also to Saudi Arabia, which is undoubtedly the leader of the Arab states of the Arabian peninsula.

In this connection the king's reflections on the subject of whether it would be possible, even given a peaceful settlement of the Kuwait crisis, to achieve an order in which Iraq could not once again threaten its neighbors could not pass unnoticed. Unless this is the case, we also will have to arm ourselves "to the teeth," the king said, and not only increase our purchases but also ourselves create and develop the manufacture of increasingly intricate arms systems. We decidedly do not want this, and I believe that the prospect of an arms race in our region is not in the interests of the Soviet Union either.

I fully agreed.

Of course, I conveyed to the king Saddam Husayn's words to the effect that it was Fahd, more than any other Arab leader, who could play a leading part in a settlement of the Kuwait crisis and also the fact that Husayn offered to hold a meeting with him. The king avoided a direct answer, but recalled that there had, after all, already been meetings. T.Y. Ramadan, deputy prime minister of Iraq, had been here, and there had been contacts in other countries also. One felt that the king was reluctant to adopt decisions on a new Saudi-Iraqi meeting "on the spot," so to speak. The close coordination between the Saudi and American leadership was reflected (and it could not have been otherwise under the conditions of the presence of American forces on Saudi territory). The difference in views in the ruling family evidently made itself felt also. But even under these conditions Fahd clearly favored a continuation of our mission. The king said he placed a high value on the confidentiality taking shape in relations between our

countries and declared that he would send President M.S. Gorbachev a message with his thoughts on the situation and in consideration of the detailed discussion with us.

Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal conveyed the desire of the emir of Kuwait for a meeting with the representative of the USSR president. During the commitment of Iraqi forces to Kuwait he had managed to flee from the palace, which was being stormed, and make his way to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis said that a royal aircraft could take us to al-Ta'if, not far from which the emir's temporary residence in the Sheraton Hotel was accommodated.

From the very outset of the Kuwait crisis we have unshakably adhered to the position of the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty, sincerely sympathized with the grief which has become the lot of its people, and never forgotten that Kuwait was the first oil emirate to establish diplomatic relations with us and maintain close ties.

For us this meeting was important also because it afforded an opportunity to learn directly from the emir about his attitude toward the USSR's political activity—after all, for perfectly understandable reasons Kuwait adhered more than anyone to a hard line and considered the use of force against Iraq essential. But the emir received our explanations with satisfaction, apparently, and did not in the least display doubts as to the expediency of the attempts to find a political way out of the labyrinth.

Back to the United States, But for a Different Purpose

At the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York on 15 November, the presentation of the G. Kennan award took place. The award for 1990 was conferred on Senator William Bradley and myself. My arrival in New York coincided with the start of the discussion of the draft of yet another UN Security Council resolution—this time giving the deadline after which the use of force against Iraq was sanctioned. I received many requests from televison companies and newspapers for interviews. One was published in THE NEW YORK TIMES 16 November. In it, I proposed that the adoption of this resolution be postponed.

The reasons for my view that it was premature seemed weighty enough to me. The draft, but only the draft, of such a resolution could be significant, if the very possibility of its adoption were to hang over Iraq like the sword of Damocles. This would create additional conditions for political pressure with a view to persuading it to withdraw the troops from Kuwait. However, if such a resolution became a reality, and especially if a a time limit was put on political maneuvering, then the room to maneuver would be narrowed. And psychologically—I could picture this clearly—the adoption of the resolution could even be counterproductive. I still remembered Iraq's reaction—which I discussed earlier—to the long series of resolutions adopted by the Security Council immediately after its invasion of Kuwait.

My negative attitude toward the proposed adoption of the resolution immediately attracted the attention of the press. Secretary of State Baker, who was in Europe at the time, was asked a question about it. The essence of his reply was that, as he understands it, I was giving my personal view. That was certainly true, and I had said so in the interview.

Security Council Resolution No. 678 was, of course, adopted. Of the permanent members of the Security Council, only China abstained. Before this, Tariq 'Aziz had again visited Moscow, followed by the Saudi foreign minister. I met with neither of them, although I was back in the Soviet Union by then...

Thus Resolution No. 678 set Saddam Husayn an ultimatum. The USSR president's line was to use even this last opportunity to prevent war. I.S. Belousov, who traveled to Baghdad, was tasked with trying to persuade Husayn to agree to a meeting with American representatives in Geneva. This was at a time when it looked as if the prospects for a U.S.-Iraqi meeting had been nullified by Husayn's unwillingness to accept the dates proposed by the United States and by the U.S. refusal to send the secretary of state to Baghdad during the days named by the Iraqi leader.

The Geneva meeting took place. The fact that there was a seven-hour discussion—which immediately became known to journalists—inspired hope. But these hopes were not to be realized. Tariq 'Aziz, who had brought nothing new in his diplomatic baggage, and J. Baker, who, judging by public statements, had come to Geneva in order once again to demand the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops, went back to their respective countries empty-handed.

UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar flew to Baghdad, but, as was only to be expected, his talks also failed to bring success, since his hands were tied fast by the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council.

All the same, the USSR president did not give up his attempts to prevent war. Approximately a week before the expiry of the ultimatum set by the Security Council resolution, M.S. Gorbachev called G. Bush and told him that he was willing to send his representative to Baghdad yet again. The details of the so-called "invisible package," which had been proposed even earlier and was intended to make Saddam withdraw his troop from Kuwait without the use of armed force against him, were conveyed to our Washington embassy in parallel. Bush told M.S. Gorbachev on the telephone that he would immediately invite Ambassador A.A. Bessmertnykh to call on him.

A positive reaction to M.S. Gorbachev's proposal could be heard in G. Bush's radio speech. But a few hours later the USSR ambassador was invited back, and was told that the United States has no objection to a visit to Baghdad by a Soviet representative, but only in order once again to tell S. Husayn: "Leave Kuwait."

At 0245 hours on 17 January I was woken by the telephone. M.S. Gorbachev said: [Defense Minister] Yazov, Bessmertnykh, and [KGB Chairman] Kryuchkov are on their way to the Kremlin, you come too. Later he explained: A few minutes earlier, the U.S. secretary of state had called the USSR foreign minister at home and told him that military operations were to begin in a matter of minutes. M.S. Gorbachev asked for a request to be conveyed urgently from him to G. Bush, for the commencement of operations to be postponed at least for a time, to allow for one more attempt to obtain from Iraq a statement of readiness to withdraw its troops from Kuwait. J. Baker replied to A.A. Bessmertnykh that military operations were already taking place. Missiles and bombs had begun to explode on the territory of Iraq and Kuwait.

Part IV

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[Final part of article by Academician Yevgeniy Primakov: "The War Which Might Not Have Been"]

[Text]

Start of Combat Operations

As was to have been expected, the war commenced with powerful attacks from the air. First, missiles fired from American ships in the Persian Gulf crashed down on Iraq's airfields and radar systems, then came waves of bombers, including Stealth, which had been specially transferred here on the eve of operations.

Washington had apparently conducted an extensive disinformation campaign against Iraq. Just days before, "reassuring" statements of American officials and generals were saying that the coalition armed forces would be completely ready for the start of combat operations only by the end of January. Nor can it be ruled out that specially prepared information was fed to Baghdad, as, equally, via "their own people," to other Arab countries.

One way or another, the tactical surprise of the attack on Iraq was evidently achieved. It would seem that until the last moment Saddam Husayn was, for all that, proceeding from the fact that the multinational force would not commence military operations. This was one further miscalculation, fatal, perhaps.

During my recent trip to Baghdad, which will be dealt with below, I was told that immediately after Husayn had received President Bush's proposal for an exchange of visits by the foreign ministers of the United States and Iraq, he observed to his closest associates: I told you that the Soviet Union was trying to intimidate us with the inevitability of an attack—events are proceeding according to a different script.

But they did not. In the first hours and days of the war euphoria set in in the United States and the other coalition countries—there was talk of the total destruction of all electronic command and communications systems and the disabling of all airfields of Iraq and the destruction of the bulk of the air force on the ground, and a kind of estimate was made even—as a result of the first few days 80 percent of Iraq's military potential in the Persian Gulf had been put out of action. Such estimates were soon disavowed. Iraq began to "snap back," the first losses in the coalition air forces emerged and, what was received particularly painfully, a large part of the missile batteries that had been engaged, for attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia included, continued to exist.

Iraq attached particular significance to missile attacks on Israel. It was clear that Baghdad wanted to pull it into the war and thus completely alter the configuration of the belligerents. S. Husayn was undoubtedly hoping that the Arab countries participating in the anti-Iraq coalition would be forced to change the front.

A wave of anger did indeed arise in Israel, and there came to be public pressure on the government aimed at pushing it into an armed response to the Iraqi provocations. Big efforts were needed to stop the Israeli leadership. This was done mainly by the United States. The Soviet Union unequivocally condemned the missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The war, meanwhile, was escalating "vertically." The bombing and missile attacks on Iraq and the grouping of Iraqi forces in Kuwait gained in intensity. The main targets were military facilities and installations and industrial enterprises working for the Iraqi Army. The United States attached particular significance to strikes against nuclear reactors, chemical enterprises, and centers where biological weapons might have been under development. Material on whether the destruction of these Iraqi facilities was affecting adjacent countries, which include the USSR, was naturally required immediately. The president of the USSR issued instructions to the scientific and technical services. The southern border regions of the Soviet Union, 250-300 km from Iraq, were put under 24-hour supervision.

An operational "crisis group" was formed in Moscow at this time. It was made up of the foreign, defense, and interior ministers, the KGB chairman, A.S. Chernyayev, presidential assistant for international affairs, and myself. V.N. Ignatenko, the president's press spokesman, and A.M. Belonogov, deputy foreign minister, participated in the work of the group. I may say with great confidence that people who understand one another instantly worked in the "crisis group."

On day three of the war—19 January—the president of the USSR assembled the "crisis group" and made the decision to present one further political initiative aimed at halting the war in the Persian Gulf. The Soviet ambassador in Baghdad was instructed to contact Saddam Husayn immediately or convey to him via

Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz the following: If we confidentially obtain assurances from Iraq concerning its readiness to unconditionally and unreservedly withdraw its forces from Kuwait, we will propose a cease-fire to the United States. President Gorbachev had preliminarily (I wish to emphasize this particularly with regard for the accusations made by those who either did not know the true circumstances or who ignored them, declaring that we were acting "behind Washington's back") notified the U.S. leadership of the efforts being made by the Soviet Union.

Baghdad remained silent for two days and then gave a negative response, announcing on the radio that such proposals "should be addressed to President Bush."

New emphases in the hostilities began to appear, meanwhile. Peaceful inhabitants of Baghdad and other cities came increasingly to be within the sphere of the bombing and missile attacks. All the country's power stations had been destroyed. As a result water- intake purification installations and pumps used in sewerage operations ceased to function—all this presaged most serious consequences, including mass epidemics. The attacks began to be launched against targets which could hardly be termed military, such as ministries and other "prestige" buildings.

The war in the Persian Gulf acquired an ecological dimension also. Iraq had released into the waters of the Persian Gulf a vast quantity of oil. This oil slick has created a danger to the environment for many years to come. The danger of Iraq using weapons of mass destruction still at its disposal was intensifying. Saddam Husayn explained that it was a question of chemical and bacteriological and nuclear weapons. In the opinion of many specialists, Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons, but it was not ruled out that radiological weapons could be used by way of spraying them over the troops and, possibly, over the peaceful inhabitants of Israel and the Persian Gulf Arab countries fighting Iraq. This was a cause of particular concern.

"Counter" statements which came to be heard on the part of the United States about the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a land battle against the Iraqi Army were noted also.

USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh visited Washington 26-29 January. A Soviet-U.S. joint statement was adopted, which said: The ministers continue to believe that a halt to the hostilities is possible "if Iraq gives an unambiguous undertaking to leave Kuwait." They also believe that such an undertaking should immediately be underpinned by specific steps leading to full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions. Such an affirmation was extraordinarily important since it unambivalently reduced the task of compelling Iraq to unconditionally leave Kuwait.

It was in this respect that the statement was sharply criticized in the United States. "Variant readings" of the approaches to a settlement of the Kuwait crisis not only on the part of the USSR and United States but between the Soviet-U.S. statement and the White House came to be found.

A second point which evoked criticism was the mention in the Soviet-U.S. statement to the effect that elimination of the sources of conflicts and instability in the region was impossible without a full-fledged peace process, including reconciliation between Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. It was perceived that a toughening of position was being asserted in the United States by the most influential forces.

M.S. Gorbachev said at the meeting of the "crisis group" on 9 February that he had decided to make his own statement on the situation surrounding the Kuwait crisis at once. It was necessary to enter into direct contact with the Iraqi leadership once again. One proposal had amounted to an invitation to T. 'Aziz to visit Moscow. No. We had to send our representative to S. Husayn directly, the president said. We had no time for "intermediate" conversations. Turning to me, the president said: You need to leave as quickly as possible.

The statement of the president of the USSR was published the same day. It emphasized that events in the Persian Gulf were assuming an increasingly disturbing and dramatic nature. First Kuwait and now Iraq also were threatened with catastrophic destruction. The Soviet leadership's fundamental policy of support for the UN Security Council resolutions was confirmed, but it was observed at the same time that the logic of military operations and the nature of the hostilities were creating a danger of the mandate defined in these resolutions being exceeded.

Third Trip to Baghdad

Getting to Baghdad this time was incomparably more difficult. It was thought that the best route was across Iran. Account was taken here not only of considerations connected with the possibility of obtaining assistance from the Iranian authorities in organizing the journey to the Iraqi border. There was to be a meeting at Tehran Airport with the deputy foreign minister, immediately after, what is more, Iran itself had presented a peace initiative. USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.M. Belonogov had visited Tehran several days prior to this, and his discussions had been very useful, and before the trip to Baghdad I wanted to familiarize myself with the Iranians' latest impressions and ideas as regards the position of the Iraqi leadership. The meeting took place and justified expectations.

The Iranian authorities gave permission for our aircraft's overflight from Tehran to Bakhtaran (the former Kermanshah) and from there kindly provided automobile transportation with an escort, of which we availed ourselves on the four-hour journey to the border.

Already awaiting us on the Iraqi border were S. Faysal, deputy foreign minister of Iraq, and Soviet Ambassador V.V. Posuvalyuk. The hour was late, and we set off for

Baghdad at great speed. The main beams of now one, now another of the cars following closely in convoy, switched on periodically, snatched the road out of the pitch darkness. As soon as we reached the suburbs of Baghdad, just over two hours later, the convoy immediately dispersed. The vehicles in which we had been driving—I was convinced that this was characteristic of all the Iraqi leadership's motor vehicles—had for camouflage purposes been smeared with dirt. But I thought: Does the dirt not distinguish these vehicles from others and unmask those using them?

We were put up at the al-Rashid Hotel, at which we arrived at about 2300. We were told that this was the safest place in the Iraqi capital since it was here that foreign journalists, particularly Peter Arnett from the American CNN, who has become world famous, were living. There was no light, the elevators were not working, a kerosene lamp was burning in the stylish hotel room—as distinct from my colleagues, I had been vouchsafed this privilege—and tubs with reserved water stood in the bathroom.

It was quiet. The bombing, which had usually already begun at this time, was for some reason or other late, and the journalists, drawn to the "light," joked: Stay as long as possible, perhaps there will be no bombing. But they brought it upon themselves, as they say. The air-raid siren wailed an hour later, and, according to many people whom I had a chance to meet, one of the city's fiercest bombardments occurred on those two nights we spent in Baghdad.

Late at night we were informed that the meeting with Tariq 'Aziz would take place at 1100. He chose as the venue for this the residence of our ambassador. The discussion had barely begun before accusations were showered on the Soviet Union and its policy, which had virtually "given the go-ahead" for "the UN war against Iraq."

I proposed that Tariq and I take a stroll around the garden. Even when we were alone, the conversation continued sharp. It occurred to me that this was being done on Tariq's part to gauge from my reaction how strong our interaction with the United States and the other countries of the "multinational coalition" was and "what reserves" Iraq had in this respect. The idea concerning the "probing" purpose of the conversation with me was reinforced also during the meeting with Saddam Husayn, which once again began with a reprimand of the USSR, but I will describe this meeting somewhat later.

I told Tariq 'Aziz that Iraq was making one mistake after another, attempting to preserve what was unpreservable and driving itself into an impasse from which it could hardly extricate itself. I gave him as an example the news, which had agitated the whole world, that the Iraqi authorities had announced their intention to accommodate captured American pilots and representatives of other countries from the multinational force at strategic sites in total violation of the Geneva convention. In response Tariq once again resumed his charges against us. I then told him: We have not come here to listen to all this. If this has been programmed on Saddam's part also, it is, perhaps, not worth my while to meet him?

The meeting with Saddam Husayn took place in the evening of the same day. We were prepared to be taken to a bunker, taken far beyond Baghdad, perhaps. It all proved far more prosaic. We were taken to a guest house in the center of the city. We at first thought that this was a "transfer point" and that from there the "walk to the dungeon" would begin. But it was to this guest house, in which electric lights were burning, since a local generator had unexpectedly begun to work, that Saddam Husayn came with the entire Iraqi leadership. He took a seat near a small stove, took off his overcoat, unbuckled, as usual, his belt with holster and placed it on the floor. And it was here that I noticed how much thinner he had become. Since our last meeting he had lost 15-20 kg. But he appeared outwardly composed and quite assured.

I have already mentioned the fact that he began his speech with rebukes of the Soviet Union and also certain words which could be seen as an attempt to show the "unshakability" of the position adopted by Iraq. The nature of S. Husayn's statements was most likely explained by the presence of his closest advisers. I had the impression that he was addressing not me but them.

I said that I would like us to be left tete-a-tete, and when this was the case I unambiguously emphasized that the Americans were decidedly in the mood for starting a broad-based ground operation, as a result of which the grouping of Iraqi forces in Kuwait would be crushed. You understand, would be crushed. I said that politics was the art of the possible. As instructed by the president of the USSR, I proposed to him the following: that he declare a withdrawal of forces from Kuwait and determine in this declaration, what is more, the shortest timeframe for such a withdrawal. And this withdrawal had to be complete and unconditional.

It was here that there really was for the first time a change. Saddam Husayn began to put questions in point of substance: Could he be sure that "the soldiers leaving Kuwait will not be shot in the back" and that the attacks on Iraq would stop following the withdrawal of his forces? In connection with the withdrawal of forces would the sanctions against Iraq imposed by the UN resolutions following its refusal to leave Kuwait be lifted? Saddam simultaneously began to sound out the possibilities of a change in the nature of the regime in Kuwait. I answered him as distinctly as possible: It must be a question of a restoration of the situation which pertained prior to 2 August.

Saddam Husayn asked whether I could stay for a while in Iraq—he had, after all, to confer with his leadership colleagues. Fearing a delay in the response, I replied that I could not since I had to leave at 0600 for the Iranian border. Saddam agreed that he could really assemble the

Iraqi leadership that night and declared that a concise answer would be brought to the Soviet Embassy (telephone communications had also been knocked out by the bombing) in a few hours by Tariq 'Aziz and that the Iraqi president's personal representative would go to Moscow to continue the contacts.

Saddam heard in silence my observation that time would not wait and that it was essential to shorten it as much as possible. Nor did he respond to my appeal that he speak even in a brief Iraqi reply in positive terms about an unconditional withdrawal of forces from Kuwait and abandon the idea of the continuation of attacks on the peaceful population of Israel since, aside from all else, the hostilities against Iraq would in this case not end.

Two hours later we were in a room on the first floor of our embassy. Assembled in the room were many of the 30 Soviet people who were in Baghdad at that time. These courageous people were devoid of any affectation and posturing and were at the same time uncomplainingly enduring all the burdens of Baghdad life—without power and without clean water and in cold, unheated premises (it is cold in Baghdad at this time of the year, and by morning the puddles are covered with a crust of ice). To cap it all, the shortage of gasoline was being felt increasingly—it was being collected literally by the liter not to heat the premises and not for lighting but for the "motor" in order to maintain communications with Moscow. And all these 30 people, what is more, who had voluntarily remained behind under such conditions to perform their duty, were spending a considerable amount of their time in a metal duct about two meters in diameter covered with earth and girders. This duct could only conditionally be called a bomb shelter, of course, but, as our Baghdad friends assured us, they were securely sheltered here from the fragments which would fall from the skies in abundance during the firing at the aircraft attacking Baghdad.

The real leader of this small group was Ambassador Viktor Posuvalyuk. And I am not only talking about work. We saw in the duct bomb shelter the guitar he would play while singing with talent songs he had written.

Tariq 'Aziz called at the room on the first floor of the embassy which we had rendered "habitable" at 0200 on 13 February. He brought a written statement, which said that the Iraqi leadership was seriously studying the ideas set forth by the representative of the president of the USSR and would provide an answer very shortly. Tariq 'Aziz informed us that he would be flying to Moscow on Sunday.

When, having completed the return journey of 14 hours altogether, we returned to Moscow, we were greeted at the airport by a large group of Soviet and foreign journalists. Unaware that this same day V.N. Ignatenko, the president's press spokesman, had at a briefing already quoted the words "promising signs have emerged" from the telegram sent from Baghdad, I used these same words in response to the correspondents' questions. The leaders of a whole number of states were notified by USSR Foreign Ministry telegrams of the results of the trip to Baghdad.

The 'Gorbachev Plan'

On the 15th, that is, two days prior to Tariq 'Aziz's arrival in Moscow, Baghdad Radio interrupted its programming to read out a statement of the Revolutionary Command Council. The statement spoke of Iraq's readiness to act in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 660, which demanded the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, this part of the statement was hedged about in propaganda fashion by a whole number of traditional slogans, incantations, and promises "to bring the war to a victorious conclusion" and also by a list of problems to be solved: the Palestinian problem, the withdrawal of American forces, an end to the sanctions, Israel's departure from the occupied territories.

I was not surprised that in the first statement with which in practice the process of a political settlement began it was "painted" such as to avert even the thought of Iraq's surrender. At the same time it was clear that this would be seized upon by those who either did not want Iraq to "escape a conclusive assault" or who simply did not believe Iraq. So it was. The statement was rejected by the United States and its coalition allies.

Tariq 'Aziz flew to Moscow in the evening of the 17th on a Soviet aircraft which had been specially sent to Tehran for him. I was invited to take part in the negotiations both with Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh at 0900 and with President M.S. Gorbachev at 1045. Outlining his position, Tariq 'Aziz said that, despite the most savage nature of the attack on it, Iraq would not surrender. He was unbending on this point. But if there were an opportunity for an honorable peace, the Iraqi leadership would be prepared to do everything to take advantage of it.

I understood President Gorbachev primarily to want the Iraqi leadership to unequivocally abandon the setting of conditions for the withdrawal of his forces. Your position appears highly inconsistent, the president said. On the one hand this is an important step toward a political settlement since you recognize Resolution 660, which, as you know, demands, **unconditional** withdrawal. On the other, your position appears such that withdrawal is hedged with prior conditions. You cite a whole number of important problems—they are a fact. But if they are strictly tied to the withdrawal of the troops, this is unacceptable and unrealistic and will be the cause of an increase in hostilities as an inevitable option, virtually.

Tariq 'Aziz was forced to agree that the list of problems were "not conditions of withdrawal" but "a program, as it were," which should be implemented in the future.

M.S. Gorbachev observed in passing: Why, for that matter, is there no mention in the statement, when it speaks of troop withdrawal, of the word "Kuwait?"

In response to T. 'Aziz's question as to how we understood the approaches to a peace process which would lead to a fitting and honorable peace, the president of the USSR proposed that the Iraqi leadership immediately think over the following plan: Iraq declares the complete withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait (from Kuwait, not generally) and determines in this statement the timeframe of the conclusive withdrawal, and this timeframe must be as short as possible, what is more. The departure from Kuwait is not burdened by any conditions, except for one—a guarantee that the troops withdrawn from Kuwait will not be attacked and that they will not be "shot in the back."

Also present at the discussion with M.S. Gorbachev together with T. 'Aziz was another member of the Iraqi leadership—Deputy Prime Minister S. Hammadi. The president of the USSR said, addressing them: The time factor now plays a tremendous part: If you value the lives of your compatriots and the fate of Iraq, you must act without delay. T. 'Aziz and S. Hammadi replied that they represented merely part of the Iraqi leadership and had to report everything to Saddam Husayn.

Immediately following this conversation, the president of the USSR was connected with the President of the United States and the leaders of a number of West European countries. Having notified them of the nature of the discussion and his impressions, M.S. Gorbachev asked account to be taken when it came to planning military operations at this time, particularly those fraught with the danger of casualties, of the new points that had emerged. The impression was that all this was meeting with understanding.

Tariq 'Aziz left for home immediately, once again via Iran.

Anxious hours stretching into days dragged on in the wait for news from Baghdad. Information had at this time been leaked to the press from official American circles to the effect that the president of the USSR had requested that large-scale ground operations not commence at least until the completion of the negotiations with Iraq.

T. 'Aziz flew to Moscow from Tehran on 21 February at 2015. The world, meanwhile, was already commenting extensively on Saddam Husayn's speech which had just been heard on the radio—contradictory and emotional and containing a repetition of a whole set of charges and threats. It seemed to me that the set of propaganda statements was directed, of course, inside Iraq and, apparently, for the purpose of "clearing the way" for the adoption of a radical decision. But conjecture is conjecture, and we all awaited with tremendous impatience the start of the negotiations with Tariq 'Aziz.

M.S. Gorbachev had not left the Kremlin when, at midnight, Tariq 'Aziz and the group of persons accompanying him were brought straight from the airport. A discussion lasting until 0300 on 22 February was held. A number of points were examined "in rough," in the first approach. The main one was, naturally, the clause to the effect that Iraq accepts UN Security Council Resolution 660 and is prepared to fully withdraw its forces from Kuwait. At the same time the Iraqis maintained that they could not do this within a maximally compressed timeframe, giving as the reason for this the fact that it was necessary to withdraw a huge army under conditions where bridges and roads had been demolished. They cited initially a timeframe of three to four months, then, a "minimum" of six weeks.

To the comment that they had committed their forces in a matter of hours, T. 'Aziz replied that two divisions had been committed, but that approximately 500,000 men with rear support, stores and equipment had been concentrated in Kuwait in the seven months. M.S. Gorbachev said that the proposed timeframe could and must be cut to the maximum extent.

Many important points had thus not been harmonized and polished, and the negotiations had to be continued in the morning of the same day. But even in the form originally proposed by the Iraqis the main thing was Iraq's acceptance of the demand of the world community concerning a complete withdrawal of forces from Kuwait.

Since time was extraordinarily tight and, besides, the whole journalist corps in Moscow was up and about, V.N. Ignatenko held a briefing at 0330. The press center was filled to overflowing—all the representatives of the biggest television companies, world news agencies, and press organs impatiently awaited the appearance of the USSR president's press spokesman, who, reading out the points which had already been examined, said that work on them would continue and that we were hoping for further progress. V.N. Ignatenko's statement was greeted by the journalists' applause, and all rushed to transmit "flashes" to their mass news organs. Both hope and optimism grew.

At 0400 M.S. Gorbachev had a 90-minute conversation with President Bush. I was present during this conversation. G. Bush expressed gratitude for the efforts being made by the president of the USSR. At the same time he voiced doubt as to the possibility of advantage being taken of the opportunity connected with the change in Iraq's position. Bush emphasized here that he was particularly worried about the fate of the captives, who had been placed under the severest conditions, and also the impossibility of "overlooking the colossal material damage" done to Kuwait by Iraq's aggression. The U.S. President was also dissatisfied with the length of time needed for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces.

M.S. Gorbachev referred to T. 'Aziz's assurances that the Iraqi leadership had made the decision to withdraw and

would abide by it. In conclusion M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush underlined their resolve to continue to work together for the common cause of peace. It was emphasized in the conversation that the policy of the development of the cooperation of the USSR and the United States was a vital necessity for the world community. It was agreed that they would keep in close touch.

As soon as M.S. Gorbachev replaced the receiver, he told us: Pay particular attention during the negotiations which you will be having in a few hours to the issues that G. Bush raised.

Indeed, a few hours later—there had been practically no time for sleep—A.A. Bessmertnykh, A.M. Belonogov, and myself were meeting in a private residence of the Foreign Ministry with T. 'Aziz and the persons accompanying him. An incredibly difficult "smoothing" process began. Approximately an hour was spent on the discussion of one question alone—a pressure question on our part—the timeframe in which the American and other captives would be released. The Iraqis cited difficulties of a technical nature. We ultimately insisted, nonetheless: three days following a cessation of hostilities.

The discussion of the timeframe of the withdrawal of forces was heavy going. The Iraqis insisted on six weeks, emphasizing that this was for them a purely technical matter. Bearing in mind that the season of winds and storms, contraindicated for military operations, was soon approaching and that the Americans believed that under such conditions Iraq would deliberately stall, we proposed that the timeframe of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait City be determined separately—within the first four days, and no longer.

The biggest debate occurred and total intractability was manifested during the discussion of questions of a termination of the UN Security Council resolutions adopted in the wake of Resolution 660 which, as is known, provided for sanctions against Iraq, including the payment of compensation for the damage caused Kuwait. T. 'Aziz stressed that all these resolutions had been approved as a consequence of Iraq having refused to comply with Resolution 660, but now, he said, it agreed to immediately comply with its all requirements, and the other resolutions which were passed were thus legally meaningless.

We disagreed with this way of putting it, but T. 'Aziz declared that he had a "strict mandate," beyond whose framework he could not go. We explained to 'Aziz that this was a matter for the Security Council and that it alone could make the decisions, while we could merely speak about our position.

Six points (they have been published in the press) were ultimately born, the main one being as follows: "Iraq agrees to comply with Resolution 660, that is, to immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from Kuwait to the positions which they occupied on 1 August 1990."

In spite of all our objections and urging, T. 'Aziz did not withdraw the following point: "Immediately following the completion of the withdrawal of forces from Kuwait, the reasons in accordance with which the other Security Council resolutions were passed will be inoperative and, by virtue of this, the said resolutions will cease to have effect."

At the same time T. 'Aziz said that the approval of the entire leadership, primarily Saddam Husayn, was needed, but that he had no doubts as to a positive response. But 'Aziz nonetheless suggested to this end that he fly immediately together with me to Baghdad for a meeting with Husayn. Realizing that time was of the essence, we turned down this version, considering it possible to contact the Iraqi leadership immediately from Moscow.

"But how?" T. 'Aziz asked. "The telephones are not working." Since the bombing of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry radio station the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow had been without communications with Baghdad. We proposed that 'Aziz avail himself of our transmitters and send a telegram via the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad in Iraqi code even. It was in this way that these six points were transmitted to the Iraqi leadership in Baghdad.

Final Act of the Drama

But even prior to this, at 1900 Moscow time, President Bush had delivered an ultimatum to Iraq demanding the withdrawal of forces from Kuwaiti territory within a week, this included 48 hours to be out of Kuwait City, and that this withdrawal commence before noon New York time on Saturday, 23 February. The trigger was cocked.

Meanwhile events were developing thus: On 23 February at 0200 Moscow time (it was still 22 February in Washington) a positive response from Saddam Husayn to the telegram sent by 'Aziz was received.

At 1205 on 23 February Tariq 'Aziz met with journalists in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center. He read out the decision of the Iraqi leadership on the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all its forces from Kuwait, but alluded here to the entire "complex" worked up in Moscow. 'Aziz concluded his speech with words to the effect that the decision on the unconditional and unreserved withdrawal of forces from Kuwait was the response to President Bush's demand. Tariq 'Aziz hereupon left the Soviet Union.

Political work of the president of the USSR of unprecedented intensity began at once. First, telegrams were sent to the leaders of all countries on the Security Council. But M.S. Gorbachev did not rest content with this. He had telephone conversations—one after the other—with British Prime Minister J. Major, Italian Prime Minister G. Andreotti, French President F. Mitterrand, Egyptian President H. Mubarak, Syrian President H. al-Asad, German Chancellor H. Kohl, Japanese Prime Minister

T. Kaifu, and Iranian President A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and once more with U.S. President G. Bush. During these conversations—each had, naturally, particular content, its own emphasis and, if you will, its own form—M.S. Gorbachev emphasized:

Following the Iraqi leadership's consent to the unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait, the situation had assumed a fundamentally new nature—it was improper at such a time not to take note of the fact that an appreciable change had occurred;

achieving the turnabout would have been impossible without the joint actions of the whole world community channeled in different forms against Iraq's aggression;

Iraq's unconditional agreement opened the way to the transfer of the conflict in the Persian Gulf to the channel of a peaceful settlement.

It was proposed to President Bush and others that the UN Security Council be convened and that the plan already accepted by Iraq and the demands of the United States be combined in a single whole. It was emphasized in the conversations that the differences between the wording to which Iraq had consented and the proposals of a number of other states were not great and that they could, it seemed, be harmonized within the framework of the Security Council within one or two days.

...At daybreak on 24 February the President of the United States declared that he had given the order for the start of a ground offensive....

Tariq 'Aziz came to the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad at 0040 on 26 February. He requested the urgent transmission to the Soviet leadership of a message from Saddam Husayn, in which the latter announced the start of the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, emphasizing here that the evacuation would be carried out as quickly as possible. The Iraqi leader requested that the question of a cease-fire be raised as quickly as possible.

A telegram from our ambassador was "flashed" to Moscow. While still night the president of the USSR instructed the Soviet Embassy in Washington to notify the U.S. Administration at once.

In the night of 26 February New York time (during the day of the 26th Moscow time) a meeting of the Security Council was convened at the request of the USSR. At midday the Iraqi leadership declared that its forces would be withdrawn within a day. V.N. Ignatenko then conducted a briefing. To Western correspondents' questions as to why Iraq had not "bared" all its "reserves" in Moscow, he replied that during the negotiations with Tariq 'Aziz in Moscow he had been asked insistently to "lay on the table" all that he could. But once again, obviously, what was now customary for Iraq—a decision was made only by Saddam Husayn—was reflected.

In the night of 27 February the USSR's ambassador in Baghdad was summoned to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, where he was awaited by members of the leadership—S. Hammadi and T. 'Aziz. They requested that he convey urgently via Soviet channels to the UN secretary general and the UN Security Council chairman the statement of the Iraqi foreign minister that the Iraqi Government once again confirmed its acceptance of Resolution 660. The full withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait would be completed within several hours. It spoke also of agreement to comply with resolutions 662 and 674. The first demanded restoration of the legitimate authorities in Kuwait, the second, payment of reparations and compensation for the damage which Iraq had inflicted on this country.

A telegram was dispatched immediately to the Security Council, which was in session during the day Moscow time, but in the night New York time, of 27 February. The members of the Security Council once again requested that the Soviet channel of communications be used to convey to Iraq that this country's immediate recognition of all Security Council resolutions passed since the start of the Kuwait crisis without exception was essential.

Several hours after the transmission of this telegram to the Iraqi leadership it confirmed that it agreed to accept all these resolutions.

There were practically no longer any Iraqi forces in Kuwait by this time.

At 0245 on 28 February J. Baker called A.A. Bessmertnykh and told him that in response to Iraq's agreeing to accept for execution all UN Security Council resolutions on the Kuwait crisis, the United States had decided to suspend hostilities.

A new, very tense stage of the elimination of the crisis in the Persian Gulf is approaching. The guns have fallen silent. The politicians are now to have their telling say once more.

United States & Canada

Reports Preview Baker's Upcoming Moscow Visit

Post-War Gulf Settlement Eyed

PM1103154191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin from roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, SIBINFORM, REUTER, and UPI items: "Telephone Conversation Between J. Baker and A. Bessmertnykh"]

[Text] As M. Yusin. our diplomatic correspondent, was told at the USSR Foreign Ministry, on the evening of 10 March there was a telephone conversation between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. The conversation was devoted to the Persian Gulf situation.

Baker, who is touring countries in the Near East, contacted Bessmertnykh soon after the end of the talks in the Saudi capital with the foreign ministers of the eight Arab states belonging to the anti-Iraq coalition—Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar.

At the end of the Near East section of his tour on Thursday 14 March the Secretary of State will be flying to Moscow where, it is planned, he will spend two days. In the words of a well-informed USSR Foreign Ministry staffer, the main themes of Baker's talks with Soviet leaders will be the "postwar settlement in the Persian Gulf; the situation in the Near East and in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict; and problems of disarmament, first and foremost the reduction of strategic offensive arms."

Visit With Yeltsin Not Planned

LD1203113291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Text] A meeting between Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian legislature, and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, is not planned for the next few days. This was announced by the White House press secretary replying to journalists' questions about the forthcoming visit to Moscow by the top American diplomat.

Near East & South Asia

Bahrain Defense Minister Favors Improved Ties

LD0603102191 Moscow TASS in English 0941 GMT 6 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Bogachev and Victor Lebedev]

[Text] Manama March 6 TASS— "Problems linked with security and stability in the Gulf region will be resolved in the spirit of concord, now prevailing in the world, through common efforts exerted by members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab states of the Gulf. Every Gulf state will ensure its national security in cooperation with other parties," Bahrain Defence Minister Khalifah Bin Ahmad Al Khalifah told TASS.

The minister favoured the development of Bahrain-Soviet military relations. "We respect the Soviet Army and highly value Soviet military hardware, which has proved its worth in the Middle East. We are pleased with the cooperation between Arab armies and the USSR. We are looking forward to the opening of a Soviet embassy in Manama." he said.

Al Khalifah regretted that two Arab states—Kuwait and Iraq—had incurred huge losses due to the conflict. He condemned the Iraqi leadership for invading Kuwait.

The minister said Bahrain did not want Iraq to be dismembered or a civil war to break out there.

Egyptian Envoy Comments on Soviet Mideast Role

LD0903100891 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Statement by Ahmad Mahir al-Sayyid, Egyptian ambassador to the Soviet Union, to an unidentified correspondent, place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] In this crisis, the Soviet Union played a positive and extremely important role, whether at the level of bilateral relations or within the framework of the Security Council. It assumed this role as a friend and as a superpower and also as one of the founders of the new political thinking. All these factors made the Soviet role clear from the outset.

The Soviet Union was of the opinion that the aggression had to be denounced and ended, and that Iraq had to withdraw from Kuwait. Secondly, it preferred that this be achieved by peaceful means, as a result all the contacts and missions entrusted to Soviet envoys to Iraq were aimed at convincing Iraq to respond favorably to the demand of the international community for a complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. In other words, the Soviet Union was acting within the framework of the UN resolutions and international legitimacy.

Moreover, it was clear to the Soviet Union from the start that the aggression against Kuwait had impeded the efforts to settle the main issue, namely the Middle East issue, and that after dealing with the aggression it was necessary to move quickly on the road of settling the other problems in the region.

This was clearly stated in the joint communique issued by President Gorbachev and President Bush in Helsinki and it was also clearly stated in the statement issued Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker in Washington. The idea is that we have to settle all the issues of the region on the basis of justice and law. Therefore, the Soviet Union is now

clearly active in the effort for actions to settle the Palestinian issue. The U.S. side is convinced of this and we heard President Bush in his address last night before the Congress stress the real need for swift action to settle the problem between the Arabs and Israel. We have also heard the Soviet Union stress the same idea; and we hear that U.S. Secretary of State Baker will be visiting the region and the Soviet Union to tackle this issue.

Therefore, we believe that the Soviet Union played an active role in this respect from the start and that as a friend of the Arabs, a friend of justice, and as a superpower, it is taking advantage of its role at the United Nations and of its relations with the United States and with the various states of the world in order to push forward the issue of a settlement in the Middle East.

We are convinced that during all these contacts and during all this flurry of activity the Soviet Union is committed to its positions based on principles, namely the rejection of aggression, the right of the peoples to self-determination, and the need to establish peace on the basis of justice. Within the framework of this justice it is possible to settle all the problems in a way that is satisfactory to all parties and that does not include any injustice to the Palestinians.

This is the position of the Soviet Union as we have seen it since the start of the crisis and this is the Soviet position that we know will continue. We are looking forward to the day when it will be able, in collaboration with the other effective powers in the world, to reach a settlement of the Palestinian problem.

We are consulting with the Soviet Union on this matter and it is consulting with us, and the consultations are close and continuous. We will see that these consultations will have good affects and, with God's permission, the new order will be established in the Middle East region. Perhaps the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait has made people aware of the need to lay down guarantees in the region and lay down the political, legal, and other guarantees in order to be able to avoid similar situations in the future and tackle similar situations that exist now.

Iraqi Businessman Interviewed on Soviet Stance

PM1103115091 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Iraqi businessman Husam al-Khalidi by correspondent V. Afanasyev under the "Viewpoint" rubric; place and date not given: "And Moscow Stayed Silent..."]

[Text] What did Iraqi business circles think of the USSR's February peace initiative and the Soviet Union's position in the Security Council? Our correspondent V. Afanasyev met with eminent businessman Husam al-Khalidi, whose firm has long-standing and solid links with the USSR, and asked for his opinion.

[Al-Khalidi] From the very beginning, I believed that the Soviet Union would intervene in some way in the military action by the multinational forces against Iraq. As an Iraqi citizen, and as an individual who has lived in your country for many years, who grew up here, and who is well acquainted with and fond of the Soviet people, I was at a loss as to why Moscow stayed silent. Moscow had its say, but unfortunately it was far too late. Moscow stayed silent when the Americans mercilessly destroyed my country's peaceful population, when they wreaked vengeance on Iraq. I say "the Americans" because they form the overwhelming part of the multinational forces. The Americans bombed not just civil targets, but—as Mr. Primakov confirmed in a television interview and in his PRAVDA article—"prestigious" targets. They dropped bombs and missiles onto the Palace of Congresses, Baghdad's most beautiful bridges, the finest superhighways of a sort that not even the whole of Europe can boast, mosques, and churches. They literally plowed Baghdad into the ground. Judging from America's boastful communiques and the reports on Baghdad radio, the Americans have simply razed Basra to the ground. It is significant that American pilots liked to don earphones and listen to the Rolling Stones during operational sorties. This, as a radio presenter once announced, was confirmed by polls carried out among U.S. servicemen serving in the multinational forces. That says it all! The Americans boasted about their "smart" bombs capable of hitting a target to an accuracy of 30 cm. For example, having bombed a baby food factory, a hospital, and residential apartment blocks, they announced that according to their information there was a chemicals plant on that site. Iraq accepted the Soviet initiative because it derived, and I stress this, from the Soviet Union.

[Afanasyev] According to reports from the Iranian News Agency IRNA and other media sources, the multinational forces even completed raids over the cities of Karbala and al-Najif, which are considered sacred by Shi'ites. As a result, in Karbala for example 25 mosques were damaged. Al-Najif was subjected to bombardment by the multinational air forces 300 times.

[Al-Khalidi] It is so barbaric to bomb mosques, which are Muslim places and sacred to all and which are not of course military targets.

[Afanasyev] But Muslim pilots in the multinational forces took part in the bombardment of Iraq. Admittedly, I cannot recall any reports of direct participation by them in these monstrous acts.

[Al-Khalidi] I do not think that Kuwaiti pilots or for example those from the United Arab Emirates would encroach upon the Muslim holy places—I credit them with some decency and some sense of morality! I am a Muslim and I always treat Christians with great respect. Indeed the majority of my friends are Christians. But to destroy mosques is barbaric and totally unforgivable. Anybody who participates in the slaughter of the civilian population or the destruction of cultural monuments

and peaceful civilian targets must be called to account before God and mankind as criminals. How could anybody vote so lightly to begin this war? I for one never doubted that the Americans would bomb civilian targets.

[Afanasyev] What do you think of UN Security Council Resolution 678 which presented Iraq with the 15 January deadline for withdrawing its troops from Kuwait? What is your attitude toward the USSR stance in voting for this resolution?

[Al-Khalidi] Do you want my personal opinion, or would you like me to respond as if writing in your editorials?

[Afanasyev] Your personal opinion, of course.

[Al-Khalidi] Then I will say that the Soviet Union was wrong. Even China abstained. Having maintained friendly relations with Iraq over many decades, armed it so that it might rebuff any aggression, and signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with it, the Soviet Union then sanctions its slaughter! I think that the Soviet Union voted for this resolution in the heat of the moment.

[Afanasyev] How do you, a businessman, view the prospects for future developments in Soviet-Iraq relations?

[Al-Khalidi] The last Soviet initiative, which ended the war, retrieved the situation in principle and saved the lives of tens if not hundreds of thousands of people, and I think it will increase the Soviet Union's prestige, which had taken something of a knock in Arab eyes after the vote in the Security Council in favor of using military force against Iraq. Now more sober individuals, professional diplomats, are at the helm in the Soviet foreign policy department. I get the impression that Gorbachev is also giving more careful attention to this region. This is reflected in recent visits to Baghdad by his special envoy, Mr. Primakov.

[Afanasyev] There are various views on the aims pursued by the United States and their NATO allies in this war. What do you think about this?

[Al-Khalidi] Many people, including in the West, rated the Iraqi Army fourth in the world behind the United States, the USSR, and China. Iraq was forced to create a powerful army because we have close by us such an aggressive state as Israel, which arms itself systematically....

[Afanasyev] Which is not averse to the idea of creating a "Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates."

[Al-Khalidi] Absolutely. The Zionists include part of Iraq in their image of the "Greater Israel." That is why Iraq was forced to arm itself and strove to create a strong and disciplined army.

Remember the chronicle of events in the Arab-Israeli War. The world community in the form of the United Nations repeatedly branded Israel an aggressor and introduced hundreds of resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories and condemning Jerusalem's annexation of the Golan Heights. The Soviet Union's policy over the decades has been to support the just cause of the Palestinian people, their lawful right to self-determination and to the establishment of their own state. This right was bestowed on them by the United Nations. But Israel, with characteristic insolence, has to this day refused to fulfill these resolutions and the United States has supported and shielded it in every way possible. Nobody blockaded Israel, nobody sought to force it to leave the occupied territories under threat of military intervention by multinational forces. Let us face the truth. Why was there no anti-Israel coalition? Why no "carpet" bombing of Israel by Soviet aircraft? Why does the Soviet Union not use force to get Israel to fulfill the relevant UN Security Council resolutions? It sounds funny, do you not think? But there is Israel, and then there is Iraq. You know some people think that the Iraqis are savages and that you can do anything you like to them. Is that not imperialist arrogance?

I think that the liberation of Kuwait is only of minor import for the West. The priority is the total destruction of Iraq's military machine so that Israel can feel confident and dictate its terms to the Arabs. Another aim is to destroy Iraq's economic potential. The third is to do away with a modern, civilized Iraq and place it under a cloud of ruin, famine, and ignorance.

[Afanasyev] During my work in Iraq and on my latest trip to that country I have seen for myself that traditionally the Iraqis are very friendly to Soviet people. All our specialists with whom I had occasion to speak out there stressed this time and again....

[Al-Khalidi] We have a unique relationship with the Soviet people. In Iraq, the Soviet passport has always been like some kind of magic wand. We have always loved and respected the Soviet people. Iraqis were happy to send their children to study in the USSR. The roots laid by the USSR in Iraq are so deep that it would be impossible to rip them all out in one go.

Reports Follow Arab Coalition Talks in Damascus

PRAVDA Notes Postwar Agenda

PM1103124591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

["Correspondent's Comment" by Vladimir Belyakov: "Regrouping Of Forces"]

[Text] Cairo—A declaration on coordination and cooperation among the Arab states was initialed in Damascus on Wednesday. The participants are eight countries of the anti-Iraq coalition—the "six" oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf, headed by Saudi Arabia, and also Egypt and Syria.

Observers focused attention on the declaration's provisions concerning the safeguarding of peace and stability in the region in the context of a postwar settlement. The document notes that Egyptian and Syrian forces will form the backbone of an inter-Arab peacekeeping force after the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region.

According to the parties to the declaration, since the liberation of Kuwait a favorable atmosphere has been created for the elimination of the Israeli occupation of Arab lands. They believe that an international peace conference under UN auspices would be a suitable instrument for securing an end to the Israeli occupation and safeguarding the Palestinian people's national rights on the basis of the well-known UN resolutions. There is no mention in the document of the PLO and its right to participate in the peace process as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, acknowledged by the United Nations. As is known, the PLO did not support the anti-Iraq coalition, which caused strong criticism on the part of its participants.

The declaration also calls for the transformation of the Near East into a zone free from all types of mass destruction weapons, above all nuclear weapons.

Equally interesting are the provisions in the document that relate to economic cooperation among its participants. The point is that 10 years ago the rich "six" formed the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], whose economic links were orientated toward the West and not toward the Arab world. For instance, on the eve of the Gulf crisis, Kuwait's capital investments in Western states' economies amounted to $100 billion, whereas investments in the economy of Egypt—the biggest Arab country—were no more than $4 billion. Saudi investments told a similar story. This policy caused irritation in the Arab world, and Iraqi propaganda used it for its own ends during the crisis.

As GCC Secretary General 'A. Bisharah said when I met with him in Riyadh, the "six" have revised their views on economic cooperation with the Arab world. It was decided to set up a special development fund of $15 billion. According to Bisharah, only the anti-Iraq coalition states will use the fund's resources.

It should be pointed out that the GCC was followed in 1989 by the creation of another two subregional organizations in the Arab world—the Arab Maghreb Union, comprising five North African states, and the Arab Cooperation Council, which included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. The latter organization disintegrated after the start of the Kuwait crisis. Now the Damascus declaration talks of the need to create an Arab economic grouping on the basis of the "six," Egypt, and Syria. So we are seeing a regrouping of forces in the Arab world.

Cooperation Noted

PM1103125591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent M. Kozhevnikov: "Security in the Near East as Seen by the Arabs"]

[Text] Damascus—Over a two-day period—5 and 6 March—you needed a special pass and had to go through several security checks to get into the Sheraton hotel, which is located in one of the most picturesque corners of the Syrian capital. It was the venue of the first postwar conference of the foreign ministers of the eight Arab states that were recently allies in the anti-Iraq coalition....

Representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] countries and Egypt and Syria had assembled there to discuss the current political situation in the region and elaborate a general strategy and tactics for the immediate future. The discussion resulted in a document entitled the "Damascus Declaration on Coordination and Cooperation." It is essentially a policy document and it will soon be submitted for ratification by the supreme legislative organs of the countries that participated in the conference.

The declaration expresses satisfaction in connection with the liberation of Kuwait and the restoration of the legal authority there and stresses adherence to the Arab League Charter and also to the treaty on joint defense and economic cooperation among the organization's members. At the same time, the document stresses that the Arab League mechanism, as recent experience has shown, needs improvement, in particular where using it for the settlement of acute inter-Arab conflicts is concerned.

The declaration gives prominence to questions of cooperation in the military sphere. For instance, the ministers came up with the initiative to create an inter-Arab peacekeeping force in the Persian Gulf within the framework of a new regional security system. The declaration says that the Egyptian and Syrian forces which have been in the region since the conflict began could form its backbone. Remember that after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait Egypt and Syria stationed military contingents on the territory of Saudi Arabia and some other countries in the region at their request. They subsequently participated in the operations to liberate Kuwait. In the present situation, the Arab allies in the anti-Iraq coalition believe, these forces could be given the job of maintaining stability in the region in the postwar period.

There are many other interesting and important points in the Damascus declaration. First and foremost, there is the participants' acknowledgment of the urgent need to turn the Near East into an area free from mass destruction weapons, above all nuclear weapons. The countries that signed the document expressed their resolve to bring this about by exploiting every opportunity available to

them, including the medium of authoritative international organizations. As Egyptian Foreign Minister I. A. 'Abd-al-Majid told journalists, it is a matter, of course, of certain commitments on the part not only of the Arab countries, but also of Israel, which must also abandon the production and use of such types of weapons.

As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the opinion of the declaration's authors, the time has come for more vigorous efforts to bring about a final and just settlement. The document expresses full support for the idea of convening a representative international conference on the Near East and stresses that it alone can contribute to the cessation of the Israeli occupation of Arab families [as published] and safeguarding of Palestinians' legitimate national rights.

In announcing their political program, the Damascus conference participants made it plain that their initiatives are not an exclusive affair. They stressed that any of the other Arab sides could endorse the declaration they had drawn up. The declaration, the document says, is not directed against anyone, but is intended to be the preamble to the "arrangement of a dialogue with Islamic and other states who respect the interests of the mass of Arabs and the principles of the international rule of law." Commenting on this formula, observers believe that it refers above all to Iran and the role allotted to it in the regional security system in the new conditions. The statement by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmed at the end of the conference is typical in that case. "We have good relations with Iran and we hope that it will remain neutral and will not interfere in inter-Arab affairs," he said.

At the same time, it was said behind the scenes at the conference that some of its participants were somewhat anxious when they heard the latest report about the actions of the Shi'ite opposition in Iraq, seeing it as an attempt by Tehran to influence events in a neighboring Arab country. Political observers note that the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are pinning great hopes on Syria, which, in their view, is capable of playing a stabilizing role in the region, above all in view of its traditional friendly relations with Iran. Clearly it is no accident that senior Iranian representatives—First Vice President H. Habibi and Foreign Minister 'A.A. Velayati—are due to arrive in Damascus immediately after the conclusion of the conference of the Arab "eight."

Iraq's Defeat, Consequences, Lessons Viewed

PM1103115591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major M. Pogorelyy: "From a Military Observer's Viewpoint; What the War Showed"]

[Text] The six-week war in the Persian Gulf region will evidently continue to be studied long and hard at the staffs of many countries' armed forces. The actions of the opposing sides, the components of the success scored by some, and the miscalculations and mistakes of others will be analyzed in detail. Politicians, too, will have to thoroughly comprehend the situation which took shape, as they go about building future regional strategy in the light of the consequences and lessons of the crisis. The eruption, course, and outcome of the war between the countries of the multinational coalition and Iraq in the Kuwaiti theater of military operations even now enables some conclusions, albeit preliminary ones, to be drawn from what has happened.

Thus, why did the war break out at all? What made it inevitable? The most obvious answer is the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait and its unwillingness to fulfill the UN Security Council resolutions, as well as the world community's determination to see these wishes fulfilled. This answer is not completely exhaustive, however. First, many similar conflicts lasting for years still remain unresolved and the aggressors unpunished. To name but a few examples the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, Turkish troops' retention of the northern part of Cyprus, etc.

Second, it seems that the countries of the anti-Iraq coalition just made no attempt to wait for the various UN sanctions to take effect (but let us remember the West's long-suffering patience in respect of South Africa, "blockaded" by sanctions). The war started immediately the time set for Iraq had expired.

The reasons for the firm and, let us put it this way, the consistent U.S. determination to smash Iraq and destroy its military and economic potential lie primarily, of course, in the Near East's oil. The main and not very well concealed spring of the war can be seen in its desire to secure free access to the oil for itself. "The largest oil reserves in the world," the French L'HUMANITE states, "come henceforth under U.S. control." Which, as the saying goes, is what it always wanted.

Not everything here is so simple, however. It can be assumed that Baghdad's undoubted pretentions to leadership in the region, in the Arab world, and possibly in the whole "Third World" gave the U.S Administration a powerful push toward open armed conflict. U.S. Senator A. D'Amato spoke completely unambiguously about this the day before the war: "Imagine a Near East where Saddam Husayn commands a multimillion army equipped with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the intercontinental missiles to deliver them. If Husayn is not destroyed now, this is precisely what will confront us in the future...."

Finally, by all accounts, the need for rehabilitation after the inglorious and fruitless Vietnam adventure came to the surface in U.S. society. In the years that have passed after it ended a new generation has grown up which has continued to bear the burden of the "sins" of 20 years ago. Here in the Arabian deserts, in the words of President G. Bush, "the 'Vietnam syndrome' has been killed once and for all." The fear or the unwillingness to use military force to achieve foreign policy objectives have,

it seems, been overcome.
In the very situation in question U.S. national interests coincided with the will of the world community of nations which was convinced that henceforth not a single people's or a single state's sovereign rights must be allowed to be flouted. This main line of world policy received decisive support from our country, which spoke out against the aggression and against the right of a powerful neighbor to crush a weaker one. That is, in this case it was not a question of automatically approving any U.S. Government actions—the Soviet Union stood up for the very principles of new political thinking in the practice of international relations.

Another major question is why the multinational coalition won (so quickly and with minimal losses), in just six weeks inflicting a crushing defeat on an army until then considered fourth in the world in terms of numerical strength and effectiveness.

Of course, what told here was above all the overwhelming superiority of U.S. troops—the basis of the coalition—in contemporary warfare methods: in aviation, high-accuracy weapons, means of intelligence, of communication, and of controlling troops and weapons, radio-electronic warfare, etc. Many observers have formed the impression, which is probably not so very far from the truth, that Iraq was simply stunned and crushed by the storm of fire that rained down on the positions of its troops, military installations, and cities. Allied aviation alone completed over 110,000 sorties in this period, each day raining such a quantity of bombs and missiles down on Iraq that their total yield was equivalent to the U.S. atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

I think that what also told was the multinational coalition troops' superiority in strategy and tactics, the skillful combination of fire and maneuver, and the organization of collaboration between tank units, motorized infantry, artillery, aviation, and marine units. It is highly indicative that the ground forces combat operations where Iraq had definite advantages lasted a total of only 100 hours.

I cannot fail to object to those who claim that the smashing of Iraq is a "mirror of the defeat of the Soviet Armed Forces in a possible military conflict" because S. Husayn's Army is equipped predominantly with Soviet military hardware and weapons. There are more than enough of such judgments in both the foreign and Soviet mass media. At the same time, there is evidence of another interpretation. I will cite one instance. The British INDEPENDENT newspaper, quoting the words of a participant in combat operations, writes: "They (the Iraqis) had at their disposal fantastic modern systems and an air force for which we ourselves would give anything to possess. They had the latest tanks and the most modern artillery. What they did not have was... the proficiency and the doctrine to enable all this fantastic potential to be put together." Moreover, according to an assessment by specialists, the Syrian forces, which were equipped with Soviet-produced weapons that were even less up-to-date, acquitted themselves well in the battles for Kuwait.

The lack of the necessary proficiency and training of servicemen in the army that seemed strong and hardened by the battles of the preceding eight-year Iran-Iraq war played its fateful role in the clash with the well trained and properly prepared troops of the United States and of their coalition allies. Without minimizing the role of the military technology factor, in my view the lack in Husayn's soldiers of the great force that unites and repeatedly strengthens warriors—the awareness of the rightness of the struggle for a just cause—cannot fail to be noted. Let us recall Lenin's words, whose correctness life has repeatedly confirmed: "Belief in the justness of a war and awareness of the need to sacrifice one's life for one's brothers raises the morale of soldiers and makes them endure unheard of difficulties.... Realization by the masses of the aims of and reasons for a war is of enormous significance and guarantees victory." The fact that the moral and political factor on the battlefield is not something that the political workers can merely fabricate, as Western military observers also confirm. The Frenchmen J. Isnard, for example, thinks that Iraq's defeat is explained by the "mood of the soldiers, who did not support this war." G. Bush also expressed a similar idea, noting that "soldiers fighting for freedom are stronger than soldiers fighting under duress." It is difficult not to agree with this.

How will the situation in the Persian Gulf region develop in the future? Making a forecast is still too complex. Only one thing can be said with certainty—there is still a long way to go to stability there. As serious politicians note, winning a war is not enough, it is more important to win the peace. At present, Washington considers the expansion of its military presence there (compared with its prewar presence) as a definite guarantee of stability in the region. According to information from Pentagon sources, what is specifically envisaged is the maintenance on the Arabian peninsula for an indeterminate time of a minimum of one armored division and the hardware for another two such divisions, and one or two fighter-bomber aviation wings, and the presence in the Gulf of one or two aircraft carrier groups. Even now the regular conduct of major joint maneuvers of U.S. and allied armed forces is being planned. How much will this powder keg, placed where they are ready to brandish a burning torch, help to preserve peace?

Something else makes me suspicious. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey have requested that before the end of this year the United States sell them weapons worth $33 billion—$2 billion more than in 1990. This is what gives grounds for pondering one's responsibility for regional security. Let us not forget that, however paradoxical it might be, Iraq created 95 percent of its military potential from deliveries by the five permanent UN Security Council members!

It should also be noted that in recent days the military technical aspect of the Near East problem in general has been growing increasingly popular in the West. NATO Secretary General M. Woerner sees the war's main lesson as the need to strengthen the bloc's southern flank. French politicians are talking of the need to increase their country's military expenditures by 50 billion francs a year, considering that such is the price of "France's place as a permanent Council member and of its world role"....

The removal of the deep-seated reasons for instability in the region and the sources of the cataclysms constantly shaking the Near East is becoming increasingly significant in the situation as it exists today. First and foremost this means settling the Arab-Israeli conflict and unravelling the Palestinian problem. The mutual understanding that has taken shape between the USSR and the United States and the other UN Security Council members can play a decisive role in this process. The main thing is to remember, as expressed in the words of THE WASHINGTON POST, that the problems of a Near East settlement and ensuring security here do not lend themselves to the same solution that President Bush used during the war.

It is Soviet policy, in my view, that is an example here. However critically it might be assessed in the West, including in Washington, at the end of the day in reality it played a considerable role in the speedy termination of the war. Having realized the viability and practicability of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's plan, S. Husayn came to the conclusion about the need to stop the bloodshed and prevent the complete destruction of Iraq and the Iraqi people. How many anti-Iraq coalition soldiers' lives were saved by the termination of further hostilities and the peace talks that followed this.

U.S. journalists think that as a result of the victory the epitome of an "awesome and powerful America" has been created. I would like to see America as wise and restrained, capable of resisting the temptation of the opportunity to bring large strike forces into play, and, in collaboration with its neighbors throughout the planet, persistently and patiently seeking and finding political solutions to complex problems of contemporary life.

Regional Arab Alliances May Replace Arab League

PM1203102591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent A. Portanskiy: "First Casualty of Crisis"]

[Text] Algiers—"We no longer need a regional organization," Chadli Klibi, former general secretary of the Arab League, stated at the height of the war in the Persian Gulf. "We must radically review its base, the league should be transformed into an Arab community." Klibi also admitted with regret that the solidarity of the organization's 21 members has frequently come down merely to a common tongue.

Perhaps this was put too severely. After all, for many years (when, incidentally, it was Klibi who headed the Arab League) it played a notable role in the international arena, be it in the United Nations or in the nonaligned movement. The Organization of Arab Unity and the Islamic Conference Organization arose with the assistance of the Arab League.

The Arab League was able to withstand the trial by Camp David in 1978, when as a result of Egypt's signing of what were from the Arabs' viewpoint shameful agreements with Israel, Cairo's membership of the organization was suspended and its headquarters transferred to Tunis.

But the time bomb's clockwork mechanism began its countdown long ago. For the long-term interests of the fabulously wealthy oil monarchies on the one hand and the large but poor Arab states on the other gathered under the single roof of the league had ultimately to diverge.

The explosion occurred in the fall of last year, when the Arab states' desperate attempts to find an Arab solution to the crisis in the Persian Gulf failed and the Arab League split into two camps.

In many Arab capitals you can now hear it said that the Arab League became the first casualty of the crisis in the Persian Gulf. What is meant by that? The point is, the Moroccan political scientist A. Saaf [name as transliterated] explained in a talk with me, that the regional Arab system did not withstand the trial of the crisis. Because upon checking it turned out that the mutual relations of some Arab countries with external partners were more important to them than their ties with other Arab states. For instance, for Egypt relations with the United States were more important than relations with Iraq. The same thing, Saaf notes, can be said of other states. For Morocco and Tunisia their relations with France have always been more important than their relations with Algeria.

The Arab world, according to Algerian President C. Bendjedid, will no longer be what it was before. That means in particular that in the political sense it can no longer be viewed as something which extends from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic. Therefore in all likelihood the regional Arab system should also change substantially. Signs of these changes can be discerned today. The vacuum which has formed from the virtual departure of the Arab League from the arena is already being filled by regional organizations which are more restricted in terms of the number of their members and younger in terms of age. It is primarily a case of the cooperation council of Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, whose conference has just been held in Damascus, and of the Arab Maghreb Union whose member states, although they were further from the conflict zone, nonetheless realized sufficiently clearly that their economic and political security should be ensured primarily by joint efforts at their own, regional level.

Korniyenko Criticizes Shevardnadze Gulf Stand

PM1103161891 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by former USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister G. Korniyenko under the rubric "On the Persian Gulf, and More Besides": "Sing No Hymns to Dilettantes"]

[Text] *E.A. Shevardnadze: "I see no flaws in the policy I was responsible for implementing..." (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 10 March 1991).*

Kuwait is liberated. Iraq, which perpetrated the act of aggression against it, has suffered a crushing defeat. Grounds for rejoicing, you would think. But let us ask just one question of ourselves, and of our former [foreign] minister E.A. Shevardnadze, who voted on behalf of the Soviet state on 29 November last year in favor of the UN Security Council resolution giving the United States and its allies in the anti-Iraq coalition virtual carte blanche in their actions against Iraq after 15 January 1991. The question is this: Would any of us have voted for this resolution if we had known in advance that the United States would implement it the way it did?

If any of us, E.A. Shevardnadze included, can answer that question in the affirmative, it is a matter for his conscience—no further questions arise for him. But since I myself, like, I suppose, the majority of us, cannot with a clear conscience answer that question in the affirmative, two further questions inevitably arise: What was the nature of the mistake made, and how can it be explained? That is what I want to talk about, drawing on my own knowledge of U.S. affairs, which goes back more than 40 years, and my knowledge of Near Eastern affairs, which is less extensive, but also goes back many years.

I imagine it goes without saying that the Iraqi troops' invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 should have immediately been described by us as aggression, and condemned. One cannot help being perplexed to find that neither of these elements was present either in the initial comment by our Foreign Ministry's official spokesman, or in the first Soviet Government statement of 2 August, a statement prepared by that same department. E.A. Shevardnadze's memory was clearly letting him down when he asserted in his speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet on 11 September that "on 2 August, a few hours after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait became known, a Soviet Government statement was issued, clearly condemning the use of force...." That was precisely what did not happen, and the West noted this fact at the time, with displeasure. True, this blunder was soon rectified, when the Soviet Union, later the same day, voted for Security Council Resolution 660, which condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its troops from that country.

It was also indisputably correct, in my view, for the Soviet Union to support in both word and deed the Security Council resolution concerning the use of economic and other nonmilitary sanctions against Iraq on the grounds of its nonfulfillment of Security Council Resolution 660.

Doubts about the correctness of our line in connection with the Persian Gulf crisis began to emerge, particularly with regard to the implementation of that line by our then foreign minister, from the time that the question arose of the possible use of military sanctions against Iraq.

It is well known that immediately after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the United States, at the request of the government of Saudi Arabia, which was threatened with the same fate, sent troops to that country and began to move its naval fleet up to the Persian Gulf. During August and September the Bush Administration gave public assurances that the purpose of the presence of American Armed Forces there was to enforce the economic blockade of Iraq and prevent further aggressive acts on its part, and not for using directly to expel the Iraqi troops from Kuwait, still less for a strike against Iraq itself. It emerged from conversations I had with many prominent political figures while I was in the United States last September that at that period the Bush Administration's line was determined by the existence of quite strong feelings in that country against a "new Vietnam," which could have resulted from direct U.S. involvement in military operations in the Persian Gulf zone.

Be that as it may, in his speech at the UN General Assembly session on 1 October 1990 President Bush did not breathe a word about the use of military force against Iraq. On the contrary, he emphasized his confidence that "military force will never be used."

The first person to speak from the UN rostrum about the possibility of the use of force against Iraq if its occupation of Kuwait continued was—strange as it may seem—the then Soviet foreign minister. This can easily be seen by anyone who takes the trouble to study the transcript of the general debates at the UN General Assembly in late September-early October last year, comparing, in particular, E.A. Shevardnadze's 26 September speech and the aforementioned speech by G. Bush on 1 October. The Soviet minister stressed, of course, that "the use of force is possible only in extremis." But the fact remains that it was he who made the first reference to the possibility of using force to make Iraq leave Kuwait.

I am not saying that without him the United States would not soon have gotten around to raising this question itself, but why be in a hurry to jump into the fire first, as the saying goes? What lofty ideals prompted this? Did common sense come into it at all? A number of U.S. politicians who deemed it possible and expedient to bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait through the continuation, and if necessary intensification, of economic and other sanctions against it, but without the use of military force, said frankly that these remarks by the

Soviet minister did not help them, but did more to help those who were impatient to deal with Saddam Husayn and did not shrink from war.

But our minister's main blunders were perpetrated, in my view, when the United States officially raised the question of the Security Council's adoption of a resolution authorizing the use of military sanctions against Iraq.

Given Iraq's stubborn refusal to leave Kuwait, the adoption of **some kind** of resolution on this question was, in my view, permissible in principle, as a means of bringing additional pressure to bear. In any case, it was clearly not possible wholly to rule out that possibility in the situation that had arisen, especially in view of our minister's earlier statements on this score.

The problem was to make the resolution such that it would, on the one hand, serve the aforementioned goal, that is, act as a means of considerable additional pressure on Iraq, but, on the other hand, not channel all efforts into the military plane and make the use of armed force inevitable. In other words, it was a question of creating a situation in which a "sword of Damocles" would hang over Iraq, but its use would not be inevitable or automatic.

Of course, it is easier to say that than to draft such a resolution. But that is what the difficult art of politics and diplomacy consists of, if it is to be anything more than high-flown rhetoric.

Most regrettably—to put it mildly—Security Council Resolution 678 did not turn out that way. To see that, you only have to read closely its most important clause, which declares that the Security Council "authorizes the UN members states in cooperation with the government of Kuwait, if Iraq does not fulfill the aforementioned resolutions as stipulated in Point 1 above on our before 15 January 1991, **to use all necessary means** to maintain and fulfill Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the region."

The very fact that the resolution set an ultimatum with a specific date (15 January) made war inevitable, and so it turned out. The authors of the resolution (and the USSR was among them) tied their own hands, in the sense that the issue was predetermined. At the same time, the fact that the Security Council permitted, or rather, even, **authorized** the states of the anti-Iraq coalition to use **all necessary means** to that end meant that they were given a completely free hand in choosing those means.

Since the resolution placed no restrictions on this point, had the United States decided to use nuclear weapons or other means of mass destruction it would theoretically have been entitled to say that this was permitted by the resolution. The fact that the resolution did not specify that it was talking about the use of "all necessary means" solely against Iraq, but spoke of their use in general to "maintain and fulfill" Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions, theoretically gave the United States the right to use force also against other states that were at fault, for instance, in the matter of observing the sanctions against Iraq stipulated in those resolutions.

Leaving aside these hypothetical situations (although the authors of the resolution had a duty to exclude the slightest possibility of its being interpreted loosely), and bearing in mind what actually happened after 15 January, you cannot help coming to the conclusion that the scale and nature of military operations by the United States and its allies against Iraq were by no means confined to the task of liberating Kuwait's territory. But all accusations that its actions had gone beyond the bounds of the Security Council mandate or were in danger of doing so, were swept aside by the United States—not without theoretical justification—with a reference to the basically "elastic" formulas of Resolution 678. Indeed, the framework of the mandate was defined so broadly and vaguely that the United States and its allies were able to fit anything they liked into that framework. In this respect Security Council Resolution 678 is worthy of inclusion, in my opinion, in textbooks on the art of diplomacy, as an example of how not to draft such a crucial document.

I foresee counterarguments to the effect that making the Security Council resolution conform to my view was impossible because of U.S. objections, and if we had not accepted such a resolution whatever form it took, the United States would still have engaged in military operations against Iraq, but would not acted under UN auspices, which would have been even worse, since it would have had a totally free hand.

The argument that without the Security Council's sanction the United States would have started a war against Iraq all the same is entirely reasonable, though not absolutely beyond dispute. Suffice it to recall the difficulties that Bush experienced, although he already had carte blanche from the United Nations, in obtaining the consent of the U.S. Congress to the use of the armed forces in the Persian Gulf region—he did not obtain that consent until 12 January this year, three days before the expiry of the ultimatum imposed on Iraq, while in the Senate only just over half the members (52 Senators to 47) voted in favor of granting the President that right. Clearly it would have been far more difficult for Bush to obtain the consent of Congress to commence military operations not under a Security Council mandate, but on his own authority.

Nonetheless Bush would eventually—this is also my view—have obtained the consent of Congress even without the existence of the Security Council resolution, but would this have made things "worse"? When it comes to the conduct of hostilities, we have all seen that even with Security Council Resolution 678 in existence, the United States turned out to have virtually a completely free hand. At the same time, in that event we

would not have borne the moral responsibility for its considerable "excesses" in the course of fulfilling the resolution.

Since I am inclined to think that E.A. Shevardnadze would not, after all, have incurred guilt by voting for Resolution 678 if he had had a clear idea of the future shape of U.S. operations, the question remains, how can we explain his mistake on this point. No doubt it is not particularly surprising that in five and a half years as foreign minister, despite his numerous meetings with American leaders, he could still have failed to accumulate sufficient knowledge himself to correctly predict the U.S. line of conduct. But I know that there are plenty of specialists at the Foreign Ministry who know the United States well and who would not have found it particularly difficult to make a fairly accurate prediction of how the United States would behave once it received carte blanche from the United Nations. So either their knowledge and experience were not enlisted at all, or else, as used to happen in the old days, the experts were heard, and their opinions ignored.

Incidentally, the same question arose at the very beginning of the Persian Gulf crisis. In a talk with journalists on 3 August 1990 at Vnukovo Airport, where E.A. Shevardnadze had a working meeting with Secretary of State J. Baker, the USSR foreign minister admitted that at a meeting with him in Irkutsk on the previous day, the secretary of state had expressed serious misgivings in connection with the concentration of Iraqi troops on the border with Kuwait. E.A. Shevardnadze went on to say: "I will be frank, at that time I all but ruled out further complications. I did not expect the Iraqis to resort to open aggression against a defenseless, peace-loving country."

Once again, it is not surprising that the minister himself had not yet managed to gain sufficient knowledge of the Arab world. But I am sure that no serious Arabist, of whom there are many at the Foreign Ministry, would have ruled out or "all but ruled out" the possibility of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the situation that had arisen by the beginning of August.

The Persian Gulf crisis was by no means the only occasion when our line of conduct was determined and implemented by E.A. Shevardnadze without due reliance on the knowledge and judgment of competent specialists and without all-around consideration of the Soviet state's interests. A good many specific examples of serious miscalculations resulting from this could be cited in the disarmament sphere, as well as in German, Afghan, and other affairs.

He had a tendency in general to undervalue professionalism in diplomatic work except when it served his own ideas on the expediency or otherwise of a given action at a given time. He was more inclined to favor "philosophers," "speechifiers," and "performance" men, rather than the workers who make up the backbone of any diplomatic department—the real experts on countries and regions. In this respect the following fact speaks volumes: Among the 25 members of the USSR Foreign Ministry collegium, by the time of E.A. Shevardnadze's departure, **not one** of the leaders of the ministry's territorial subdivisions was left.

E.A. Shevardnadze apparently thought that the new political thinking would itself cover any flaws at the professional level. He even tried to find a theoretical justification for this approach, stating that the highest degree of professionalism is no substitute for correct political principles. Although this formula in itself is beyond doubt, it only contains half the truth, and the other half is that even the most correct political principles, if not put into practice to a high professional standard, usually remain mere declarations, or else become distorted in practice. Conversely, even a political principle that is in some way inadequate can sometimes be "brought up to scratch" with the help of a high degree of professionalism.

It also seems obvious that a bolder foreign policy needs to be implemented not less professionally, but more. Only then can one count on securing the maximum return while at the same time minimizing the possible errors, the risk of which, for obvious reasons, is potentially greater where the policy is bolder. This is not an argument against a bold foreign policy, but an argument in favor of implementing it in a highly professional manner.

The fact that E.A. Shevardnadze came to the post of foreign minister without being a professional in that sphere is not the point—this is not unusual, in fact it is rather the rule, in other states. No particular problems arise when a political appointee, aware not only of his own strengths, but also of his weaknesses, seeks to make up for them appropriately with the help of other people's professional knowledge and experience. But it is a very different matter when he chooses to regard his weakness is practically a virtue.

Thus in one of his speeches in the United States E.A. Shevardnadze, quoting an unspecified Soviet cultural figure who said that "art needs dilettantes," expressed his own confidence that even the cause of diplomacy can be served to an inestimable degree by "people who bring to a professional art—including the art of politics—freshness, an unprejudiced approach, and originality of opinions and views." On hearing this speech by the Soviet minister, one professional American diplomat aptly called it a "hymn to dilettantes."

TASS Reports Clashes With Kurds in Iraq

LD0903140491 Moscow TASS in English 1351 GMT 9 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Batyrev]

[Text] Paris March 9 TASS—Kurds' actions against the Saddam Husayn regime continue in many areas of the

Iraqi section of Kurdistan, says a communique by the Paris-based Kurdish Institute, received by the TASS Paris bureau today.

The communique points out that, judging by information received from Kurdish sources on Friday, fierce clashes between Kurds and Iraqi Army units are taking place in the Iraqi Province of Al- Sulaymaniyah. The fighting broke out in the city of Sulaymaniyah, the administrative centre of the province, where rebels occupied, in part, the building of the local police office.

The Iraqi Army used combat helicopters, which raided several neighbourhoods of the city. Numerous casualties are reported among the population. The big city of Raniyah and several other settlements in the province are controlled by rebels, according to the institute.

Unrest is also reported in other provinces of northern Iraq. Fighting is going on in several parts of the city of Karkuk, the administrative centre of northern Iraq. Rebels also seized the city of Chamchamal, which is located 45 kilometers east of Karkuk.

Popular unrest flared up also in Irbil, another province of Iraq, where Kurds live. The suburbs of the provincial centre are occupied by rebels. The cities of Salah al Din and Habat are also controlled by Kurds.

According to information made available by the Kurdish Institute, armed detachments of the Kurdish resistence, which had been deployed until now in the area of the Iran-Iraq border, began moving towards the "liberated areas".

About 40,000 Iraqi servicemen surrendered to the Kurdish forces. Thousands of them are reported to join Kurdish fighting men to fight against troops that remain loyal to Saddam, the communique reports.

East Europe

Moiseyev Meets With Polish Foreign Minister

LD1103224891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1808 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Warsaw, 11 Mar (TASS)—Army General M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, first deputy USSR minister of defense, arrived in the capital of Poland today on a two-day working visit. The Soviet military leader was received by Kszysztof Skubiszewski, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland. During the talks, the two sides discussed the issues of Soviet troops staying on the territory of Poland, the periods for their withdrawal, the technical aspects of implementing this operating, and also the transit travel through Poland by the Soviet military contingent being withdrawal from the former territory of the GDR,

After the talks, M.A. Moiseyev stated to journalists that "good progress in ways of resolving these important problems took shape as a result of intensive dialogue."

Hungary's Defense Minister Interviewed on Security

LD0903175791 Moscow International Service in Hungarian 2000 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Lajos Fur by correspondent Sergey Shevykin in Budapest, date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Shevykin] My first question to the minister of defense: the Warsaw Pact no longer formally exists. As a result, has the military security of the Hungarian Republic increased or decreased in your opinion?

[Fur] It is difficult to judge at this stage because indeed the Warsaw Pact ensured a kind of military security as well. By its dissolution, however, it is on the other hand possible, to a full extent, to ensure the sovereignty of the country. This is something, which, of course, the Hungarian Army cannot in itself guarantee, but it precisely for this reason that we endeavor to find such solutions which in this transitional state of affairs—until the universal European security system is created—may ease the distrust, and which can provide a kind of security in the region and for every country. These [solutions] are nothing more than the conclusion of bilateral military agreements with neighboring countries or with those countries who have until now been incorporated in the system of the Warsaw Pact [word indistinct].

[Shevykin] Looking ahead, can it be said that such areas of Soviet-Hungarian military cooperation exist whereby this cooperation can develop, or at least remain at their existing level?

[Fur] There are in our eyes several areas in which the relationship should remain identical to the one which has existed until now. What is more, there are areas which could even be expanded. To be more precise, new areas of cooperation could evolve.

Such a traditional area of cooperation has been even until now the provision of all military technology to the Hungarian Army; to name just one thing—ensuring its functioning, for the majority of this [technology], almost all of it, comes from Soviet import. It is obvious that in this area very close cooperation will have to prevail in the future between the two armies of the two countries, or more precisely between the defense industries of the two countries. But I can refer to other areas, too, in certain spheres of training, particularly in officer training. In further training we would like to continue to rely on, to expect very close cooperation, with the Soviet Union.

For us the maintenance and construction of bilateral military cooperation, and laying down an agreement on the important elements and practice of this—I can state with assurance—is of vital importance. In several areas

of military life we simply could not exist in this region if we are unable to sort out our military cooperation in a very normal manner, in a really goodneighborly fashion.

[Shevykin] My next question also concerns the training of military officers. As is known, many Hungarian military officers have obtained their training in the Soviet Union. (?What is the degree) of these officers' professional competence? Does their competence suit their new requirements and to what extent will these officers fulfill the tasks of Hungarian defense?

[Fur] To the extent I have been able to become familiar with the officers who have been trained in the Soviet Union and to learn about the standard of the training there from them, I have heard simply from all of them a very high assessment. All of them spoke of the comprehensiveness of this training; very demanding, particularly the knowledge of the officers who received further training—ie the high-ranking officers trained at the higher level military academies.

I think that this knowledge is good enough. After a year of training the information acquired; is well utilized in the new situation too, even in view of the construction of the new Hungarian military defense system.

West Europe

Turkish President's Moscow Visit Reported

Interviewed on Eve of Visit

LD1003214891 Moscow TASS in English 1939 GMT 10 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Yalchin Ali-Zade]

[Text] Ankara March 10 TASS—On the eve of his official visit to the Soviet Union President Turgut Ozal of Turkey agreed to answer to a number of questions from the official Soviet news agency—TASS.

[TASS] As is known, the treaty of friendship and fraternity between Turkey and the Soviet Union was signed on March 16, 1921. Your visit to the Soviet Union will take place seventy years after the treaty was signed, linking the two dates in history. Could you name other major landmarks on this path?

[Ozal] The basis for Soviet-Turkish relations was laid by Vladimir Lenin and Kemal Ataturk. Despite fluctuation, ups and downs, they have reached the present level over the seventy years of consistent development. The Turkish Republic from the day of its establishment attached great importance to relations with the USSR. I believe that our bilateral relations, based on principles of non-interference into internal affairs, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, and peaceful coexistence, will keep developing.

The two countries' geographical proximity and transportation opportunities provided by the Black Sea washing both countries are the factors which directly facilitate the intensification of our trade and economic relations. Relatively low transportation costs and possibilities for coastal trade make easy the task of increasing the volume of commodity turnover between Turkey and the USSR. In building our relations, we take guidance from principles of mutual benefit and strive for the most extensive development of these links.

[TASS] What is your assessment of today's level of Soviet-Turkish relations?

[Ozal] East-West rapprochement and the process of renewal in the Soviet Union are favorable influences on Soviet-Turkish relations, the present level of which is satisfactory to both sides. I am confident that our relations will continue to develop in the direction of mutual benefit. The development of Soviet-Turkish relations undoubtedly contributes to the stabilization and strengthening of peace in the region.

[TASS] Mister President, what do you expect from your visit to the Soviet Union from the point of view of prospects for the development of relations between the two countries?

[Ozal] As president of Turkey I feel deeply gratified with my visit to the Soviet Union. In 1986, when I was prime minister, I visited your country and spent some time there in intensive meetings and talks. I am sure that as head of state this time, my visit, during which I am due to meet President Gorbachev and the leaders of three Soviet republics, will exercise a positive influence on the development of our relations. In this connection I hope that certain acceleration will be imparted to our contacts with the USSR and its constituent republics. Besides, I believe that specific steps will be made to implement the project we proposed to create a Black Sea zone of economic cooperation.

[TASS] The programme of your visit to the USSR includes visits to three Soviet republics. Turkey, as is known, has considerable experience in establishing constructive relations with Soviet republics. What is the relative importance of these visits to three republics within the entire programme of your visit?

[Ozal] During my visit I will visit Moscow and also the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. It has repeatedly been noted that along with the Soviet Union, we strive to develop relations, especially in the field of trade and economic cooperation—with constituent Soviet republics. The visit to three of them should be viewed from this standpoint. Naturally, I would like to visit other republics as well. Regrettably, limited time does not allow this.

[TASS] Mr. President, in recent years Turkey has been working to create a zone of trust and cooperation in the region. One of its components is economic cooperation. Your proposal to create the Black Sea economic zone,

supported by the Soviet Union, and the idea of implementing a similar plan for the Middle East are two instances of this. Could you clarify this concept?

[Ozal] As you know, Turkey is a stabilizing element in the region. Besides, it is involved in the dynamics of the regional development. I already noted before that we are ready to make any efforts in order to stabilize the region and establish stable peace in it. The creation of a security system in the region depends largely on economic cooperation and integration of economies.

Both the Soviet Union and Turkey are interested in the neighboring Middle East, a boiling cauldron of incessant conflicts. Some people believe that a post-war settlement in the region can be achieved by setting up military pacts between Middle East countries, pacts that may exist in the long term. From this viewpoint the need arises to create a model of cooperation to link all countries in the region and complement the security system. The economic aspect of the system to be established in the region must ensure economic interdependence, because economic imbalances prove to be sources of conflicts in the region.

In the first place, proposed economic cooperation must provide a mechanism aimed at eliminating damage caused by the war. On the basis of the principle of division of responsibility and assistance to regional economic cooperation it is necessary, on the one hand, to ensure financial sources and, on the other, to direct efforts to gradually bringing closer and integrating regional economies.

In this way, paying war damages, paying damages to countries of the region and third countries must be envisaged, as well as the creation of a special development fund and development bank, with which to coordinate efforts to ensure sources of finances coming from the region's oil extracting countries and other oil-consuming industrial countries outside the region.

I am confident that the implementation of such economic cooperation will become the most important factor in securing stability in the Middle East and fulfilling pivotal projects for building oil and gas pipelines and solving water supply problems.

Naturally, of great importance is the prompt solution of the Palestinian problem and the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For this, it is necessary for every country to make its constructive contribution and maximum efforts.

[TASS] During recent Soviet-Turkish consultations in Ankara, it was stressed that the Soviet Union and Turkey were close to each other in their attitudes to the Persian Gulf conflict. What can you say on this score?

[Ozal] Just like the Soviet Union, Turkey favors stabilization and durable peace in the Middle East. From the very beginning of the conflict, which arose following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, we did everything in our power to ensure a peaceful settlement of the problem. Turkey from the very start pursued an active policy. Like the Soviet Union, it condemned the aggressor and by shutting down two oil pipelines set an example to many countries which were hesitant in implementing the economic embargo resolution by the U.N. Security Council.

We were guided by the idea that the effective embargo would enhance hope for finding a peaceful settlement of the crisis. For the first time in the history of the U.N. Security Council 12 consecutive resolutions were adopted virtually unanimously. Turkey backed all these resolutions.

Despite efforts made by the United Nations, as well as the Soviet Union and other countries, no positive outcome resulted because of the destructive position taken by the Iraqi leadership. On January 17, hostilities began.

On January 11, a letter was conveyed to Saddam Husayn through the Iraqi ambassador, calling on Saddam to comply with the demands by the international community. But I received a negative reply. Turkey, acting within the framework of U.N. resolutions with the aim of promptly ending hostilities, opened the Incirlik air base for use by allied forces. We repeatedly stressed that our actions were fully consistent with international law and were taken in accordance with our laws.

On the other hand, from the very beginning of the crisis, we took all necessary measures to ensure the most effective defence of our country. We repeatedly stated that we have no claims on anyone's territory and would only use troops if there is direct aggression by Iraq.

We all witnessed the end of the war in its 43rd day. Naturally, the end of hostilities did not bring about the automatic solution to problems. We are facing a long and complicated road. Both during the war and now, Turkey is ready to make a necessary contribution to the establishment of peace and security in this region which is so important to us.

It follows from an analysis of different views currently circulating on the world arena, the envisaged solution consists of the following basic elements: the creation in the region of a security system based on close cooperation and interrelation of economies and the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The basis of the security system will be made up [of] territorial integrity, a principle applicable to Iraq and to all other countries. The preservation of Iraq's integrity and the democratization of that country will facilitate the success of rehabilitation period. We are confident that averting the arms race in this region and especially banning sales of mass destruction weapons here will facilitate the prevention of the emergence of adventurist regimes on the arena.

Its democratic system and an effective market economy make Turkey the only Muslim country which can serve as a model for post-war arrangements in the region. In

addition, we have already proposed holding in Turkey an international conference on the Middle East, taking into account that we maintain relations both with Arab countries and Israel.

We are prepared to contribute to healing the Kuwaiti people's wounds inflicted during the seven-month crisis.

We are also prepared to extend a helping hand to the Iraqi people. Necessary steps in this direction have already been taken.

[TASS] Mr. President, what would you like to wish the Soviet people?

[Ozal] I want to wish the Soviet people, for which the Turkish nation has friendly feelings, peace stability and prosperity. I want to convey all my love and hope for the development of relations and rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Expectations Noted

LD1103224791 Moscow TASS in English 1347 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS— "The official visit to the USSR by Turkish President Turgut Ozal, which begins today, will give a fresh impetus to the development of Soviet-Turkish relations," Chief of the Asian Economic Relations Department of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations Viktor Koptevskiy told TASS. He said both sides were expected to express their "agreement in principle to the further promotion of bilateral relations, primarily in the commercial and economic domains".

According to Koptevskiy, both the Soviet Union and Turkey had repeatedly expressed this intention at different levels, including the summit.

Turning to concrete problems of bilateral economic cooperation, Koptevskiy said that the negotiations were expected to result in the signing of agreements on commercial, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as on the exclusion of double taxation. "Hence," Koptevskiy believes, "a package of intergovernment agreements will be concluded to ensure a full-blooded development of economic relations between the two states".

Touching on the present state of Soviet-Turkish commercial and economic relations, Koptevskiy said that they were developing "sufficiently dynamically". Whereas in 1989 the bilateral trade turnover amounted to $1.3 billion and to $1.9 billion in 1990, the figure is expected to grow to $10 billion by the year 2000. The Soviet Union delivers to Turkey natural gas, oil and its derivatives, ammonia, chemical goods, ferrous metals and passenger cars. Turkey exports to the Soviet Union mainly food products and consumer goods.

"Nevertheless," Koptevskiy said, "the Soviet side is far from satisfied with the state and level of commercial and economic relations with Turkey, considering the potentials of both countries." He "expressed hope that Ozal's visit to the USSR would help "step up bilateral economic relations and expand their range."

Leaders Discuss Postwar Ties

LD1103194291 Moscow TASS in English 1913 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—Mikhail Gorbachev and President Turgut Ozal of the Republic of Turkey met in the Kremlin today. Ozal arrived here for an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet president.

For almost three hours, in an unconstrained wellwishing atmosphere, the two presidents considered problems that are now most important to their countries.

They discussed in detail the post-war situation in the near and Middle East. Evaluations of the Gulf war and approaches to a post-war settlement were similar in many respects. They stated the basic importance of finding such solutions which would take into account the interests of all peoples and states in the region, would proceed from the inviolability of the existing borders and the need to revive economic potential and would rely on the prestige of the United Nations and on new criteria in world politics which have already manifested their universal value.

Much attention was devoted to bilateral relations. The two presidents were gratified to point out that these relations have developed and markedly improved in recent years. Gorbachev emphasised that it was particularly to the credit of the president of Turkey.

The two presidents' discussion of economic relations was thorough and substantive. Ozal put forward a number of interesting ideas, the elaboration of which will be entrusted to the two countries' departments.

Gorbachev's and Ozal's discussion of economic reforms, which have already produced outstanding results in Turkey, was extremely interesting and beneficial. The two presidents attentively examined various aspects of these reforms with due account of the specificity of each country.

The discussion of the Turkish president-suggested project to establish a Black Sea economic zone, which would encompass many countries that are directly associated with the Black Sea, figured importantly during the two presidents' first meeting.

'Total Understanding' Noted

TA1103213491 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2100 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] The first round of official talks between the Turkish and Soviet delegations, headed respectively by President Turgut Ozal and USSR President Mikhail

Gorbachev, ended in Moscow today. It was announced that during the talks, the two sides displayed total understanding.

According to a statement issued by presidential spokesman Ambassador Kaya Toperi, during today's session the two sides discussed the Gulf crisis, bilateral economic relations, and topics concerning the Black Sea cooperation project.

Ozal, who is continuing his official visit to the USSR, met with a delegation composed of representatives of [word indistinct] Turks in Moscow tonight. During the meeting, the delegation members expressed the wish to immigrate to Turkey. In turn, Ozal explained that recently Turkey has been receiving approximately 10,000-15,000 immigrants yearly for various reasons. Ozal pointed out that the urbanization and industrialization processes must be accelerated if this figure is to be increased. The president will continue his meetings in Moscow tomorrow.

Friendship Treaty Signed 12 Mar

LD1203131291 Moscow TASS in English 1211 GMT 12 Mar 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Oleg Polovko, Sergey Postanogov, and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Turgut Ozal today signed a treaty on friendship, good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

Soviet-Turkish talks in the Kremlin today resulted in signing inter-governmental agreements on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation and on avoiding double taxation of profits. The sides exchanged letters extending by a year the effect of the Soviet-Turkish agreement on goods turnover for 1986-1990.

Bessmertnykh Receives Turkish Foreign Minister

LD1203141691 Moscow TASS in English 1303 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today met his Turkish counterpart, Ahmet Kurtcebe Alptemocin, who arrived in Moscow in connection with the official visit to the Soviet Union by Turkish president Turgal Ozal.

The sides discussed the key aspects of Soviet-Turkish relations, as well as urgent international and regional problems.

Joint FRG Agreements on Troop Provisions Reported

LD1203115891 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 12 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS—"A number of new agreements with German private and state firms followed the signing of a package of Soviet-German treaties. They were needed to provide Soviet troops with everything necessary," Soviet Deputy Defence Minister Vladimir Arkhipov, who also heads the Soviet Armed Forces rear [services], told TASS.

According to Arkhipov, after the German unification, Soviet troops' provision with various goods, services and transport facilities has considerably changed. "This is connected with the fact that such issues have been resolved not on the governmental level," he said.

In accordance with the agreements, German authorities "guarantee regular provision of the Western army group with everything necessary". Since the signing of the treaties, "there were no interruption with provisions on the part of Germany", Arkhipov said.

Arkhipov said that in order to settle the disputable issues and differences connected with conditions of Soviet troops' stay and withdrawal from German territory, a joint Soviet-German commission and a working group have been set up to ensure legal assistance and administrative cooperation.

Arkhipov recalled that the joint commission at its recent meeting discussed a range of issues. He said he was satisfied with the German side's agreement to pay for transporting Soviet troops to the Soviet Union by sea in German marks.

The German side also agreed to help sell 200,000 tonnes of scrap metal and 1,300 tonnes of military and technical equipment, he said. Arkhipov noted that Germany agreed to "study proposals by the Western army group to set up a number of joint ventures using its realty". He said the agreement was useful and constructive.

"Soviet-German treaties aim to develop goodwill between the German population and state bodies and Soviet troops, and they will show their positive aspects," Arkhipov said.

Supreme Soviet

Gorbachev 7 Mar Speech to Supreme Soviet

PM0803143091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

[TASS report on USSR President M.S. Gorbachev address to USSR Supreme Soviet 7 March: "Cooperating, Not Cutting Ourselves Off"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev described the results of the Federation Council sitting as a great advance. The latest working day of the USSR Supreme Soviet session 7 March began with his report on this issue.

Yesterday we examined the draft Union Treaty as prepared by the republic's plenipotentiary representatives, the president said. With consideration for the republics' declarations of sovereignty and on the basis of the decisions adopted by the USSR Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet it proved possible to create a document whose main idea is a major reform of our multinational state. It is being preserved as a federation and at the same time renewed through the republics exercising sovereignty and due to the new role played by the center.

The draft submitted to members of the Federation Council contained alternative suggestions on 10 questions. As a result of careful analysis and intense and constructive discussion it proved possible to find a common position on nine of these. Alternative opinions remained over the question of representation in the upper house of the Union's future legislative organ. It was decided to send the draft in this form for republic supreme soviets to discuss and publish it so that the public can study it. That will clarify many things. People will be able to go to the referendum knowing what is going on and with an open heart.

Now a word about the Cabinet of Ministers sitting. The situation has compelled us to return to the agreements on economic questions as a whole and on food. You realize that both documents won the support of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. They were the basis for the work of all republics and labor collectives. Although it has proved possible to conclude 86 percent of contracts, the economic situation is still most grave. The destruction of economic ties in the latter half of last year is taking its toll. The market has been torn to pieces, everyone has started to try to save themselves, but that is a great mistake. We can only escape from the critical situation by cooperating rather than cutting ourselves off from one another.

Much is attributable to the fact that the state order and economic agreements between republics were not organically linked. Union departments did not do everything to take this reality into consideration when resolving questions of material and technical supply. I think that the republics also nurtured illusions you only have to switch to direct ties and everything will fall into place.

The Cabinet of Ministers deemed it necessary to set up a group headed by V.Kh. Doguzhiyev to examine immediate questions with the participation of the union republic governments' first deputy chairmen.

I must also say that many conflicting decisions adopted by republics, oblasts, and even cities had an adverse effect. They were frequently designed for effect and dictated by political ambitions, which complicated the situation in our transitional economy still further. Rural soviets, rayon soviets, and city soviets—they were all giving orders. No labor collective can operate under these conditions, of course. Integration processes are underway throughout the world—in Europe and in North and South America—yet we have moved toward feudal fragmentation.

Here politics did the economy and social affairs a disservice. Everyone realizes this now, although by no means everyone has drawn the requisite conclusions from this. Yet a real threat of the further disintegration of economic ties has loomed. We experienced oil, gas, coal, meat, and milk shortfalls. In these conditions there are people who act on the basis of the following principle: The worse it is the better. Some RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet deputies—I said this yesterday at the Federation Council—are driving around mining regions urging people to strike. Yet that is suicidal and irresponsible!

People in the country must be aware that we are now seeking ways to stabilize the economy and progress with the development of market relations. I ask members of the Supreme Soviet not to delay in examining the draft laws on denationalization, overcoming monopolism, developing enterprise, and shaping the market structure. We need to set in motion processes in the countryside as regards the implementation of land reform.

Practical actions are the most important thing now. We must act to change the situation for the better despite the fact that the so-called democratic press makes no secret of its plans to topple the government, writes what you have to do to this end on the 10th, 16th, and 26th of the month, and urges you to vote against the Union in the referendum, etc. But the people are already beginning to grasp what's what and who is taking action—even if flawed or delayed action—and who is engaged in political demagoguery and inflammatory activity.

The sittings of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Federation Council examined the food question in particular. Spring will be very hard, we must prepare ourselves for it and support country people.

M.S. Gorbachev submitted his suggestions to deputies as regards the composition of the Security Council, which is to take care of the country's security in the broad context, from the viewpoint of defense, the economic situation, the environment, the stability of the state, and interethnic relations. He then answered questions.

Deputies asked, in particular, whether the question of the 17 March referendum was discussed at the Federation Council sitting and whether the wording adopted at the Supreme Soviet was changed.

Neither the referendum itself, the date, nor the question asked in it were questioned, the president said. It is well known that attempts are being made to somehow change the fundamental question and add parallel questions. Some republic Supreme Soviets have adopted their own wordings, believing that they are no different, effectively, from the wording approved by Union organs. In conjunction with the Central Electoral Commission, the USSR Supreme Soviet must define its position so that we do not have a situation where we are unable to collate the referendum data.

Parliamentarians inquired when retail prices would be reformed and social protection measures introduced. The work has been completed, M.S. Gorbachev replied, all the republics have signed: R.I. Khasbulatov signed on behalf of Russia, having received authorization to do this. The Cabinet should submit its final proposals within the next day or two. The intention is that compensation should be issued at least a week before new prices are introduced.

In response to a question about the situation in South Ossetia, M.S. Gorbachev spoke about the discussion of this matter at the Federation Council. A leadership has been formed there, so there is now an entity with which to conduct talks, and the Georgian Supreme Soviet and government have committed themselves to doing this. We expect these talks to begin, the president stressed, and we decided yesterday—in order to promote the success of these talks—to send Supreme Soviet and government representatives immediately to both Georgia and South Ossetia to facilitate the quest for a political solution. The situation is acute, people are dying virtually every day. What is more, it was agreed at the Federation Council that if nothing comes of this, the president, on the basis of consultations with the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Georgian Supreme Soviet, will find other ways of resolving the problem. I hope nonetheless that we will be able to do this nicely, otherwise both the Georgians and the Ossetians and everyone who lives there will be in a bad way. We will all be in a bad way. We hope that the incumbent Georgian leadership will have sufficient wisdom and responsibility.

A question was asked about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Over the last few months, M.S. Gorbachev pointed out, there has been reciprocal movement by the leaderships of both republics and by sensible people within Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast who think that the peoples should no longer be kept in this psychological and political state. But as soon as this discussion goes beyond contacts between the leadership of the country and the republics, mechanisms that bring everything to a halt immediately come into play. There are powerful forces who are not interested in normalization. I would very much like the process of restoring human relations to begin at last. The time has come to say firmly: No more playing with people's lives and well-being, no more setting the peoples against one another.

What is to be done about the fact that the Moldova president gathered leaders of city and rayon soviets and warned them that the holding of the 17 March referendum on the republic's territory is not permitted and that those soviets that dare to do so nonetheless will be disbanded?

That is unconstitutional and illegal, the answer came. Especially since Moldova's leadership said prior to this that, although it opposes the referendum, anyone who wanted could take part in it. I think that one should act on the basis of the resolution that we adopted recently. The referendum is being held throughout the country and both the Supreme Soviet and the Central Electoral Commission should do their utmost to facilitate this.

V.I. Samarin asked me to name the people's deputies who have tried to persuade foreign countries' governments not to give us credits. It would be no bad thing, M.S. Gorbachev said, for a Supreme Soviet commission to analyze who is doing what abroad and submit a report. I propose that V.I. Samarin be tasked with heading a deputies' group on this matter.

"Mikhail Sergeyevich, we women have always known that you support us in all our actions and undertakings. Do you think it possible for women to be involved in the Security Council?"—Deputy R.A. Ubaydullayeva asked.

M.S. Gorbachev said that he thinks that women can participate in all structures, and that a woman could become president. Democratization processes have now developed to such an extent and are promoting so many new people, and this must be welcomed, he said. I don't know how you view this, but we will propose that the cabinet structure includes a Ministry for the Affairs of Families and Women. Just as, in response to the opinion of the Youth Affairs Committee, we will propose that the government also include a subunit of that kind.

People are asking what relations will be like between the Cabinet of Ministers, the Security Council, and the Committee for Coordinating the Activity of Law-Enforcement Organs. I think that they each have their own sphere of activity. A.V. Yablokov, A.I. Kazannik, and V.M. Desyatov have reminded me that that it is still not clear who will tackle environmental problems at the Security Council. I think that there is someone to tackle this. But since it is a question of the professional side of the matter, we will ponder this further. I have already said that the composition of the Council is still open.

M.L. Bronshteyn has asked a question about an old subject: "Can we not begin with the economy?" I must say that all republics are parties to economic and food agreements. All 15 republics. The leaders of the three Baltic republics are also contributing a great deal of useful thought to the discussion of these questions. I

realize that they have tried to live alone and sought a better life elsewhere and can see better than the others what breaking away from the Soviet Union means. Only real interests can serve as the basis for the development of fully fledged cooperation.

Nevertheless this does not negate the fact that the Baltic republics have a specific situation and specific positions as regards the new Union Treaty. Yesterday I met with the leaders of the three groups formed by presidential decree to discuss questions relating to the future of the Union and these republics—V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, V.M. Velichko, and N.P. Laverov. They have things to tell their partners, and representatives of the Baltic republics will also voice their opinion. Only this should be done with no ultimatums or conditions. No one will play "games" of that kind.

Great changes have occurred within CEMA as well as within the Warsaw Pact. We have seen that there was an accumulation of matters causing grievances and dissatisfaction with cooperation within the framework of this organization. After weighing everything up, we decided to take a calm stance and allow time to do its work. The whole range of relations with these countries must be discussed. They are all insistently raising the question of a meeting and we are open to that.

These countries' peoples are our long-standing friends, we have ramified ties that must be preserved and improved. We must renounce elements that put an excessive burden, so to speak, on our relations, and improve the quality of cooperation and build it up. You know, life is richer than all plans and political slogans, it acts—gradually, but irreversibly—on politicians' moods and positions, to whatever currents they belong. First there is common sense—that is, incidentally, something which every people hangs on to above all, and only then do they decide which god to worship, which party to join, and whose rally to attend.

The questions addressed to M.S. Gorbachev included the following: With the introduction of the laws on enterprise and with the accumulation of capital and the concentration of ownership, isn't the economic foundation of the Soviet system being eroded, and don't you think that this constitutes counterrevolution?

Certainly not, the president replied. By reforming property relations and introducing new forms of economic management, we will at last be able really to generate interest on the individual's part and step up his motivation for work. This will not conflict with the socialist idea or the notions of a democratic society where a working man's interests are reliably defended and questions of social justice and freedom are resolved. As for the selling off of state property, I think that property should end up in the hands of the people as a result of this process. We must move toward a mixed economy. We must study everything attentively and in the context of our real situation resolve problems in the people's interests. We are following a path of renewing our society and giving it a second wind.

The next point on the fifth session's agenda was the examination of the USSR president's candidacies for membership of the Security Council. Chairman A.I. Lukyanov said that, under the USSR Constitution, the president appoints Security Council members with consideration for the opinion of the Federation Council and by agreement with the USSR Supreme Soviet. He recalled that the Security Council is to formulate recommendations on the implementation of all-Union policy in the sphere of USSR defense, on maintaining the country's reliable state, economic, and environmental security, on overcoming the consequences of natural disasters and other emergency situations, and on ensuring stability and law and order in society.

Eight of the nine candidacies for the Security Council received the consent of the Supreme Soviet. They are G.I. Yanayev, V.S. Pavlov, V.V. Bakatin, A.A. Bessmertnykh, V.A. Kryuchkov, Ye.M. Primakov, B.K. Pugo, and D.T. Yazov. V.I. Boldin's candidacy did not win a sufficient majority of votes. This question, the chairman said, is returned to the president for further consideration.

The Supreme Soviet then returned to the formation of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. Parliament agreed to the appointment of B.Ye. Orlov as finance minister, V.G. Kolesnikov as minister of the electronics industry, and V.N. Kirichenko as chairman of the State Committee for Statistics. Deputies returned once again to K.Z. Terekh's candidacy for the post of minister of trade. But the question was once again not resolved since, in the opinion of a number of deputies, the candidate for this post should have been submitted not by the corresponding committee but by the prime minister. It was decided to defer the discussion to the chambers' next joint sitting.

To conclude the working day the Supreme Soviet voted to appoint V.V. Gerashchenko chairman of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] Board and V.V. Kulikov his first deputy.

The sitting took place on the eve of the 8 March holiday. This was celebrated with congratulations to women from the president, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and all male parliamentarians.

The chambers' next joint sitting will be held Monday 11 March.

USSR Supreme Soviet Proceedings 11 March

LD1103211491

Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1847 GMT on 11 March begins a recorded account of proceedings at the 11 March session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin.

Deputy V.I. Semenko delivers a report on the draft law on the procedure for settling individual labor disputes, recalling the main provisions of the draft, which has been published in IZVESTIYA and TRUD and aroused great interest, as is evidenced by letters and reactions to it. The draft is subsequently adopted.

At 1916 GMT a debate begins on Yeltsin's 9 March speech; during an interval deputies were able to listen to a recording of it. The deputies criticize the speech and wonder if it was unconstitutional. Deputy Roy Medvedev criticizes the democratic movement. Deputy Zhuralyev says that parliament ought to deal with real issues and not bother about what was said by whom. Deputy Tsyplyayev seconds this. Deputy Pupkevich criticizes the harsh tone of attacks on the coming referendum. This TV report does not carry the draft resolution criticizing Yeltsin.

AT 1931 GMT Lazarev, deputy chairman of the constitutional supervision committee, tells deputies that the decision of the Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies adopted last summer concerning the mechanism of power of the people, which contained a ban on officials holding more than one post, is unconstitutional. The decision lost its legal validity as of 25 October 1990. However the Russian Supreme Soviet and Yeltsin have ignored this. General Prosecutor Trubin confirms this and says that there are no laws compelling the courts to prosecute leaders of soviets who combine their duties with other activities.

At 1934 GMT Krasnopivtsev, deputy chairman of the prices committee, explains that retail price rises will have an upper limit. Most of the additional revenue accrued will be spent on compensation. He recalls his committee's criticism of unwarranted price increases, carried by PRAVDA and TRUD on 6 September last year.

At 1947 GMT Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, calls on members to facilitate the coming referendum. A Soyuz group statement on the deteriorating situation in South Ossetia is then read out (not quoted). The next sitting of the Supreme Soviet will be on 19 March.

Issues Decision on Referendum

LD1103190991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1746 GMT 11 Mar 91

["The USSR Supreme Soviet's Decision on People's Deputies Promoting the Holding of the Referendum"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 11 March. (TASS)—Following is the text of the decision on USSR people's deputies giving assistance to holding the USSR referendum, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet today:

For the purpose of ensuring strict observance of the USSR law "On Nationwide Ballot (Referendum) in the USSR", and the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the holding of the USSR referendum on 17 March 1991, the USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To instruct USSR people's deputies to take active part in ensuring the holding of the USSR referendum on 17 March 1991 in their constituencies in strict accordance with the current legislation.

2. To regard as expedient sending groups of USSR people's deputies to republics and regions for observing the course of holding the referendum.

3. To grant USSR people's deputies and groups of people's deputies the rights of official observers on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet for holding the USSR referendum on the entire territory of the USSR within the powers stipulated by the USSR law on the status of a USSR people's deputy.

4. USSR people's deputies and groups of deputies should take active part in clarifying the goals and essence of the USSR referendum and decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet on this issue, and give all- round assistance to commissions for holding the USSR referendum in implementing the tasks placed upon them.

While carrying out the USSR Supreme Soviet's instruction, USSR people's deputies have the right to obtain from the commissions any documents and to familiarize themselves with them; to demand that the corresponding bodies and officials should comply with the legislative provisions on the USSR referendum; and, when necessary, to raise with law-enforcement bodies the issue of stopping violations of the legislation and calling those guilty to account as stipulated by law.

While doing so, special attention should be paid to strictly observing citizens' rights and freedoms determined by the USSR Constitution and ensuring conditions that permit each citizen to freely express his will regarding the future of the union.

5. The USSR Procuracy and the Ministry of Internal Affairs should ensure strict observance of legality and public order everywhere and take all necessary measures to ensure that on 17 March each USSR citizen has genuine possibilities for implementing his constitutional right to free expression of will in the course of the USSR referendum. Any encroachments whatsoever upon the citizen's right to participate in the USSR referendum and any restrictions upon this right contradict the USSR Constitution and are illegal.

6. The bodies of state power and administration in republics, and the local soviets of people's deputies and their executive and administrative bodies should provide USSR people's deputies with the necessary assistance in implementing the tasks and functions they have been entrusted with.

The USSR Supreme Soviet once again appeals to all the citizens of the country, calling on them to take the most active part in the USSR referendum and to take in their hands the solution of an issue of historic importance—of the future of our state which is being renewed—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Resolution Assails Yeltsin

LD1103181691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1620 GMT 11 Mar 91

[From the "Legislative Diary" program]

[Text] [Announcer] As was to be expected, the USSR Supreme Soviet today has not ignored the recent speech by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, at a meeting with representatives of Russian political movements. The deputies had the text and also listened to a recording of the speech. The following recording will, I hope, give you an idea of the nature of the discussion which followed:

[Begin recording] [Lukyanov] I have to give the floor to Deputy (Serebryakov), because 20 deputies have signed here, and I ask him to speak on this matter as he has requested. Go ahead.

[(Serebryakov)] A number of deputies are offering for your examination a draft resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the materials with which we have been familiarizing ourselves. I think that there probably is some sense, and my colleagues in the corps of deputies agree, that such a resolution should be adopted. Here is the draft resolution, Anatoliy Ivanovich, with the signatures, and I'll read it out.

[Lukyanov] Go ahead.

[(Serebryakov)] Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet: Having familiarized itself with the materials "Meeting of Russian Political Movements held on 9 March," and the speech given there by Chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

First, to consider as impermissible actions aimed at inflaming political tension, at inciting to confrontation and violence, and at bringing into opposition and conflict local and central authorities, and to urge all Soviet people resolutely to curtail destructive actions of this type.

Second, to reaffirm that state power in the localities belongs to soviets of people's deputies of all levels, and attempts to discredit their role, to replace legally elected organs of power, and to place above them so-called plenipotentiaries is a gross violation of the USSR Constitution, of democratic processes and of the policy aimed at restoring the authority of the soviets.

Third, to deem as unacceptable the calls made at the meeting on 9 March 1991 for the wholesale and forced privatization of property, the distribution of land into private ownership, and other slogans grossly distorting the aims of the economic and political renewal of society and exceeding the bounds set by the Constitution and laws of the USSR.

Fourth, to reject resolutely attempts to discredit the draft treaty on a union of sovereign republics, and to support the draft union treaty as a document of prime importance for the destiny of our multinational state, on the basis that it reflects the aspirations of the majority of citizens of the USSR and opens up the possibility of every citizen taking part in determining his attitude to the preservation of a renewed union at the referendum on 17 March.

The Supreme Soviet, guided by the supreme interests of the people, appeals to the citizens of the USSR at this crucial and difficult time to concentrate on creative work, on effective participation in resolving economic problems, and on restoring and preserving contractual inter-economic links, and to support measures for resolutely fighting crime and ensuring order and constructive discipline.

I think that this resolution will combine with the address given by Anatoliy Ivanovich [Lukyanov] on the "Vremya" program; in a recent interview he said that the Supreme Soviet should probably react to all this and voice its point of view. [end recording]

Security Council Membership Debated 7 March

PM1103161791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Mar 91 Union Edition pp 1,3

[IZVESTIYA legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev Kremlin report: "USSR Security Council Formed"]

[Text] The discussion of candidate members of the USSR Security Council was undoubtedly the most important and at times simply dramatic part of the chambers' plenary sitting 7 March. In our previous report we were only able to report on the results of the voting. But the importance of this new Soviet leadership organ requires a more detailed description of how the procedure of forming the Security Council went.

Chairman A.I. Lukyanov first suggested that parliamentarians agree that the candidates be appointed Security Council members en bloc, so to speak. But a vote showed deputies intend to voice their attitude toward each of the nine candidacies proposed by the USSR president.

The first two candidates—G. Yanayev and V. Pavlov—won a fairly high parliamentary rating: 304 and 320 deputies respectively agreed to their appointment.

When it came to V. Bakatin's turn, Deputy Ye. Kogan took the floor first. He said that the former USSR internal affairs minister was to blame for the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] MVD [Ministry of

Internal Affairs] being removed form USSR MVD jurisdiction, resulting in the militia's "elimination" as of 1 March this year. In Kogan's opinion, these processes have resulted in weapons falling into terrorists' hands in many republics. He said: A man who does not comply with the USSR's laws and does not respect the opinion of the country's Supreme Soviet cannot be a member of the Security Council. Deputy A. Sobchak drew his colleagues' attention to Deputy Kogan's unsubstantiated claims which are aimed not so much against Bakatin as an individual or anyone else as against certain legally elected structures in the Estonian republic. It is inadmissible for passions to be fueled in this way within the legislature.

The legislature's collective opinion was as follows: 279 people voted "for" Bakatin, 35 voted "against," and there were 40 abstentions.

There was total confidence in the candidacy of USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh—not a single vote against.

Whereas until this moment the voting had taken place without the candidates presenting themselves—their names and actions have always been there for legislators to see—contender V. Boldin had to take the platform. This was the first time that USSR People's Deputy Boldin had addressed his colleagues in parliament.

Obviously, the fact that Boldin's activity as a deputy has hitherto gone unnoticed was also responsible for the fact that only 237 deputies supported him. Another people's deputy, Ye. Primakov, received even fewer votes—210.

Another three candidates joined the USSR Security Council quite assuredly, with 339, 296, and 310 members of the Supreme Soviet respectively voting in favor of V. Kryuchkov, B. Pugo, and D. Yazov.

Thus seven of the nine men proposed by the president became members of the USSR Security Council.

Legislators then continued with the formation of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers. The following were fairly promptly confirmed as USSR ministers: 55-year-old V. Orlov as finance minister, 66-year-old V. Kolesnikov as minister of the electronics industry, and 60-year-old V. Kirichenko as chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics.

After this the USSR president was given the floor.

M. Gorbachev asked deputies to return to the vote on the Primakov and Boldin candidacies. It came as a great surprise to me, the president said, that we resorted to the voting machine, so to speak, without discussion or comment and denied Primakov—a prominent scientist and politician—a place on the Security Council, where he could have done useful work. I will press on and ask you to back my proposal. The selection process in respect of candidacies for Security Council members is very complex, the president stressed. There has been much to weigh and consider before taking a decision.

The president proposed initiating a discussion of Primakov's candidacy during which he expressed his readiness to provide thorough evidence of the soundness of his choice.

As for Boldin's candidacy, the USSR president explained once again that in this case it is a question of staffing the Security Council's operations. Boldin is head of the presidential apparatus and will remain such. He has been my assistant, Gorbachev said, since 1981. You probably realize what it means for the president and CPSU Central Committee general secretary to take on an assistant. Moreover, these are people in whom I have absolute faith.

Gorbachev asked deputies during the recess to rethink and revise their decision. He also voiced his regret that there had been no questions about the proposed candidacies before the vote and expressed his readiness to give the most detailed answers should questions arise during further discussion.

Primakov was the first to ask for the floor after the recess when, at Lukyanov's suggestion, the deputies returned to considering candidate members of the Security Council.

First, he said, I want to thank the president for what he said about me. I have worked under Mikhail Sergeyevich's leadership for some years and they have been the most fruitful and the happiest years of my life. I consider him an outstanding leader. As for myself, I want to say that, in connection with this vote, I ask you to withdraw my candidacy and not vote again, despite the fact that this is what the president asked. I am prepared to work as an adviser or in any other area. There is no question that I may quit the team. That will not be the case. I will spend all my time on this team. I simply want to withdraw this question from the agenda due to the results of this vote.

Almost a fifth of the deputies spoke during the debate that ensued. Typically, all the speeches without exception gave a high assessment of Primakov's activity as a scientist and politician. Many speakers said that the candidate's withdrawal is undoubtedly an honest, bold act, but that the Supreme Soviet should not agree to it. In effect, opinions were only divided on one issue—whether to vote again immediately or postpone a second vote for several days inasmuch as the Supreme Soviet may be portrayed in an unfavorable light—as Deputy L. Sukhov noted—if a decision that has just been adopted is overturned. It was decided by a majority to vote again immediately. We have already announced the results of the second vote. Primakov won the deputies' support. Boldin's candidacy did not gain the requisite number of votes the second time, although a number of speakers who know the candidate well from working with him spoke highly of his organizational capabilities.

During the debate it was also asked several times if the Supreme Soviet's current practice of discussing and approving candidates for various state posts needs to be improved. However, Deputy G. Igityan drew attention

to the moral aspect of a second vote. He voiced his incomprehension—particularly in the case in question, involving the candidacy of a man whom everyone knows—that deputies can so easily and rapidly change their opinion—and not for the first time. It is a matter either of deputies' not having their own opinion, the speaker said, or of their being easily influenced. This reminds the deputy of psychotherapist Kashpirovskiy's performances. Igityan also voiced the opinion that the composition of the Security Council could be much better. In the deputy's opinion, over the last six years the president has been surrounded by the same people to whom we have grown accustomed, just as we have grown accustomed to the pictures of CPSU Central Committee Politburo members. Igityan said he has the impression that over the last six years the president has not discovered anything new as regards the cadres around him. Or he has discovered all the negative things...

In this respect Lukyanov voiced the opinion that it is better to vote three times and adopt the right decision.

In turn the USSR president described Deputy Igityan's speech as ill-conceived. He rejected his statement that no new people have appeared in the presidential team over the last six years. On the contrary, Gorbachev stressed, all the candidates who have been submitted for consideration have proved their worth in the country's political life over the last six years. The president also drew the attention of the sitting's participants to the fact that the doors to the Security Council are not closed. He said that Deputy Igityan's wishes may be implemented to some extent.

In the remaining time the deputies examined and approved the USSR president's proposals that V. Gerashchenko be appointed chairman of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] Board and V. Kulikov first deputy chairman of the USSR Gosbank Board.

Soviet of the Union members also adopted the amendments proposed at the Soviet of Nationalities sitting to the draft USSR Supreme Soviet Resolution "On Deeming Unlawful and Criminal Acts of Repression Against Peoples Subjected to Forcible Resettlement, and on Safeguarding Their Rights." What is more, the Soviet of the Union voted in favor of adopting the draft laws on changing and deeming invalid certain legislative acts in connection with the adoption of the USSR Law on Enterprises in the USSR, and also on changing and deeming invalid USSR legislative acts in connection with the adoption of the Fundamentals of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on Land. The Soviet of Nationalities had earlier adopted similar decisions.

The sitting took place on the eve of the 8 March holiday. This was celebrated with congratulations to women from the president, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and all male legislators.

The chambers' next joint sitting will be held Monday 11 March.

Militia Law, Referendum Debated 6 March

PM1103102391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "Draft Union Treaty Prepared"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Deputies devoted the second half of the 6 March morning sitting to an article-by-article examination of the draft Law on the Soviet Militia. Although the discussion proceeded very thoroughly and additions and changes were proposed with regard to almost every article in the draft law, in the end the document underwent only insignificant changes. And there was no particularly stormy debate. Maybe this was a result of the new form of preparation of the document, to which A. Lukyanov drew the deputies' attention. Each disputed article in it was accompanied by a brief commentary—enabling deputies to investigate everything in detail. Ultimately, the Law on the Soviet Militia was adopted in full.

The USSR Supreme Soviet resolution on the procedure for bringing the new law into force was also adopted. The law comes into force the moment it is published. A number of USSR Supreme Soviet decrees governing the work of the militia are deemed to have lost their force. The resolution also contains an instruction to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers to define the procedure for funding the militia and providing it with material-technical and everyday social backup, as well as compensating militia workers for serving beyond the work time laid down in legislation, on weekly rest days, and on holidays and paying an allowance in cases of dismissal from internal affairs organs.

At the evening sitting the deputies debated a very wide range of problems. But the chief topic of discussion may rightfully be named as the preparations to hold the all-union referendum. And the situation is very complex. Here is just one characteristic example: Deputy S. Vasilyeva told the sitting participants that, according to the data of Kazakhstan's mass media, voting papers wording the question differently to the way adopted by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies are already being printed in that republic, whose Supreme Soviet has announced its decision to participate in the all-union referendum. In this connection the deputy asked the Supreme Soviet to make an assessment of these actions of the republican leadership.

A. Lukyanov gave the sitting's participants an explanation with regard to this question. He reported that on 16 February the USSR Supreme Soviet had received a telegram in which Asanbayev, chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, notified the decision of the republic Supreme Soviet session to submit its own wording of the question for the referendum: "Do you consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a Union of equal sovereign states?" The reply telegram contained the explanation that the wording of the question being put to the USSR referendum stems entirely from the decisions of the

Fourth Congress of People's Deputies and cannot be altered. A. Lukyanov emphasized that the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee had also given the same conclusion on this point. The Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium discussed this question once again and left its previous decision in force. Then today—6 March—A. Lukyanov said, I passed this question to the Federation Council for examination. In a conversation with N. Nazarbayev literally one hour before the start of the sitting he was also instructed to bring the republican legislature's resolution into line with the decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. We must respect our decisions, A. Lukyanov emphasized.

All the deputies who participated in the discussion of the preparations for the referendum without exception expressed profound concern at the present situation. Some republics are refusing to participate in the referendum, others are changing the wording of the question, and the leadership of yet others is considering the possibility of applying sanctions to enterprise leaders if they take advantage of the right granted them by the USSR Supreme Soviet to form commissions on the holding of the referendum. In practically all the speeches the thought was voiced that, unless effective and immediate steps are taken now, the referendum could, contrary to the originally conceived aims, help to deepen the split in society. In addition, A. Lukyanov pointed out that in the course of the fierce struggle which has developed over the referendum attempts are being made to present the matter as though the very idea of a nationwide vote on the fate of the Union and the wording of the question have been imposed by the USSR president personally. This, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet emphasized, is a deliberately distorted referendum formula.

Very different proposals for changing the situation for the better were heard. Thus, in their appeal to the country's parliament, members of the "Soyuz" deputies group urged that republican and local authorities be required to create normal conditions for the referendum to be held. Another large group of deputies proposed urging all USSR people's deputies to participate in the preparations for and holding of the referendum and sending members of the country's Supreme Soviet to regions where their presence is particularly needed. The group of Communist deputies also proposed sending to the Baltic republics observers from among the USSR people's deputies and members of the country's Supreme Soviet to monitor observance of all the requirements and provisions on the holding of the referendum.

The question of the situation in the Republic of Moldova was especially raised. Deputy N. Kostishin, in particular, voiced doubt that the republic's internal affairs organs will be able to ensure proper order during the holding of the referendum.

"Our Law must operate, and USSR organs must operate where necessary," A. Lukyanov remarked in this regard. Deputy S. Akhromeyev told the sitting participants that he had information about threats by representatives of the Moldovan People's Front and individual statesmen against the leaders of enterprises and collective and state farms in the republic where the referendum might be organized. He proposed entrusting the USSR Prosecutor's Office with checking out this information. The deputies supported the proposal by a majority of votes.

At the same time certain deputies expressed the views that in the present situation it would be more sensible to postpone the holding of the referendum and wait for the conclusion of the Union Treaty. At A. Lukyanov's suggestion, the deputies agreed to adopt the Supreme Soviet's final decision at the next sitting, after information on the results of the Federation Council's work has been heard.

During the remaining time the sitting's participants gave their consent, after a brief discussion, to the appointment of N. Gubenko as USSR minister of culture (as we see, the new department—the Ministry of Culture and Tourism—has not come about).

Reports were also heard from Deputies I. Lyzo and R. Medvedev. In the first case it was a question of an instruction to the country's Cabinet of Ministers concerning the realization of the Law on Pension Provision—it was decided to give this instruction. In the second it was a question of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's publication of a copy of a document expressing the USSR president's support for the activity of the "Soldiers' Eternal Memory" fund—one of the extras [figuranty] in the well-known "case of the 140 billion." The deputy concluded that this document was a forgery. R. Medvedev expressed the opinion that the newspaper did not have the right to publish unverified material, and he asked for an investigation into this affair by court organs. By a majority of votes the deputies supported A. Lukyanov's proposals—to submit the question for examination to the USSR Prosecutor's Office and to have the Supreme Soviet Committees for Legislation and for Questions of Law and Order and the Fight Against Crime draw up proposals for increasing liability for an encroachment upon USSR organs of state power.

Discussion of Treaties With Germany Analyzed

PM0503163591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[V. Izgarshev report: "Monday Session Will Discuss..."]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security yesterday discussed a package of treaties and agreements between the USSR and the FRG signed last year. They will be submitted for discussion and ratification by the country's Supreme Soviet this coming Monday.

These are far from ordinary documents. Although any interstate agreement is of enormous significance for the future of the countries and the peoples concluding it, the

significance here is special. The new status of relations between the Soviet state and the country whose army treacherously invaded our land 50 years ago is being defined. The peoples of the Land of the Soviets made countless sacrifices on the altar of victory. That dreadful war remains a source of anguish in millions of Soviet families to this day.

It was with such a yardstick that, in my view, the people's deputies approached the discussion of the documents. But initially they heard reports delivered by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Kvitsinskiy and Army General M. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. These were calm, convincing, thoroughly well-considered reports by competent officials.

But then, as first one and then another speaker mounted the rostrum, passions flared. No, there were no direct opponents of ratification of the treaties and agreements. But, in the context of the present agreements, how can you forget that that no other people in the world suffered such cruel losses and sacrifices! And deputies did recall this. Some 27 million people died in the fighting, from bombing, and in fascist captivity. Some 26 million people were wounded and crippled. More than 25 million people rendered homeless. Millions of ophaned children. Millions of widows. Some 1,700 cities reduced to ashes and destroyed, 70,000 villages... But Deputy N. Tutov had obviously forgotten this. Pay attention, readers! According to Tutov it turns out that, in routing the aggressor, our army was entitled to call itself a liberator only as far as the borders of the fascist Reich and, after crossing its borders, it became an... aggressor. What do you say, friends and comrades-in-arms?

However, frontliners—there are not many of them, but they were, fortunately, in the committee—gave a fitting response to the "revelation" by this young figure of Russian social democracy.

People's Deputies V. Alksnis, N. Petrushenko, Yu. Samsonov, V. Ochirov, N. Britvin, V. Lobov, V. Filin, S. Akhromeyev, V. Shabanov, Acting Committee Chairman L. Sharin, and others—while sometimes heatedly arguing with one another—spoke with conviction about our state's fundamental positions in relations with the FRG and other countries. The crux was that diplomats, military men, and economists—everyone charged with conducting international talks—should place the lofty interests of the fatherland to the fore. On announcing their decision to introduce the package of agreements for discussion and ratification by the Supreme Soviet, members of the committee also proposed that certain other questions—considered important by the people's deputies and concerning property, financial, and other issues connected with Soviet troops' stay in Germany and their withdrawal home—be discussed during the subsequent implementation of the provisions of the treaties.

By the end of 1994, some 337,000 personnel, 167,000 members of servicemen's families, and 40,000 workers and employees of the Soviet Army will have returned home from Germany. Some 54,000 families of officers and NCO's have no home to return to. A more than sizable addition to the 200,000 military personnel without accomodation. And it is additionally necessary to withdraw 111,000 pieces of equipment and 1.5 million tonnes of military freight from Germany. Such are the problems! While not forgetting the defenders of the fatherland and lavishing care and attention on them—that is what was uppermost in the minds of the members of the Committee for Questions of Defense and State Security.

Political & Social

Martial Law Seen As Stabilizer

PM1203114391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[M. Tretyakov article in response to reader's letter; first two paragraph is reader's letter: "A Sharp Shock: Reminiscences Inspired by Some Speeches and Publications"]

[Excerpts] "Politics is now intruding upon our daily lives. Wherever you look, people everywhere are talking about one thing: What is in store for us tomorrow. Some people have been making analogies and expressing fears that martial law is going to be introduced in our country as it was in Poland in December 1981. But what were things like there then? Could you tell us about it?

[Signed] "Ye. Neklyudova, Moscow"

Indeed, if you listen to some speeches and read some articles on the situation in our country a feeling of gloom does descend. Our homegrown pundits are painting daunting pictures of casualties, the blood that is bound to flow, and a return to the times of the Stalinist repressions. Are we really going to have go through all that in the near future? I do not think so; I believe that "prophecies" of this kind will never be realized. However, the constant speeches from parliamentary platforms, television screens, and in the newspapers which claim that we face the threat of the introduction of martial law, direct presidential rule, and the use of other emergency measures fills people's minds with concern.

You have to be very naive not to understand what is behind all this—it is a political power struggle. I should like to recall the dramatic events of the early eighties in Poland that unfolded before my very eyes, being a frequent direct participant as a foreign correspondent.

The power struggle divided Polish society and invaded families and enterprises. The center's economic directives were ignored, the country was gripped by continuous strikes and rallies on any pretext, reciprocal deliveries of goods were not met, the shelves in the stores were

depressingly empty, there were long lines for basic essentials, and people lost their faith in the future. By December social tension had reached an extreme pitch beyond which the specter of anarchy and civil war loomed.

The radicals who by that time had gained the upper hand in the Solidarity leadership planned a general strike for 17 December 1981 which, they believed, would develop into direct confrontation with the state structures. It was stated: "The authorities must be told openly: This will be their last battle."

Thus the situation left two solutions: Either the authorities adopt emergency measures or there would be a fratricidal confrontation. And as the development of events showed later, the majority of the Polish people realized that fact. The introduction of martial law is viewed in different ways now. Some express the opinion that it was almost a declaration of war against their own people. However, many consider that it was an enforced measure which prevented the collapse of Polish society and saved many lives. [Passage omitted]

What did Poland gain from the application of such a radical measure as martial law? The domestic political situation stabilized. The decline in production was halted and a gradual increase in production was noted. Consumer goods began to appear in the stores. So as not to bore the reader with figures I shall cite just one example: Coal extraction in 1982 was over 30 million tonnes higher than the previous year. And it must be said that coal occupies a key position in the Polish economy.

Admittedly, certain circles in the West were counting on a change of power in Poland in December 1981 and mounted a propaganda campaign in the mass media. They ascribed the economic successes following the introduction of martial law to fear, saying that behind every Polish worker there was a soldier with a gun. They released this "canard" without even bothering to consider where that many soldiers could be found. The West imposed an economic blockade on Poland, thereby inflicting tremendous material damage on the country. Yet for understandable reasons the Western mass media tried to avoid that fact.

At that time some other foreign correspondents and I visited the Wujek mine in the center of Katowice where tragedy had struck in the frosty days of late December 1981. The Polish press had reported that a group of irresponsible elements using terror and intimidation had organized a strike at the mine and had attacked representatives of the public order forces. Fatalities resulted. We went down the mine to a depth of 680 meters, where there was no one apart from the miners, of course—no soldiers, no guns. When the Western journalists asked the miners where their uniformed supervisors were, they themselves treated the question as a joke.

Of course, martial law is not pleasant, and to consider it a panacea would be simply naive. It is an exceptional measure, one enforced by circumstances to save a disintegrating state organism. Or to be more precise, it is political shock therapy used in those circumstances when there is simply no other way to rouse a society disoriented by the hysteria of mass rallies. It is a sharp shock to cool those hotheads who, in pursuit of their own arrogant aims, are prepared to use extreme measures including bloody struggle, acting against the will of the overwhelming majority and embroiling inexperienced youngsters first and foremost in this.

Almost 10 years have passed since the December events in Poland. But they still arouse heated disputes, discussions, and different assessments. Harsh measures cannot be the driving force behind society's development, of course. However, there are times when to delay in using them can mean huge human casualties and material damage. The point is to implement them within the framework of the strict observance of the rule of law.

Pavlov, Prokofyev Address Moscow Meeting

LD1203010491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1942 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow, 11 Mar (TASS)—The situation in the country on the eve of the referendum was the main subject of a meeting held here today between Yuriy Prokofyev, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee; Valentin Pavlov, USSR prime minister; and heads of industrial enterprises, institutes, and construction sites in the city and secretaries of party committees and party bureaus.

It is a question, said Yuriy Prokofyev, not just of the future of a renewed Union as a single whole, but also of the preservation of a state with a thousand-year-long history. He stressed the impermissibility of political speculation on the problem, which is of great significance in the lives of millions of people, and has made itself decisively felt—and stressed in particular attempts to make the referendum a personal affair.

In the speeches from microphones, which took up most of the time, the majority of speakers stated that the labor collectives of the capital are in favor of preserving the country's unity. Critical remarks—at times in scathing form—were addressed to the CPSU Central Committee and the Moscow party organization, which had, in the opinion of the speakers, tolerated passivity in the face of the forces encroaching upon the integrity of the state. The need to hold similar discussions in the near future, at the major labor collectives of the capital, was stressed.

The economic situation in the country was analyzed in detail by Valentin Pavlov, who showed, citing specific examples, what attempts to remove our overall potential to "national billets" will lead to. He answered numerous questions.

Centrist Bloc Roundtable Fails

LD1103222291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Report by German Sedov in Moscow; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] Unfortunately, an attempt by the Centrist Bloc to gather representatives of various parties, including Democratic Russia, at a roundtable today to define the parties' positions regarding the Union referendum was unsuccessful. German Sedov is at the microphone.

[Sedov] The idea for this conversation came from the Centrist Bloc of parties and movements. Representatives of various parties and political movements were to gather in this big hall at their suggestion. As you can see, the meeting turned out to be more modest than planned.

[Begin recording] [V. V. Voronin, leader of the Centrist Bloc] You have seen the names of those invited by us and those whom we would have liked to see here. Many of them agreed to take part in the roundtable, but it turns out that it is easier to agree to come, and, apparently, it is much more difficult to show the country who is who and to express one's position on the eve of the referendum: yes to the Union or no to the union.

[Sedov] It is evident that they postponed it until the referendum itself.

[Voronin] You know, I would like to say this. Serious political struggle is under way. Politicians should sit at the roundtable and the parties and unionwide movements they represent should know how their leaders are behaving.

[Sedov] You said that you have already defined your position.

[Voronin] Absolutely, we have already defined it. We are in favor of the territorial integrity of our state, and if we preserve the territorial integrity of our state within the state borders, we will manage to sort out other issues—the sovereignty as well as all other similar issues. We are confident that the political struggle will reach its height in 1991. In 1992 stabilization will start. It is impossible that in a civilized country that has a constitution and laws one of the republican leaders is calling for the overthrow of the government. Is this permissible?

[Sedov] What other opinions were expressed at this table?

[Voronin] Well, I will tell you this. Judging by what was expressed here, everyone is in favor of preserving the Union and everyone will be voting for preserving the Union. Well, you have seen the speech by Boris Ilyich Oleynik. He also agreed to our wording and proposed his own, which is slightly different.

[B.I.Oleynik, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Links with Public Movements] Let's say, personally I am dissatisfied with the question being posed in this way, as this confuses many people: Are you in favor of preserving the Union of Soviet ... [changes thought] from the very beginning this first phrase exerts psychological pressure: Are you in favor of preserving this old unitary union against which we have been fighting for two years now? I would word it like this: Do you believe ... [changes thought] Are you in favor of creating a union of sovereign republics where the rights of a man of any nationality are guaranteed? I think it would have been more natural. [end recording]

Referendum May Deepen Political Divisions

91UN1020A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 9, 6 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Zarechkin, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor for sociopolitical issues: "Referendum: From the Point of View of a Political Scientist: 'Do Not Say Either Yes or No?'"]

[Text] One of the still young newspapers stated that in essence the USSR Supreme Soviet set a possible date for the beginning of civil war by deciding to have a popular "expression of will" scheduled for 17 March. There are but 10 days left; we should take up arms and get our gas masks... Apparently, front lines and military ultimatums are right around the corner from that point...

Irony aside, our official organs are attempting for the first time to implement a democratic model of relations between the citizens and the state that is close to ideal. After all, no legitimate authority in the world has ever rested on anything but public opinion. Dictators do not count, and what I call extreme socialism does not count either.

To be sure, they might object to this: How can we talk about a desire of present-day Soviet power to rely on the opinion of the people if actually this power does not exist. They say that the referendum no longer fits into the current atmosphere of universal independence and sovereignty and is devoid of power.

This is true, but a political crisis has now made the question of whether the Union is to be or not to be so acute that all the same we cannot move ahead without answering it.

In mid-January, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA held a "referendum on the referendum" of sorts where the leaders of Union republics took part. Even then it was obvious how tense the political atmosphere was, and how mixed the views were on whether to poll or not to poll the populace regarding the preservation of the USSR. At present, the ratio of "in favor" to "against" is clearly discernible: Taking into account all the territories that have proclaimed a measure of independence, 25 out of 35 republics are preparing for a referendum. Whether we want it or not, this characterizes the potential outcome of the vote. Its results will hardly make the situation explode or speed up "the war of sovereignties"

to "the victorious end." At the same time, I would be wary of underestimating the threat of civil conflicts caused by statistics.

It would be worthwhile to listen to our foreign colleagues who warn of a political danger posed by referendums and their most unexpected consequences. While being an excellent and highly democratic device, popular polls sometimes result in a colossal range of opinions (from 10 to 80 percent) depending on how the question is worded.

It appears to me that it makes no sense to conceal that the referendum is a form of political struggle. It is apparent that the closer we come to 17 March the greater the opposition of the main political forces in the mass media becomes.

We cannot show the entire spectrum of political forces in the newspaper, but here are the most characteristic, typical clashes. In the Ukraine, many organizations of the Rukh express their disagreement with the proposal of the center and believe that reactionary and chauvinistic forces need the referendum. Meanwhile, the Supreme Soviet of the republic prepares its own variant of the ballot, along with the all-Union one, where the issue of belonging to the Union is raised on the basis of a concept of Ukrainian sovereignty. Lithuania confirms that no decisions of Moscow apply in its territory, whereas the chairman of the Estonian parliament states that, despite participation in the referendum by the republic being unlikely, it will nonetheless refrain from interfering with those wishing to do otherwise. The Bashkir kurultay (people's congress) is entirely in favor of the all-Union poll, but it expresses its lack of confidence in the Russian poll... In Moscow, a plenum of the Democratic Russia Council decides to take part in the referendum but to answer "no." In Samara, that same Democratic Russia calls on the populace to discard the ballots of the USSR referendum in the ballot boxes, "crossing out both questions" as the last resort, while asking them to support Russian questions. Just the opposite, in Smolensk the Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies decided not to hold the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] referendum... In a word, it looks like a children's choosing rhyme: "Are you going to the ball? Do not say either 'yes' or 'no.'"

According to various expert and sociological evaluations, a majority of our citizens intend to take part in the referendum (for example, about 70 percent in the capital city). I believe that everything is going to be fine as far as the purely organizational aspect is concerned—the authorities will not fail to come up with districts and commissions. The situation is worse, however, when it comes to the question that needs to be answered...

As is known, there are few secrets left in the USSR, hardly any. At some later point we will definitely learn who are the authors of the "debatable" question offered to us. Once again, irony would be improper in this instance. After all, sociologists have already repeatedly dissected in their own manner the absurdity of the wording that ended up on the ballot. However, I find something else more surprising. As consultants of the Supreme Soviet testify, even they cannot comprehend where, for example, the second segment of the question came from ("...in which the rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed"). Who prepared it, and when?

In the opinion of experts, the question, resembling a multi-layer cake, is likely to help the authorities avoid an unambiguous interpretation of the results, but in the process will virtually guarantee the preponderance of votes "in favor." Pardon me, but what about... However, we have already touched on this topic. As you recall, the referendum may be dangerous, especially from the political point of view. Let us not err in our predictions, and likewise in our choice of adversaries.

PRAVDA Article Stresses Need for Unity

PM1103165591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[Viktor Shirokov article under "Viewpoint" rubric: "Parity-91"]

[Text] In Chingiz Aytmatov's novel "Buran Station" [Burannyy Polustanok] there is a science fiction story about the Soviet-U.S. space station Parity which is to begin exploiting the natural riches of a certain planet X. During the flight the Parity cosmonauts accidentally make contact with a distant stellar civilization and are invited to set off for that unknown world...

I shall not recount the details—the reader can recall them to mind himself. However, I shall remind you of the main point. The Soviet and American cosmonauts fly off, so to speak, "without authorization," since they clearly understand that their departure could set in motion forces "that see it as a political victory and the advantage of their state system whenever even an additional hockey goal is scored." Well, sad as it may be, that is the way everything eventually happens—fearful of these same "forces," the leadership of the two countries excommunicates the cosmonauts from Earth, forbids them to return, and breaks off the ties that were about to be established between civilizations.

Of course, my retelling is extremely simplified; the writer puts everything far more profoundly and philosophically. But I remembered this science-fiction parable starting from a very simple analogy: Two people from different political and social systems managed to find mutual agreement and rise above a one-sided understanding of the world to set out on a dangerous expedition for the good of all the people on the planet. Why then are political leaders in our country, even when they find themselves on the razor's edge of an impending economic catastrophe, incapable of achieving parity if only for a short time to join forces and move together toward the regeneration of our ruined economy?

But no! As if out of spite some newly fledged little political Napoleons are doing all they can to push the country toward a final collapse. They are shredding the living body of the Union, severing the age-old ties of neighboring peoples, playing around with prices, calling out thousands of people to rallies, demonstrations, and protest marches to once again to shout into the microphone the traditional "democratic" set of accusations directed at the center. It is not enough that by doing this they are sapping the people's nervous energy and even their mental health. After all, rallies themselves cost a pretty penny—setting up the tribunes, chartering buses, the loudspeakers through which they pour out their standard abuse, and tidying up the squares—it is interesting to know who foots the bill for this.

I am convinced that the violent desire to score one more "additional hockey goal" against one's opponent is sated at the expense of the interests of the people, the mass of whom are not at all interested in political shindigs. The destructive pressure on the leadership of the country is ruining the country even more, drawing people into confrontation at a time when they should be joining forces and starting to work hard and constructively. And no sooner had N. Ryzhkov gone than a real witch-hunt was started against V. Pavlov's newly formed Cabinet of Ministers. But let them work for a bit and prove that the measures that they have planned are able to stabilize the situation and draw the country back from the economic brink...

...Parity is from the Latin and means the equality, identical situation, or equivalence of the sides ivolved. This year it is essential, whatever the cost, that we achieve a political balance and a truce in order to tear the country away from imminent chaos and uncontrollability. And for the sake of this we must put aside political chess games for a time. The all-Union referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union as a reformed federation could be a wonderful chance to begin unifying forces. To make calls to boycott it is unconstitutional and criminal to boot—the will of the people must be made manifest and will provide a powerful impetus toward strengthening the union of republics and constructing it on new principles.

Were I a political leader, I would suggest that all the warring sides conclude a Parity-91 agreement—a constructive union of all the forces interested in a prosperous and flourishing life for the peoples of the country, who are thirsting for hard, honest work in pursuit of this aim. It has long been high time to gather stones together.

Analyst on Antagonistic Political Forces

LD1103192191 Moscow TASS in English 1854 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS analyst Sergey Kolesnikov: "Who Is Against All-Union Referendum and Why"]

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—The closer the date of a referendum on whether a renewed union of Soviet republics should or should not be, the keener the antagonism between political forces in the country.

Of course, struggle over this or that political decision is not in itself anything unusual. However, in recent days, opposition by advocates of various views and approaches to the destiny of the union developed from a peaceful dialogue into an overt confrontation and went beyond the limits of civilised forms of political life.

Why then an all-Union referendum is opposed by a large number of people who reckon themselves among democrats and, at least, express concern over the country's future? I venture to surmise that what now comes to the fore is who holds a referendum—not the essence of the issue and not the question which has been brought up for a countrywide poll.

In other words, the attitude of a citizen of the country to a vital countrywide issue is determined quite often by superficial political and ideological sympathies and antipathies.

Can it be that, instead of coming to think over the meaning of our own actions, we shall not break free from the circle of tough confrontation, the settling of scores and rivalry of ambitions this time either?

It is not today that confrontation in society emerged. Both the ultra-left and ultra-right forces have had a hand in bringing it about. But still, we owe the current spiral of such a disruptive aggravation of the situation in the country to forces which act under "democratic" and "popular" pseudonyms. It is precisely they who launched a large-scale offensive on the soviet constitutional system in recent days. It is precisely these forces that are employing rally-type psychological pressure techniques.

In order to see this, it was enough to attend the meeting in Moscow on March 10 or watch a telecast about a similar rally in Leningrad. An escalation of confrontation and an attempt to activate the detonating mechanism of civil war—this is how the essence of speeches and the content of calls at the recent meetings could be characterised.

Unfortunately, the tone was set by the latest remarks made by Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation parliament. Who gave a signal for the "offensive" and a search for "enemies" and "traitors" even inside his own camp.

The objective of the offensive is not concealed: A war has been declared against the country's leadership, against the policy of perestroyka and against any decisions by the president of the USSR and the federal government—even the most essential and urgent decisions in the economic and political spheres.

Methods of struggle have also been mentioned: "combat actions" such as stoppages, the installing of "reliable

people" as Yeltsin's authorised representatives at the local level and the founding of a "powerful organised party."

Incidentally, the day after Yeltsin's speech, a meeting in Moscow was addressed by people's deputy Telman Gdlyan who declared the establishment of a new "People's Party of Russia," which, he said, would be able "to assume political responsibility for the future of Russia" and "will be in direct opposition to the Soviet Communist Party and the existing regime."

How serious is the impact of such pronouncements on agitated society? I think no sociological service will be able to accurately assess the correlation of people's sentiments and preferences in the present-day confusion of opinions.

However, there have been and remain people's common sense and reason. This has been illustrated by the following facts: The March 10 meetings against an all-union referendum were attended not by expected "masses" but by far lesser number of people, namely, by slightly more than 100 in Ryazan and Chita, about 400 in Bryansk, Syvtyvkar and Pskov, about 300 in Omsk and 800 in Saratov.

But the point is, of course, not only and not so much in the number of those attending. People grow confident that only they themselves can and must decide the future of their country.

"Vremya" Considers 10 Mar Rallies' Tone

LD1103194191 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] According to news agency reports, the largest meetings on Sunday were held in Moscow and Leningrad. However, in the view of observers, they were excessively emotional. Furthermore, a number of foreign observers voice the supposition that the tone of the utterances and also the inscriptions on posters were aimed at provoking the Union leadership into adopting tough measures with respect to left-wing radical movements in the country; such measures would naturally be unpopular among the people. This would allow democrat leaders to accuse the center, yet again, of sliding toward dictatorship.

Selective TV Treatment of Rallies Questioned

PM0103151791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 91 Union Edition p 6

[Ed. Polyanovskiy report: "How Are Things, Semenych?"]

[Text] Passions have been raging for three days running in Moscow. On these days more than a million people with placards and banners, portraits, and caricatures passed along the central streets of the capital toward Manege Square.

The first procession and rally, on the evening of 22 February, was in defense of a free democratic press and in support of B. Yeltsin.

The second demonstration, held 23 February was in defense of the Armed Forces and the CPSU.

The third demonstration, held 24 February, was again in defense of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin.

Everyone had their duty on these days. For some it was a personal duty, for others a military duty. For some the crux was their own moral belief, for others it was Army regulations and military discipline, which coincided, obviously, with their own convictions.

There have been brief mentions in the press about the preparations made by the military. In particular, the Moscow City Soviet leadership was concerned by the order from the Dzerzhinskiy Military Academy to take up arms and to form a special hand-to-hand combat group.

The democratic forces' rally opened with an appeal to Russians, Jews, Chukchi, Koryaks, Yakuts, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and so forth to unite. At a military gathering not far from the rostrum a placard was unfurled: "Russians have never been to war against Arabs; they have always had the same enemy..." A dash is followed by a hexagonal star. A triumphal cry was heard from the rostrum calling for Alaska to be seized from the Americans and for other "Russian lands and territories" in Europe and Asia to be "returned." In response a chorus of many thousand voices lifted the triumphal cry to the heavens.

On the rostrum stood people who have made a career for themselves out of their concern for the people's happiness. There were clones in absolutely identical muskrat hats and with identical expressions on their faces; such people have never experienced a shadow of doubt in decades. In the mass meeting on the square many of those who were not in military uniform also turned out to be very similar: thickset, burly, with an upright bearing! Five or six men in civvies sidled up to a sturdy-looking lieutenant.

"How are things, Semenych?" they asked quietly.

Everything's fine—and you?"

Each side had its thinkers, its intelligentsia. The Democrats had Gleb Yakunin, Yuriy Chernichenko, Lidiya Fedoseyeva-Shukshina, and Andrey Smirnov. The military had Aleksandr Prokhanov and Mikhail Nozhkin.

These rallies demand serious political reflection and analysis of the possible consequences. Politicians and analysts will have their say. My question is a superficial one.

Of the three rallies, only one was shown on Central Television. Which one? There is no person in the country who would have trouble answering this question.

Why? A television service, denoted and advertised as "state" television, announces, features, and repeats yet again one and the same rally and leaves the other two out of the picture? What is it—are those people from another state, an alien people, not ours? Or are these facts of public life not so significant?

I assume the TV leaders' fears are that they do not want to stir the people up. The less they know, the quieter they will be. In other words, the same old story: The people should only know the recommended truth.

But in that case what happens to the unity and mutual understanding about which so much is spoken at every step? How are we to consolidate if some people are forbidden from knowing what others say?

And surely suppression of information excites and stirs up the people? Suppression of information is one of the methods of setting people at one another's throats. God forbid, of course, but if ever mutually uncomprehending crowds clash, a portion of the blame will lie with Central Television.

There are improvements all the same. A year ago, on the same days in the latter half of February, Central Television in the Vremya program openly called on Muscovites not to risk their lives, to lock themselves in their apartments, and in no event to attend the demonstration by the democratic forces.

There are improvements. But they are not very comforting.

Shevardnadze on Foreign Policy Group

PM1103140091 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 8, 26 Feb-4 Mar 91 pp 4-6

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Policy Association president, by Galina Sidorova in Moscow, date not given; first three paragraphs are introduction, last five paragraphs conclusion: "Eduard Shevardnadze: "I'm Not Going To Quit the Political Scene"']

[Text] I was received by Eduard Shevardnadze in his new office in a small house on Yelizarova Street in Moscow. Despite the bare walls and modest furnishing of the room I had a feeling that our conversation had not broken off since our last meeting on December 29 on the seventh floor of the Foreign Ministry building on Smolenskaya Square. In the reception-room of the minister I noticed then a sheet of paper with his schedule. There were only dates on it—29, 30, 31 December 1990 - and white emptiness.

A politician who suddenly found himself alone and enduring almost physical suffering because of this feeling. This is how Eduard Shevardnadze looked on that day.

In the detached house on Yelizarova Street I saw a man perhaps more absorbed in his thoughts and less inclined to smile, as he often did before. But the estrangement was overcome.

E. Sh. The idea of founding a foreign policy association arose not because I do not want simply to remain a pensioner. This is not the main thing. I proceed from what I said at the congress of people's deputies. The forces of the right—I called them reactionaries then—and some conservatives launched an attack on the principles of new Political thinking, seeking a restoration of the old order. They present a real danger that can be felt at official forums, in newspaper articles and on television programmes. The threat from the right is increasing.

N.T. Can you name any concrete people?

E. Sh. At the congress I said that I would not name names and do not want to do that now. For this is not a matter simply of who makes himself heard more loudly.

N.T. Nevertheless, in what political spheres does the source of the threat lie?

E. Sh. For this purpose it is enough to read the documents of the recent plenum of the party's central committee and other materials. I am very worried about the course of development. In this connection I believe that the main task of the association—and we are going to invite those who have similar views, people who can think creatively and analyze events—is to defend the achievements of perestroika, the principles of new political thinking and to carry them forward. Thanks to perestroika and democratization, striking changes have taken place in our country and the world, and we have no right to retreat. The activity of the association—research, lectures and discussions—will be subordinate to this basic aim. I even wanted to call it "New Thinking."

N.T. Almost two months have passed since you stepped down. Do you feel that you are out of politics, as we usually understand the term?

E. Sh. No, I don't feel. Together with my long-time associates I take great interest in my new work. Of course, there is a certain feeling of dissatisfaction. We have not yet organized our work on a broad scale and are still experiencing growing-pains. There are no results so far. But we have plenty of enthusiasm.

N.T. Judging by how you characterized the association, it is first of all a political organization—a forum from which to express you political beliefs.

E. Sh. It is an independent organization dealing with foreign policy, which in its turn cannot be divorced from

domestic policy. It appears therefore that it is an essentially political organization. Research, the study of different questions, global problems, the interconnection between foreign and home affairs will constitute an important part of our work. It is about politics, of course.

N.T So you remain a politician first of all.

E. Sh. When the President introduced the new minister to the Foreign Ministry building I also said a few words. I said that "I'm not going to quit the political scene." This does not mean I shall hold an official post. I shall engage in politics within my independent association. We shall try to be a truly independent organization.

N.T. How do you understand the concept "independence" in this particular case?

E. Sh. I have in mind independence in defining the main trends, in the planning of our work, in our judgements, our financial independence and, of course, an unbiased analysis of the merits and flaws of various political decisions, an unbiassed analyses based on competence, reliable information, and a high scientific level of research.

N.T. What are the main areas of activity of your association?

E. Sh. In discussing our research work I do not have in mind work of the kind done in institutes. The association can use the research conducted by scholars and institutes to draw general conclusions. It can invite specialists to make their conribution to its work, organize discussions and give recommendations on different aspects of foreign policy and separate problems.

N.T. It is a kind of creative political centre, then?

E. Sh. Yes, I think it is. It is possible that we shall have our own financial base and shall be able to conclude agreements with scholars at home and abroad and, together with foreign colleagues, work out concrete solutions to problems that require efforts on the part of politicians and scholars. We are going to study the international experience of settling conflicts in different regions and countries, draw up appropriate recommendations or even take part in the solution of problems of deep concern to everyone. It is also possible that the association will act as a mediator and take part in actual settlements. I have in mind conflicts of an international and political character.

N.T. While foreign minister, did you feel the need for advice and opinion from other people, for an independent analysis of the kind your Foreign Policy Association is goint to make?

E.Sh. There was such a need. It is in this connection that a scientific coordinating centre was set up at the ministry and conferences were organized. I think our association will be able to take a more unbiassed view of various problems.

N.T. You were in the civil service all your life. How do you feel as an independent politician?

E.Sh. It is difficult to say now. Some time will have to pass.

N.T. Aren't you afraid?

E.Sh. No, I'm not afraid. It is rather interesting to be in an unusual condition. While I was foreign minister I knew when my working day began and I had a busy schedule. I knew, for instance, that at eight o'clock in the morning I had to receive a summary of world news. It took 30 to 40 minutes to read it. Then came reports, meetings, an examination of different issues. Everything was planned. I don't have all this now.

N.T. Do you want to have a busy schedule again?

E.Sh. I hope it will be a relatively easier schedule. Perhaps I shall have a schedule of a different kind - meetings and trips. It is the most essential component of the activity of our association. If we engage in purely scientific, research work, we shall be unable to understand what worries the people, the country and the world. We must meet people, take part in discussions and keep abreast of events in order to feel the pulse of political life.

N.T. Does this mean that you are going to work at the junction, so to speak, there in the country and abroad? Do you have any ideas or proposals?

E.Sh. We have received many invitations to give lectures or take part in discussions. Many invitations have come from the United States. There are also invitations from Japan and European countries. Until now we did not give preference to anyone. It is necessary first to complete our organizational affairs, and then we shall carry our plans into practice. I repeat that trips, lectures and conferences are a component part of the mission of our association.

N.T. Thus, you are a free man now.

E.Sh. No, I answer for everything that has been done. A person cannot be free if he has a sense of responsibility. In view of obvious attempts to revise and reassess everything which has been achieved over the past five years, I am going to prove that they are groundless.

N.T. Thus, you are sticking to your guns.

E.Sh. Yes, together with my colleagues, we shall defend the policy we pursued before. Forms can be different - newspaper and magazine articles and participation in discussions. We shall also invite those who disagree with us. Earlier I invited some of my opponents from among members of the Soviet Parliament, but they did not accept. Perhaps we can attract them now.

N.T. Attacks on our foreign policy became especially noticeable during the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

E.Sh. I declare with all responsibility that from the very beginning of the Gulf crisis we have done everything reasonably, in a balanced way, with regard for the situation in the region and in our country, in the interests of our people and in saving all of our citizens. This work was carried out efficiently and in keeping with the Security Council resolutions. In the Security Council we acted honestly and in a principled way. So our conscience is clear - before our people and the world. The course of operations for implementing the UN resolution by member countries of the coalition confirms that we adopted correct and timely measures.

N.T. What's in store? I have in mind another test of the strength of new thinking. Will it be ratification of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe?

E.Sh. Indeed, there is the danger that the treaty will not be concluded. I am sure that solutions must be found. Our partners lay some claims to us, and not without some grounds. If we fail to find a common language with them, the treaty will not be ratified by other parliaments. It makes no difference what country will not ratify the treaty. The point is that it will not be put into effect. This is bad. Such a failure will cancel out everything that was achieved in Helsinki, Vienna and Paris, and the Charter of Paris will become meaningless, for the treaty on conventional forces forms the basis of new relations between East and West.

N.T. I know that you have have been visited by your former colleagues—foreign ministers of Japan, France and Kuwait. It seems to me for some reason that these were not simply courtesy calls.

E.Sh. It is usually called a courtesy call. But when politicians meet, they talk about politics. We discussed the situation in the Persian Gulf. At the meeting with Roland Dumas we also talked about Soviet-French relations, the comprehensive treaty signed by the presidents of our two countries, recalled the difficulties which cropped up and how we managed to remove them. I had an emotional meeting with the Kuwaiti minister.

N.T. Did you feel any misgivings on their part about the development of events in the Soviet Union and how these events can affect its relations with other countries?

E.Sh. They have apprehensions and they do not conceal them. But they try to understand our concerns as well. It should be said frankly that it is not so simple now to preserve the good achievements of the past few years. But this must be done in the interests of our country and our partners. A great deal depends on us in this respect.

N.T. I understand that it is impossible to discuss all the questions. Nevertheless, what developments in our country worry you most of all?

E.Sh. I am worried most of all about the danger of the failure of perestroyka. If perestroyka fails, we shall be unable to feed the people, solve our social problems or settle our ethnic conflicts. The use of force will become inevitable.

N.T. What most endangers the achievements of perestroyka?

E.Sh. The people are tired. Such a situation cannot last long. There is some limit. In these circumstances, some may decide that law and order can be ensured by a strong man. We know from our history the outcome of such a policy.

N.T. Perhaps we are trying to solve present-day problems from the wrong side.

E.Sh. it is difficult to say. The trouble is that problems have been accumulating for decades. In the past few years, too, we have not done everything as it should have been done. I am partly responsible for the mistakes because I was a member of the high echelons of power. It is on the one hand. On the other hand, old mistakes, old sins make themselves felt.

N.T. I think the enthusiasm of our present-day political leaders over perestroyka has obviously cooled down.

E.Sh. I would not say so. They are looking for a way out. However, when problems are not solved or solved improperly, people become disappointed. This influences the sentiments of the people and, of course, the leaders. It can be said that the leaders are now shrinking into themselves. However, they must act in the opposite way—to draw new people into the political process, to advance new ideas and boldly put them into practice. And, first of all, this must be done honestly. It is necessary to talk openly with the people. [Shevardnadze ends]

My conversation with the President of the Foreign Policy Association began with internal afairs and returned to them.

Organizations like the newly founded one exist in many countries. They unite retired, eminent politicians of various political leanings, use their experience and prestige in their activity, conduct research, draw on brilliant minds and give recommendations to presidents and ministers. A person must have an appropriate service record or at least the recognized level of professionalism and the recommendations from several members of the association in order to become a member. Generally speaking, it is a sort of elite club of intellectuals in politics standing above politics, so to speak.

In our society, which has thrown off its ideological fetters but has not gotten rid of ideological intolerance, such a supra- political status is evidently inaccessible for the time being.

While Eduard Shevardnadze was foreign minister he felt what it means when the entire ministry becomes the target of attacks from the right with complete silence from the left. Balanced flanks are necessary at least so

that government institutions can function properly and pursue a reasonable policy. In this respect the Foreign Policy Association might prove highly useful to the present Foreign Ministry.

I think the association will become a centre of brilliant minds from among democrats. Judging by an impressive list of its founding members, which includes research institutes specializing in international affairs, public movements, the Moscow Soviet, large export-oriented enterprises, newly founded organizations of entrepreneurs, and NEW TIMES, the Foreign Policy Association will be able to make a substantial contribution to the shaping of a democratic concensus on both foreign and domestic issues.

CPSU Assesses Orenburg Party Organization

91UN1009A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1-2

[CPSU Central Committee Press Center report: "To Underpin What Is Planned With Specific Deeds"]

[Text] While it turns regularly to matters pertaining to the work of the country's Communists in the particular avenues planned by the 28th CPSU Congress, at its session, for the first time, the Central Committee Secretariat nevertheless comprehensively reviewed the activity of one of the oblast party committees. The reason for presenting the question in this way, CPSU Central Committee Secretary O.S. Shepin noted, is obvious. It is obvious: Six months have elapsed since the congress, a period that provides material for objective analysis of the content and effectiveness of what has been initiated and done, or of the reasons for unsuccessful undertakings. Here, the results of the analysis made, as those attending the session noted, is at the same time equally useful for all party committees. In this case the Orenburg organization of Communists, which is in many respects typical, was chosen specifically as the subject of investigation.

One of the obvious characteristics of the present situation in the Orenburg party obkom [oblast committee] is that, like other party committees, it has to act in a complex sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation. Nevertheless, guided by the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums, the obkom and the party city committees and rayon committees are striving through their organizational and political work to exert a stabilizing influence on the state of affairs in the oblast and to support constructive initiatives in people's deeds and actions. The proof of this is the specific programs submitted by the party obkom to the organs of soviet power to resolve urgent political, social, and economic tasks. Thus, broad support has been given in the oblast to recent proposals aimed at extending the range of consumer goods, improving efficiency in the agrarian sector and improving food supplies for the population, strengthening the material base for public health and national education, and consistently resolving housing problems. The obkom is pursuing a purposeful and consistent policy to provide reliable social safeguards for the people of Orenburg during the transition to the market.

The constructive line of the Orenburg party obkom in supporting the soviets has been supported by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. Effective cooperation has been set up between the party committee commissions and the commissions of deputies. The authority of the party group in the oblast soviet is being underpinned by the energetic participation of communist deputies in solving urgent problems in the life of the Orenburg region. It has become the practice to invite communist deputies to meetings of the bureau and to party committee plenums, and to carry on the pages of the party press the burning issues related to life in the oblast and ways to resolve them, and to discuss them in the party organizations.

At the same time, during the course of the debate on the issue in the meeting, it was emphasized in statements by Secretariat members and by the first secretary of the Orenburg party obkom, A.F. Kolinichenko, that today the need for more mobile and creative work by the obkom and the other party committees, adequate to the new realities, is arising with increasing insistence. The obkom is not succeeding fully in exerting political influence on an extensive range of problems connected with the upcoming transition to the market, and is not generalizing and considering in a sufficiently specific manner the experience gained in the activity of the party organizations under the conditions of a diversity of forms of management, or pursuing an up-to-date agrarian policy. I.I. Melnikov, A.N. Girenko, G.V. Semenov, V.A. Kuptsov, and others who spoke noted that the party obkom and the party organizations in the oblast have slackened work among youth, in the women's movement, and at places of residence. It has not been possible to avoid the destabilizing processes that have involved many of the primary party organizations, which have been unable to orient themselves under the new conditions, and have noticeably reduced their activity. It should not be forgotten, said CPSU Central Committee Secretary Yu.A. Manayenkov, that during the past two years a major change of party workers has occurred. New cadres are present who truly want to work, but they sometimes lack the skills of political activity. Consequently, the most serious attention must be paid to training for the party aktiv.

Although there are in the Orenburg Oblast organization no instances of the withdrawal of party committees from the enterprises, nevertheless some of them have lost their influence in the collectives. This has been one of the reasons why there has been a considerable number of resignations by Communists from the CPSU: Some 15,700 people have left.

In the resolution adopted by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, giving due consideration to the decision of the January joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, the Orenburg Obkom was assigned the task of analyzing work done to comply with the instructions of the 28th CPSU Congress. It is important to underpin the positive things that enable the oblast party organization to retain its influence in the various spheres of life in the oblast. At the same time, it should act more vigorously in the directions that define the prospects and are of priority for the party and country. Measures aimed at dealing with the critical socioeconomic situation, as approved by the USSR Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, and the tasks of preserving the Union and safeguarding socialist gains should be the focus of attention in specific political work.

Discussing the question of preparations for the 121st anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth, those attending the session of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat noted that recently political opponents of the CPSU are showing a special desire to disparage the cause and person of the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, even going as far as obvious fabrications.

Primakov Charges of Bias Countered

PM0503165191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Unattributed article: "It Is a Newspaper's Duty and Right To Inform"]

[Text] Since Baghdad announced its unconditional acceptance of all 12 UN Security Council resolutions without exception and the coalition forces ceased their military operations, the debate about more or less effective ways of resolving the crisis in the Persian Gulf can be regarded as exhausted. Nevertheless the article by Academician Ye. Primakov "The War That Might Never Have Happened" (PRAVDA issues No. 50-53) is of undoubted interest both for the Soviet and the international public as a detailed, knowledgeable, and instructive account by not just an eyewitness but a direct participant in events. We have no doubt that the Soviet Union's efforts in attempting to resolve the conflict by political means will be comprehensively analyzed for a long time to come. Academician Primakov's observations undoubtedly provide material for researchers. Today we will only touch upon a few paragraphs in the article which deal directly with IZVESTIYA.

We were surprised to discover that Primakov puts IZVESTIYA among those publications carryiing articles tha "made a point of asserting the failure of the mission to Baghdad" (meaning Primakov's first mission). The author expresses here dissatisfaction with the fact that the editorial office did not consult him and did not try to "find out his conclusions and impressions," but "instead cited Western press organs and only to show that there should not even be an attempt... to settle the conflict by political means."

What can you say? It seems to us that, given glasnost, citing Western (and other) press organs has ceased to be a crime, seeing that the times when it was demanded that we cite only those items in the Western mass media that spoke exclusively about the successes of our foreign policy have disappeared into the past. As for reproaching us for a reluctance to "find out his conclusions and impressions," we wish to stress that such attempts were made by us, but were not crowned with success.

We can in no way accept the charges that IZVESTIYA was opposed to a political settlement. The world community, the UN Security Council, and our country tried since last August to resolve the crisis by political means and to make the aggressor see reason. Did IZVESTIYA really not write about this in detail, setting out all the positions and above all our own, the Soviet one?

"Later, after the war had already begun" Ye. Primakov writes, "an article appeared in IZVESTIYA claiming that if the Soviet Union did not take part in the 'victorious coalition,' it would completely deprive itself of the right to be involved in the political settlement processes."

First, the author has expounded IZVESTIYA's position very freely here, taking only "victorious coalition" from it verbatim while paraphrasing the remainder in a way that greatly distorts the meaning. There is at any rate not a word in the article that the Soviet Union "would deprive itself of the right" (see IZVESTIYA issue No. 19). And second, and this is the most important point, the article is by our correspondent in the United States, whose official duties encompass information about the whole spectrum of political opinions in the country to which he has been sent by the editorial office.

One more quotation from Academician Primakov's article: "...Another article in IZVESTIYA said that President Bush would have no option but to use neutron weapons if military success over Iraq were not achieved within six months. One is surprised at the blitheness, even recklessness, with which some of our newspapers write about things concerning the lives of thousands and thousands of people. Let alone their unthinking attitude toward our country's foreign policy interests."

'Democratic Russia' Meeting Reported

PM1103141591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by Vladimir Ardayev: "Meeting on Manezhnaya Square"]

[Excerpts] Many thousands of Muscovites responded to the appeal of the "Democratic Russia" movement and came to the capital's Manezhnaya Square on Sunday to express their attitude toward the processes taking place

in the country and toward the forthcoming 17 March nationwide referendum. [passage omitted]

G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, called the CPSU Central Committee's present policy a "program of restoration." He said that he had determined personally how to vote at the referendum: crossing out both questions and thus making his ballot slip invalid. Yu. Afanasyev specified: The "Democratic Russia" coordination council urges all its supporters to say "no" to the question of a union referendum and "yes" to the question of a Russian referendum. V. Aksyuchis, chairman of the "Russian Christian Democratic Movement" party, demanded the resignation of the USSR president and the holding of a nationwide democratic election of the head of state. USSR People's deputy T. Gdlyan announced the creation of a new political organization, the "Russian People's Party"—of democratic orientation and alternative to the CPSU.

Representatives of the Kuzbass miners strike committees also spoke here on Manezhnaya Square. The speakers said that the miners are being accused today of making excessive economic demands. So the strikes are now proceeding under political slogans, the speakers asserted. The miners firmly intend to bring this truth to the country's leadership: Immediately after the end of the meeting together with their deputies the strike committees' chairmen intended to go to the Kremlin and to hand in a petition there. They also urged that funds be collected to help the strikers' families.

The meeting took place in an organized manner. After it ended the demonstrators proceeded down Tverskaya Street. The militia's work—calm and precise—drew the attention. To a question from one correspondent a militia officer replied: "Today we are collaborating in complete agreement with the meeting's organizers..."

Shortages Top List of Citizens' Concerns

PM1103123591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Three Percent Are For 'Principles,' the Rest Choose Pepsi"]

[Text] According to the data of a February poll conducted among 2,075 inhabitants of the USSR by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, the shortage of foodstuffs and essentials has become the no. 1 problem for Soviet society. This was indicated by 67 percent of those polled.

Precisely 59 percent of the respondents are concerned about rising prices.

Precisely 29 percent of those polled declared that they are alarmed at the increase in the number of crimes.

Precisely 22 percent are displeased with the weakness and helplessness of state power.

Precisely 13 percent of the respondents believe that a threat of dictatorship hangs over the country. The same number of people polled believe that the disintegration of the Soviet Union is approaching.

Those polled are least concerned about the problem of a departure from the ideals of socialism. This aspect alarms just 3 percent of those polled. (The total adds up to more than 100 percent, because the correspondents were offered a choice of more than three replies).

Economic

Reportage on Continuing Kuzbass Miners' Strike

Appeal for 'Indefinite' Strike

LD1203084691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0734 GMT 12 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Grigoriy Shalakin]

[Text] Kemerovo (Western Siberia) 12 Mar (TASS)—The council of the Kuzbass work committees has decided at their latest sitting, which took place in Novokuznetsk, to address the coalfield's miners with an appeal to hold an indefinite political strike. The resignation of the USSR president is to be its main demand.

This morning only two coal enterprises of over 100 enterprises in the Kuzbass did not work—the "Bolshevik" mine of the "Oblkemerovougol" leasehold commercial association and the "Dimitrov" mine of the "Kuznetskugol" concern, which are situated in Novokuznetsk. It is not the first day of the strike at the "Bolshevik" mine, and the enterprise owes consumers already 20,000 tonnes of coking and power-generating coal.

Strikes Continue at 60 Mines

LD1103135991 Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] About 60 coal mines in various parts of the Soviet Union are on strike, according to reports by strike committees. The general demand of the miners is to have their wages doubled or even increased by 150 percent. They also want higher pensions.

Political demands are also voiced now. They include the resignation of the union leadership.

At several mines the strike committees intend to carry on the stoppage until the demands are met. The miners of the Kuznetsk coal field in Siberia intend to go on a general strike on Friday unless their demands are met.

However, so far most of the pits refrain from stoppages. Many of them are in a hard economic position.

Striking Miners Seek Pavlov Meeting

LD1103140391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Mar 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The situation in the mining regions—there are already strikers in all of them. A delegation of miners is trying to get a meeting with Prime Minister Pavlov in Moscow today, who believes talks are only possible with non-striking miners.

Yeltsin Receives Striking Miners

LD1103143391 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 11 TASS—Russian Parliament President Boris Yeltsin and chairmen of coal miners' strike committees, who had a meeting today, discussed the political, social and economic situation in the country.

The meeting also discussed the possible transfer of the mining and iron and steel industries in the Kuznetsk basin from All-Union to Russian jurisdiction. Representatives of miners informed Yeltsin of workers' demands to the All-Union leadership.

Asked about his attitude to continuing miners' strikes, Yeltsin stressed that it is up to miners to decide what forms of protecting their rights to choose.

Chairmen of Kuzbass workers' committees declared their full support for Yeltsin's political position and readiness "to protect it with all possible non-violent methods".

The information about the meeting was supplied by the press service of the Russian parliament presidium.

Miners Threaten 15 Mar General Strike

PM1203102991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[S. Vtorushin report: "Miners Not Reassured"]

[Excerpt] Kemerovo City, 10 Mar— [Passage omitted] The 18 months since the strike-ridden summer of 1989 have not made the lives of the Kuzbass miners any better. During the present strike, miners have given priority to political demands.

On 10 March two mines in Kemerovo Oblast—the "Kungurskaya" and the "Bolshevik"—were on strike. Another mine—the "Abashevskaya"—was working but wasn't sending out any coal. That day rallies in support of the strikers' political demands were held in Kemerovo and Novokuznetsk. Admittedly, neither rally was very large. A joint meeting in Novokuznetsk of the strike committee and the oblast council of workers' committees is planned for Monday. The meeting is due to approve a plan of further actions. The Kuzbass miners are saying that unless their demands are satisfied they will call a general strike on 15 March.

Reasons for Strikes Explained

LD1103212491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1516 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Grigoriy Shalakin]

[Text] Kemerovo (Western Siberia), 11 Mar (TASS)—Gennadiy Starkov, representative of the "Bolshevik" mine, called the main reason for striking, announced by the miners of the 103 miners of the Kuznetsk coal basin, "the empty shelves in the shops and the presidential tax" at a rally in Novokuznetsk (the rayon center of the oblast) on Sunday.

The economic instability and the lack of economic freedom promised to the enterprises of the coal industry in the area, but not yet granted, are causing the situation here to heat up seriously. This does not mean that the local authorities and the center do not see the situation as it is. However, in spite of all the agreements signed between the committees heading the strikes and the local soviet of people's deputies on cooperation, up to now no headway has been made. The transformation of the Kuzbass into a free enterprise zone, which was personally promised by Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, has come to a standstill. The issue has not yet even been submitted to the Russian parliament for examination.

One can judge the situation in which the miners of the Kuzbass and their families find themselves today from the following fact: The guaranteed norm for foodstuffs for a month per miner is, in calorific value, the norm which is, in turn, determined by special medical science as equal to the energy expended in a single work shift. The same is true for the metal workers, chemists, and builders of Kemerovo oblast.

Having announced the strike and put forward their demands, the miners were right in their own way. To have enterprises standing idle does not bode well either, however. Over the last few months the Kuznetsk basin has thrown itself back a quarter of a century in production level.

IZVESTIYA Reports on Strikers' Demands

PM1103121191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Kostyukovskiy under the rubric "Direct Link": "Miners' 'Desperate Step'"]

[Text] Kemerovo—Collectives of several mines in Novokuznetsk, Anzhero-Sudzhensk, and Berezovskiy are continuing a strike with political demands.

Supporting these demands (the main ones are the resignation of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary from the post of president of the country, the dissolution of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, the resignation of the Union Government, and the transfer of power to the Federation Council and sovereign republics), the

Kuzbass Worker Committees Council has asked other collectives to give the strikers material and moral assistance, but to strike only in the event of "reprisals" against them. "We have decided on a desperate step for the sake of a worthy life for ourselves and our fellow citizens," reads a statement by Novokuznetsk miners who, to use a local expression, have "gone on indefinite leave."

Striking Chervonograd Miners' Committee Demands

LD1203114991 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] All 12 mines in the town of Chervonograd, Lvov oblast, stopped sending coal to consumers at 1800 today. The strike committee of Chervonograd forwarded several demands after adopting the resolution to resume the strike in connection with failure to fulfill Resolution 608 of the USSR Council of Ministers on improving economic and sociopolitical conditions of miners and understanding that it will not be fulfilled in the future without a change of political structure. Some of them are:

1. The post of the president must be abolished, and the USSR Supreme Soviet and congress must be dismissed as unnecessary bodies on the way toward building independent states.
2. The Ukrainian state sovereignty declaration must be given the status of constitutional act.
3. No to the Union treaty.
4. The court case of Stepan Khmara must be stopped, and he and other political prisoners must be released.

Joint Venture Set Up With CSFR Truck Firm

PM1203094991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 7 Mar 91

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Shvetsov in Tyumen Oblast; from the "Vremya" newscast:]

[Text] [Announcer] "Tatra-Servis," a Soviet-Czechoslovak joint venture, has been established in Tyumen Oblast. Our correspondent Aleksandr Shvetsov has the details.

[Shvetsov] The inhabitants of the north have long been familiar with the output of the Tatra combine. It is largely thanks to these trucks, which have won a good name through their performance in difficult conditions, that vast quantities of freight have been transported and millions of cubic meters of earth shifted during the construction of new cities and highways and the development of deposits. There are many more years of work for the Tatra trucks here.

It would seem that this kind of cooperation between the two countries is only to be welcomed. Recently the situation has changed sharply. The system introduced a short while ago for mutual payments only in hard currency has led to a breakdown of existing ties and disruptions in deliveries of spare parts and of the trucks themselves. This has hit both us and the Czechoslovak machine builders.

A joint venture was the only mutually advantageous form of continued economic contacts. The founders are the Tatra Combine itself, the All-Union "Avtoeksport" Joint-Stock Company, the "Tyumenneftespetstrans" Production Association, and a number of other companies.

[V.Kh. Trushnikov, director general of "Tatra-Servis" joint venture] We are planning to provide technical servicing, repairs, and servicing under guarantee for Czechoslovak trucks and trucks from third countries. Our sphere of activity will be not only West Siberia, but also the adjoining Urals region and East Siberia.

[Shvetsov] The establishment within the framework of the joint venture of a broad network of Tatra repair and service stations in Siberia and the centralization of supply and trade operations will mean considerable advantages also for the Soviet side. First, many problems of the enterprises which are currently using these trucks will be removed. The assembly of dump trucks, which is to be organized locally, at Nizhnevartovsk, will mean a considerable saving in foreign currency. It will also create additional jobs for northerners, and this is important today.

Military

Moiseyev Interviewed on Military Reform

91UM0443A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian No 1, Jan 1991 p 4

[Report on interview with General of the Army M. Moiseyev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by POSTFACTUM; place and date not given: "M. Moiseyev: 'Take My Privileges!'"]

[Text] [POSTFACTUM] In your opinion, what role will be assigned to the Army in the new structure of authority proposed by Gorbachev?

[Moiseyev] My position is clearly laid out in the concept of military reform that the Ministry of Defense is developing and which has already been supported by the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on questions of defense and state security. We are proposing the establishment of a professional army. What kind it will be is another matter—one that is hired or one that is based on the principle of universal military service. Today, we are leaning toward the mixed principle. In the first stage, we will shift to manning through hiring, but for the most difficult specialties we will introduce service by contract. Our concept of military reform has a social section. The government has already approved a decree concerning an increase in the monetary pay of soldiers, cadets, and

sergeants, and pay has been introduced for proficiency level ratings and for operational alert duty.

[POSTFACTUM] In connection with the reform, will it be recommended that some of the general officers retire?

[Moiseyev] This cannot be excluded. A planned discharge is going on now in our country, and it will affect the higher echelon as well.

[POSTFACTUM] When will general officers give up social privileges?

[Moiseyev] If someone decided to spend one day with me as the chief of the General Staff, he could take over all of my privileges. I even refused a dacha, although look at what kind of a dacha—it was an out-of-town command and control panel. I have an extensive communications system, just like the minister of defense. I manage not only the Armed Forces, but the strategic nuclear forces also.

[POSTFACTUM] How can you comment on the opinion that has spread that the fusion of the CPSU apparatus and the military command authority is continuing.

[Moiseyev] There is no kind of fusion. What is meant by this? If I am a Communist, then I am kind of together with the party apparatus. But I am engaged purely in my work, for the army is the sort of structure that has clear-cut functions and clearly established tasks in defense of the interests of the citizens.

[POSTFACTUM] This means that there is no threat of danger on the part of a bloc of communists and the military, which is being talked about now?

[Moiseyev] This is ruled out.

Shlyaga Attends Academy Party Conference

PM1103110591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Party Conferences"]

[Text] A conference of the CPSU organization of the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy has been held. The report delivered by Colonel General Yu. Melnikov, chairman of the organizational committee for preparing the conference, and the speeches delivered by Lieutenant General A. Sitnikov, Lieutenant Colonel S. Terekhov, and others noted that in the situation of the aggravated political antagonism in the country the role of the party organizations is growing more than ever. It is the duty of every Communist to activate the struggle for perestroyka, the purity of Lenin's ideas, and the conservation of the USSR as a federation of equal sovereign republics.

The conference was addressed by Colonel General N. Shlyaga, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. Emphasis was placed on the fundamental difference of present conferences in the context of the reform of political organs and the formation of party structures. Specific positions were defined for the perestroyka of the training and educational process and for radical changes in training the Soviet Armed Forces political personnel cadres.

V. Ryabov, chief of a CPSU Central Committee department, took part in the work of the conference.

The party committee and the delegates to the all-Army conference were elected.

Moscow Garrison Rallies for Single Army, Union

PM0703120791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

["Appeal by Servicemen of the Moscow Garrison at 23 February 1991 Rally"]

[Text] Dear fellow countrymen! Comrades in arms!

We, servicemen from the Moscow Garrison, state that there is no higher honor for us than to serve the fatherland ano our people. The Army was created by the people and will always remain its integral part and defender. We are against the Army being torn apart into national territorial armies. We must prevent transitions from political conflict to armed conflict.

We want to tell our people that intimidating them with the idea of a military dictatorship is a form of calculated intrigue in the struggle for power and it undermines the state's foundations. We also resolutely reject the cunning games being played with the Army. It needs something quite different—a deep understanding of its problems and genuine reform.

We urge you:

—to prevent the disintegration of the Soviet state;

—to say a firm "yes" 17 March to the defense of the renewed Union;

—to support the USSR president and defend constitutional democracy;

—to say a decisive "no" to attempts to slander the Army and represent it as a reactionary and compliant force opposing the people;

—to express deep gratitude to the veterans of the Great Patriotic War and internationalist servicemen, revere the memory of those who fell, and embrace those who are alive and well;

—to affirm loyalty to the glorious combat traditions!

We advocate the preservation of the Union, united multinational Armed Forces, and the unity of the Army and the people as a guarantee of the stability of society!

Gen Batenin Favors All-Professional Army

PM1103140691 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 8, 26 Feb-4 Mar 91 pp 12-14

[Article by Major General Gelyy Batenin: "How To Overcome the 1941 Syndrome"]

[Text] The debate about what kind of an army this country needs reflects society's concern over the future of its armed forces. Polemic fervour often prevents us from noticing how we mechanically associate our own vision of the crisis of "developed socialism" with the army as a whole.

Naturally the crisis of a system means the crisis of all elements and institutions of that system. On the other hand, the scale and quality of crisis phenomena differ in each concrete case. If this fact is ignored or misunderstood, then the assessment of the crisis becomes distorted, as was the case with the article by Simon Kordonskiy (NT, No 2, 1991). Uncompromising, exaggerated assessments of the negative features of what the author called "our antiquated state" are spearheaded against the army. What for, may I ask? To shock the military and civilian reformers of the Soviet Armed Forces? Or to insult military professionals by mentioning defence research centers' "using stolen technological and scientific achievements," or by saying that this country has no qualified experts who could cope with the task of "the optimization of the army and conversion of the defence potential"?

At the same time, Kordonskiy's article contains something that is too often missing from many other articles on the army's problems. First of all, one cannot fail to observe the author's brilliant logic when he speaks on the paths to military reform which lead nowhere. In other words, Kordonskiy presents a political scientist's view on what kind of an army we do not need. Few military experts would disagree with the author's unfortunately cursory ideas about the new military-political and geopolitical priorities in the military development of the USSR. Meanwhile, some considerations may be relevant in this connection.

New Thinking and the Army

The Soviet Armed Forces are living through a deep socio-psychological and moral and political crisis. The inside aspect of this crisis may be described as low discipline, a lack of professionalism, low morale and poor combat efficiency of the Army and the Navy as a whole. From the outside, this crisis manifests itself in young people's unwillingness to serve in the army and the decline of the Armed Forces' authority as the guarantor of national security. The deep-seated reason behind the crisis is the contradiction between the extremely conservative forms of the existence of the army, inherited from the centralized bureaucratic system in its very worst, the Prussian variant, and the policy of perestroika and new political thinking. Two factors have aggravated this crisis: the war in Afghanistan and the restoration of the army's function as an instrument of coercion at home.

Let us not forget that the Americans had their own Vietnam syndrome which generated dangerous tensions in society, massive antiwar pressure on the administration and a dramatic drop in the prestige of military service. The crisis was overcome in 1975 thanks to a prompt transition to an all-volunteer army and the creation of professional armed forces. Political and social fears (concerning a mercenary spirit, racism and the emergence of castes in the army) and the negative economic forecasts, which predicted growing military spendings, proved groundless. The transition to a professional army was predated by an unprecedented propaganda and promotion campaign and a federal programme for school and college students and reservists which had been designed to boost the prestige of military service. The main factor, however, was that the military-political leadership of the United States realized that it was necessary to radically reorganize the old system of manning the armed forces. This allowed the United States to create an effective professional army with high morale and excellent combat and technical training. The US Army today is prestigeous, well-disciplined and, in a sense democratic.

The task facing us today is twofold: we must radically reshape both the system of recruiting and the organizational pattern of the Armed Forces. This reasonable defence sufficiency—the main element of Soviet military doctrine which expresses qualitative rather than quantitative parameters of the army's organizational structure.

The opponents of any changes in the existing recruiting principle often quote Frederick Engels' words about "the quality of the human material" in the context of the dependence of the military sphere on the degree of development of society's socio-economic infrastrcture. Thus they try to prove that, first, this country has no conditions for adopting the voluntary recruiting principle (the word "mercenarism" is used by them in its purely derogatory meaning). Second, the opponents of the army reform want to shield the military leadership from not always groundless criticisms concerning the poor training of the army cadres and the decline of discipline and prestige of the military service. These attempts to protect the inviolablity of universal military duty can be understood, nonetheless there are a number of arguments in favour of a democratic alternative to the existing system of conscription.

The Advantages of a Professional Army

Let us go over a few arguments:

First Complete professionalism in the Army and the Navy in a context in which combat equipment and military service grow increasingly sophisticated.

Second The possibility of selecting recruits of the optimal age, with adequate physical and psychological fitness, political views and morale.

Third Boosting the material and social prestige of the military service, which will become one of the professions which citizens are free to choose.

Fourth The possibility gains for society: a threefold reduction in the strength of the army and the corresponding influx of young males into the national economy; a greater share of NCOs and COs with secondary technical education; a 5- to 10-fold increase in the amortization cycle of active military duty (from two to three years to 10 to 20 years, depending on the arm and specificities of the service); purposive spendings on a concrete professional soldier, estimation of the worthiness of every soldier on the basis of his combat effectiveness and qualities, rationalization of spendings on armaments, material and technical supplies and maintenance of a professional army.

Thus the voluntary principle of recruitment is completely acceptable for the army as an instrument protecting national security because it can help improve the performance of this instrument and solve many professional and disciplinary problems of the army. Society as a whole is also interested in greater prestige of the military and as low defence spendings as possible. A professional army is very expensive if it is formed within the existing structures designed for mandatory conscription.

A professional army can be economically solvent only if voluntary recruitment is carried out within the context of a defensive military doctrine and corresponding organizational structure. Defensive structures are much fewer than offensive ones; that is why if new political thinking is not a bluff, there will be no sharp increase in military spending.

For the sake of objectivity we should mention one negative aspect of the formation of a professional army. This is connected with the specific features of our state and the current crisis of the federative relations in the Union. The drive to professionalize the army may aggravate the existing negative tendencies connected with the socio-legal and ethnic division of society.

Military professionalism also contradicts the traditional moral and psychological norms of society which are based on the understanding that defence of the country is the sacred duty of all citizens and even in peacetime must be the concern of the whole nation, not just a part of it.

The way out may be mixed recruitment with a gradual shift towards professionalism. This shift must be gradual and not tentative and slow as it is stipulated by the package of defence laws submitted for the consideration of Soviet lawmakers. First of all the voluntary recruitment practice must be adopted in such branches as the Strategic Missile Corps, Air Defence, Air Force and Navy. The massive Army (ground-gaining troops) must be cardinally changed so that voluntary recruitment could also be adopted there as soon as possible. At the same time, we will have to reshape the entire system of reserve and mobilization training, and probably form an Army Reserve.

The "Containment-Deterrence" Strategy

The radical reform of the armed forces which is currently on the agenda requires a radical reorganization of their structure. So far, our unilateral measures on the reduction of conventional forces and armaments, despite the impressive figures of tanks made redundant in the divisions (a 20 to 40 percent reduction), dissolution of the divisions themselves and the reduction of the army's strength by 500,000 men have not affectd the organizational pattern of the Soviet Armed Forces which have for forty years been inended for an offensive war bringing a prompt victory (vastly due to the 1941 syndrome). The theory and practice of military science were subordinate to this principle. At the beginning of the 1980s, the top military leadership of the country worked out and instructed the Armed Forces to follow the "fundamentals" of strategic, tactical and battlefield offensive operations.

The configuration and deep-echeloned pattern of the Army (meaning in this case the ground-gaining troops) and the assisting Air Force and Air Defence units corresponded (or at least everything possible was done to make them correspond) to the above-mentioned doctrine from the forward edge of the Warsaw Pact across to the Urals and even farther.

Hence the unprecedented Soviet tank buildup (over 40,000 in the European theatre alone), the galloping deployment of medium- and shorter-range missiles and the costly attempts to upset the Eurostrategic balance of forces by massive deployment of SS-20s.

Oriented at large-scale offensive operations, this strategy exhausted our economy, ailing as it was, and required a four-million-strong army with too many heavy armaments and a surprisingly weak computer and electronic backing. Today the USSR boasts one of the world's highest militarization ratios: 138 men out of every 10,000 are soldiers (not counting such branches and services as the border guards, interior troops, railway engineers and military construction teams). It must be mentioned for the sake of comparison that the corresponding ratio is 83/10,000 in the United States and 63/10,000 in Germany.

Today the characteristic features of this country's Armed Forces are an excessive numerical and quantitative strength which may be needed only in the event of the immediate threat of war, little mobility and obsolete organizational patterns. Modern Soviet military doctrine will start to work only when this country develops flexible, highly mobile defensive structures able to react quickly to changes in the international military-political

situation and to rebuff adequately any challenge. **This is the nucleus of the "containment-deterrence" strategy.**

The Three Echelons of the "Peace Front"

The ideology of the new armed forces' development must be dominated by one principle: peacetime is the principal and maybe the only period for the armed forces and their most important mission is to prevent wars. To realize the military containment factor, a corresponding reorganization of the armed forces is necessary.

The first and principal structural element of the army must be rapid deployment forces. Strategically, these forces consist of what may be described as three echelons.

First, the strategic echelon: the existing strategic nuclear triad—Air Defence, Anti-Missile Defence and Space Defence. **Second,** the tactical echelon: ground-gaining forces, Air Force and Air Defence, represented by air-mobile and air-assault divisions, which will act as a sword at major theatres of operations. **Third,** the battlefield echelon: ground-gaining troops, Air Force and Air Defence consisting of battle-ready combat and auxiliary units, something like what was known in the USSR as "fortified defence areas" acting as a shield in major theatres.

The three-echelon pattern of the main element of the reformed Armed Forces capable of reacting to any threat quickly and effectively, will, of course, require a revision of our views on the role and place of military regions in the national defence system. In the new hierarchy, the military regions will lose their traditional strategic and tactical importance, because their basic functions will be transferred to the "sword" and "shield" commands.

The military regions (one in each republic and up to three in Russia) will supervise administrative matters in their territories. On the whole, they will make up the **second element** of the Armed Forces, incorporating military commissariats, training centres, training divisions and flexible composition regiments.

Thus the military regions will be responsible for mobilization plans in their territories in the event of war or emergency, training of reservists, controlling national and territorial reserve formations, and patriotic education of draft-age people in order to ensure sufficient voluntary manning of the army.

The status of a superpower has to be confirmed economically, socially and politically. The Gulf war demonstrates that it must also be confirmed militarily.

PRAVDA Carries Army Gen Shkadov Obituary

PM2202143991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6

[Obituary of Army General Ivan Nikolayevich Shkadov]

[Excerpts] Hero of the Soviet Union Army General Ivan Nikolayevich Shkadov, eminent Soviet military leader, died tragically 15 February 1991 during the execution of official duties. A loyal son of the Soviet people and an active participant in the Great Patriotic War who devoted his entire conscious life to selfless service for the motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, which he joined in 1938, has departed this life.

I.N. Shkadov was born into a peasant family in the village of Naumovo, Spas-Demenskiy Rayon, Kaluga Oblast, 2 May 1913. [passage omitted]

After the war I.N. Shkadov commanded a self-propelled tank regiment and a tank division. He graduated from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy and served in responsible posts among the troops. He was deputy commander of the Carpathian Military District for combat training and military educational institutions and chief of its Combat Training and Military Educational Institutions Directorate, senior officer of the group of Soviet military specialists in the Republic of Cuba, commander of the Northern Group of Forces, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Military Academy, and chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Military Educational Institutions Directorate.

For a long time N.I. Shkadov headed the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate, and from 1982 he was USSR deputy defense minister for personnel, having done great work on the training of Army and Navy officer cadres. From 1987 he was military inspector-adviser to the group of USSR Ministry of Defense general inspectors. In the last two years he headed the editorial board of the All-Union Memory Book. [passage omitted]

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, G.I. Yanayev, A.I. Lukyanov, V.S. Pavlov, V.A. Ivashko, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, I.S. Belousov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, N.I. Shlyaga, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, V.N. Chernavin, V.M. Shuralev, V.M. Arkhipov, V.P. Mironov, V.A. Achalov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, V.F. Yermakov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, N.V. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, B.P. Bugayev, A.N. Soshnikov, D.S. Sukhorukov, G.I. Obaturov, A.S. Myakota.

Baltic Republics

Estonia Appeals to Gorbachev on Referendum

LD1203104291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 12 Mar 91

[Report by corrrespondent Vladimir Velman from Tallinn]

[Excerpts] The session of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Republic has continued. [passage omitted]

Estonia as a whole will not take part in the all-Union referendum, though in certain regions, in particular in the northeast of the republic, preparations are under way and evidently the referendum will take place there.

An appeal to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was adopted at the session of the Estonian Supreme Soviet which states the following, in part: The results of the referendum do not commit the Supreme Soviet and Government of the Estonian Republic to participating in talks on the issue of the Union treaty or joining the Union treaty in any form.

Estonian, Danish Foreign Ministers Sign Protocol

LD1103214191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Danish Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen and Estonian Foreign Minister Meri signed a working protocol today which stresses the fact that Denmark has recognized Estonia since 1921, and also its nonrecognition of Estonia's inclusion in the USSR. The two sides express the hope that negotiations between the Soviet Union and Estonia will begin in the very near future on the subject of granting independence.

Estonia's Savisaar Interviewed on 1991 Issues

LD1203014591 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0900 GMT 9 Mar 91

[Interview with Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers, by correspondent Kaja Karner; place, date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Karner] The question most discussed by the population at the moment is about the length of time the transition period will still last.

[Savisaar] On the one hand, one will need to resolve issues that may take years—for example, the withdrawal of the USSR Army and military bases. On the other hand, we must also set ourselves aims for the near future, because the transition period itself is a burdensome, tiring time of confusion and expectations. I would think that we must succeed in resolving the key issues in our relations with the USSR within the current year. If we do not hurry at present, if we do not act resolutely, decisively, and all together, then the empire will also find a countermove for us.

[Karner] What should this year contain?

[Savisaar] I think that we must not relinquish our positions, which we have won internationally. The words Estonia and Republic of Estonia must sound both in the East and the West. We must intensify our foreign relations, starting from relations with states, governments, and parliaments, down to economics, trade, culture, sports, and human relations. The word Estonia must have a ring of prestige, plausibility, and trust to it. International recognition of us would be the best support to reckon with. In our relations with USSR Union republics we have so far served as examples for them along the path to a market economy. We must strengthen our eastern relations along the principle that the more followers we have, the more supporters we have.

We have thought about creating a Baltic legislature, discussed the possibilities of a Tallinn meeting hall—as a new international gathering place for economists—for political conferences, cultural events, the Baltic student's song festival, even down to the idea of a Baltic olympics.

I hope that now, after the [3 Mar] referendum, the people's political activity will not abate, but I also hope that it will manifest itself in a constructive way. Democracy here has voiced itself in pluralism and diversity of opinion, sooner than in other republics, and that is good. But of course, the cruelty, wickedness, cynicism, and ill will with which different opinions pour forth saddens me, and sometime makes me even pessimistic. Even for some politicians, the concept of freedom boils down to the right to say anything at all—the main thing being that it should be as offensive as possible. [passage omitted]

Yet it seems that this year—from the referendum to becoming independent—will certainly be painful and harsh; I hope so very much that it will not be cruel.

Pro-Referendum Conference Conducted in Riga

PM1103104191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Second Edition p 3

[Report by correspondent O. Meshkov under the general headline: "For a Renewed Union"]

[Text] Riga—A conference of representatives of sociopolitical and public organizations and movements in the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] advocating the holding of an all-Union referendum in the republic 17 March has been held at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Sociopolitical Center in Riga.

More than 1,200 mandates were issued by the holders of the conference—in particular, to representatives of the "Ravnopraviye" ["Equal Rights"] faction of the republic's Supreme Soviet, the local soviet "Soyuz" ["Union"] deputies' group, the Latvian Communist Party, the

International Front of Working People of the Latvian SSR, the joint labor collective council, and other organizations. The conference agenda included the question "On the Tasks of Sociopolitical and Social Organizations and Movements in Connection With the Forthcoming 17 March 1991 All-Union Referendum." A report was delivered by A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo. The conference discussed and adopted the final document—an "Appeal to the Latvian People."

Lithuanian Presidium Sees 'New Provocations'

LD1103231291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 2020 GMT 11 Mar 91

["Statement of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium entitled 'Concerning the Continuous Aggression of the Soviet Union Against the Independent Republic of Lithuania'"—read by announcer]

[Text] In Lithuania lately there has been an increase in numbers of USSR KGB troops and Ministry of Internal Affairs troops and an increase in the intensity of armored vehicle movements and other units of the USSR Armed Forces on Lithuania's roads and the streets of cities. Violent military patrols have taken the form of shooting, detentions, and beating passers-by, robberies, and insults. These new provocations against the Republic of Lithuania have again raised the threat of danger to the life and health of the people.

These actions by the USSR Armed Forces serve as a reminder of what happened in January this year in Vilnius. They justifiably cause general concern and disquiet in people and just indignation. Events of this kind have become more frequent with the approach of the USSR referendum on 17 March. TASS disinformation reports about an invented concentration of fighters in Lithuania, about preparations to disrupt the organization of the illegal referendum, and also USSR Lithuanian Communist Party leaders; statements on helping USSR troops to hold the referendum are clearly provocative. This is also the case with the Soyuz group of USSR people's deputies demands addressed to the president to create normal conditions for holding the referendum all over the Soviet Union with a clear hint that this should also be the same in Lithuania.

All this clearly shows that the militarists and communists and conservatives of the Soviet Union, under the pretext of the referendum, are preparing a new well-thought out large-scale armed provocation against the independent Lithuanian state. The aim of the provocation is to overthrow the lawful authority and once again to introduce the rule of the Soviet Union in Lithuania, to impose alien laws.

The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council Presidium strives as quickly as possible to draw the attention of the world public to the increasing numbers of provocations and the continuing escalation of USSR armed aggression.

The Lithuanian authorities, together with the people of Lithuania and all the forces and available means, will defend the restored independent Lithuanian state and the civil liberties and rights. Faced with this danger, the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council Presidium appeals to democratic governments of all countries to give a stern warning to the USSR leadership (?to refrain from) the prepared attacks against free Lithuania. At the same time we warn that all responsiblity for possible new casualties resulting from aggression and the misery of people and crimes against the Lithuanian state and humanity will be borne by the USSR and its leaders.

Officer, Cadet Attacked by Vilnius 'Hooligans'

LD1103205691 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] There have been attacks on servicemen in Vilnius. On the evening of 8 March, Colonel Zhuk, wearing civilian clothes, was taking a stroll with his wife near his house. Suddenly, several people jumped over the fence, shouting. The officer repelled the attack by two of them. The rest, and there were no less than 10 of them, surrounded the couple, shouting insults. The colonel warned them that he was a serviceman and took out his revolver: in that garrison, officers are allowed to carry personal weapons. There were three shots in the air. After the hooligans, carrying metal bars, tried to strike blows, the officer started to shoot at their legs. That alone stopped the attackers. They dispersed and disappeared. Colonel Zhuk suffered some injuries.

Unfortunately, in the last few days such an incident has occurred in Vilnius. On 9 March, at a trolley stop, Fazylov, a cadet of the Vilnius High Command School of Air Defense Radioelectronics, was beaten up by a group of hooligans. He is now hospitalized. A legitimate question arises: When is the republic's leadership, which talks so much about human rights, going to take effective measures at last against those who make attempts upon the lives, honor and dignity of servicemen?

RSFSR

Media Continues To Assess Yeltsin 9 Mar Speech

Radio Rossii Broadcasts 'Text'

LD1103172291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Mar 91

["Text" of speech by Russian Federation President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin to a gathering of the Democratic Russia Bloc at the Theater House in Moscow on 9 March—recorded]

[Text] Dear friends: I thank you for the kindness you have displayed and for your reactions. This auditorium

holds many memories for me, and presumably for you, too. You will recall that it was in this hall that the Interregional Deputies Group was launched. Its five cochairmen sat here—among them Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. This commits us and our democratic movement to much. It obliges us to remember what Andrey Dmitriyevich used to say. Yes, indeed, during this time, the democratic movement has been drastically transformed and, of course, it has not been, I would say, a comfortable year for every one of us who took part in this movement. Nevertheless, after the successful, I would say, elections, after democrats came to many soviets, an atmosphere of euphoria took place—precisely on the part of the democrats. This euphoria played its sad role in the further development of this movement, in the further work of the democrats, including their work in the soviets. It is right to say that many democrats were, in the first place, not ready for work, for practical work in the soviets—this is one thing. Second, the democrats did not win in all the oblasts, cities, and towns of Russia—this is the second thing.

Third, you should not forget that many who came to the soviets were elected as deputies using the slogans of the democrats but they were, actually, inside traitors of democracy. [applause] It was later on that they revealed their insides. But they took on board all of our program. With this program they went to the voters; they used this program when they spoke to the voters and campaigned for this program. They pledged, so to speak, that they would implement this program. Some time elapsed and they totally rejected the program. They became not just neutralists, but enemies.

If people say to me today: Boris Nikolayevich, go on, invite the six to visit you. Have a talk. Have a talk with them. Maybe they will turn over a new leaf. These people are enemies. You shouldn't embrace them. You should fight them. [applause] Even the women. Yes, we did make some tactical mistakes, including also me, personally. Gorbachev lulled us with the 500 days program pretending that it was a mutual program. He has managed to lull not only me but also such a wolf as Shatalin, our respected Stanislav Sergeyevich. [laughter in audience]

He did indeed tell us that the resulting program was an interesting and constructive one. Let us fight jointly for it. We believed him. In October we believed this and we should not have done so. After all, we already knew that he is constantly misleading both the people and, especially, democrats and democracy. We knew about this. But we believed him because we saw an impasse, because we saw that this program could not be implemented in Russia alone. It could only be implemented throughout the entire country. We agreed to this alliance, especially as, let us recall this, you also were calling for a compromise when we met in October last year. Close up the ranks and go with Gorbachev, then we will win. No, that was a mistake. I agree with speakers here that we have lost four months.

We lost, and it was only on 19 February that finally I summoned up the courage to say that I had dissociated myself from Gorbachev's policies. [applause] An extremely fierce offensive has been in progress for a long time, in various forums, including the mass media. No methods are spurned. Persecution, slander, and dirt are again being hurled at us in ever greater quantities, with every passing day. We grin and brush ourselves off, and so on.

More dirt is to be expected. It is time for us to go onto the offensive. Democracy is in danger! [applause] This is what the miners call on us to do. For them it is much more difficult than for everyone to be seated here in the hall. They have a practical understanding of what is going on. They are doing what now needs to be done. They are acting in a practical way. Pressure is being applied to them. The media are also beginning to print all sorts of insinuations about them. The Karagandaugol association and its management have sunk so low—the news is in today's papers—as to take the striking miners to court and to claim 9 million rubles in damages from them. That is to what the leadership of the party and the country have resorted. What a disgrace, a disgrace which, I believe, we cannot forgive—to say nothing of the miners. We have been prompted by the miners to similar combat actions. Let us indeed join their militant ranks and help them—and they will help us—and we will declare war on the country's leadership, which is leading us into a bog and which is again leading us toward antidemocratic actions. [applause] Yes, the time has come to create a powerful, organized party out of democratic forces, the democratic movement, and Democratic Russia. [applause]

For a long time I was not convinced that it is necessary to do this, but since we have seen how the CPSU is organizing itself before our eyes, we have to realize that they are marching in an organized front. I agree, they are going down to each farm, to each person. As he arrives there, the representative or secretary of the rayon, city, or oblast party says just one word: Ah, you want to be a day laborer for a landowner again, do you? In that case, you go and vote for the presidency, for Yeltsin, for a renewed Russia, and so on.

That's it and he leaves. He need not do any more campaigning. Go and vote against private ownership. Therefore, it is evidently only now that a movement has been organized, and having these organized forces and powers precisely in the localities will help us nevertheless at perhaps the most decisive moment. This year in general and March in particular will be decisive. Either democracy will be extinguished or else we democrats will not merely survive but certainly triumph this year.

We are blamed for the disintegration of the Union. Who caused the disintegration of the Union? Who alienated seven of the republics? The democrats, the Russian legislature, its leadership, the Russian Government? The president pushed seven of the republics out of the Union by his policies. [applause]

We do not need the Union in its present form. We do not need a center which is so huge and bureaucratic. We do not need ministries. We do not need this bureaucratic and large-scale machine that already has been harshly dictating everything from above to below for 70 years or more now. We must rid ourselves of it. All these six years that perestroyka has been under way, people have been trying to persuade us that we will destroy the system and that we really were heading for democratic transformations. This has proved to be a lie. We were deceived and we must now open our eyes to the fact that it was a lie and go down another path. Not the one of perestroyka which was in existence, particularly during recent years.

I think that we are accused of being against the Army—that is used everywhere in the mass media. No! We are not against the Army. We are against the Army being used against the civilian population. Well, we will stand firm here. We will not give way. [applause]

In today's edition of our beloved SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, again covering (?two thirds) of page two is an open letter to Yeltsin. Now, instead of Andreyeva, it is signed by Andreyev. Who Andreyev is, I do not know. The things I am accused of. But the main thing, he writes—and I can't forgive him for this—is that I am leading Russia into capitalist ways, no more and no less, that I am against socialism, again, no more and no less. That I do not want to proceed with them into the glorious future of communism. [laughter] No, I do not, not do I intend to. [applause]

Now, the month of March is oversaturated politically. I would not argue with those who say that policy is the most important thing, that the economy is not the most important thing. It seems to me, so to speak, that these two very powerful directions should not be torn to pieces. Both policy and the economy is important. The economy will not win without policy, and policy will not win without the economy. Well, we probably should stand on these positions and complete our program already now, as it were.

I should say on the principles of the 500 day program of Shatalin and Yavlinskiy, on 15 March, but just the Russian program, will be completed on 15 March and put to the Russian Supreme Soviet. [applause] Of course, I am please when KOMSOMOLOSKAYA PRAVDA prints a cartoon. You have the mausoleum, sure enough. There were no lines there. But a line has reappeared, because instead of Lenin, the words 500 day program are written there.

March is a difficult month. In the first place, there is the referendum. We have to determine our position concerning the Union. That is to say, support for Gorbachev. Moreover, the draft of the Union treaty was published today.

Addressing the Supreme Soviet of the Union again, the president, so to speak, deceived us when he said that nine-tenths of it had been agreed.

Khasbulatov, the leader of the working group, did not sign on the part of Russia. [applause] That is a case of juggling the facts. That is simply disgraceful. I was in the Federation Council on the 16th, and I came out categorically against the publication of that document. Russia has its own way of discussing that document—in the commission that was set up at the congress there, in the first place. Further, the discussion of that document at the congress on the 28th, a congress that was thrust upon us, but we will discuss that document at it and only after that will we agree to sit at the negotiation table. Not a document that once again attempts to thrust upon us from above, thrust upon us, thrust upon us, [repeats himself] but the Union as we see it. We will be able to sign such a document. Now, they are thinking up all sorts of things! After all, I did not sign the document on prices. They are thinking how can we get away from the fact that Yeltsin will not sign the Union treaty? What can we do so that Russia will sign if he does not?

For that purpose there is the congress, for that purpose there are such tricks as: Let us single out at the congress a group of authorized representatives who are charged with signing the Union treaty. In all the other republics it is the chairman of the supreme soviet who signs, but in Russia, we have this group. At present one must expect many tricks like that. You understand, that we in our, I would say—perhaps it is fine-sounding—but we in our candor, nonetheless, still believed that they had a moral policy. There is nothing moral about it. Their policy is without morals. It is a dirty policy. [applause] Perhaps, in some ways, it is time we did like the miners: rolled up our sleeves and raised our fists. [applause]

Why is it that we have several dozen extremely serious comments to make on the draft Union treaty, starting with the heading itself? In today's Constitution we are a sovereign state. So, in the new Union treaty even that has been struck out. It has already become a union of sovereign republics, but there is a great difference between a republic and a state. When at the Council of the Federation, the chairman was asked: What is the matter? Why do we have a transformation like this? You yourself said it would be a union of states, and then you went on to reject it. Well, you know, that is practically the same. It depends what people call it: some a republic, some a state. Since it is all the same, let us write the word state. Let's leave it as it is. It is not just a matter of a name, but further a principle, the division of property, the division of functions. In there, there is a great deal with which we categorically do not agree, categorically.

Next after the referendum comes the congress. The question of whether democracy will triumph or be vanquished could also be decided at the congress. I think that in that case the whole democratic movement will lose. Therefore, although they reproach us for holding rallies and so forth, either a rally is held, drill-like or to order, or in response to a call from the heart, which is not the same thing. They must realize this, too. If on the 10th, and then in advance if the 28th, certain actions in support of the congress, the Russian Supreme Soviet,

and the government [changes thought] yes, the government and the supreme soviet are guilty of certain things. The government could now be bolstered a little. It is up to you. But, nevertheless, a loss would put us into the clutches of the leadership. It could supercentralize everything and return not just to the start of 1985 but to even worse times. This could happen unless we unite quickly. I am prepared for people to unite, to go into the offensive in such a broad front, without hestitation. They would push aside those who wish to remain today, such as the first secretary of the oblast committee and the chairman of the oblast soviet. No, our deadline is 15 March, and on 16 March cases will be instituted against each one of them. They don't believe all that. Well then, this time it will really happen. [applause]

I am in favor of the whole structure of power then being underpinned by the people. I said that before the election. But I am in favor even now of a power structure that is reinforced by the people in some way. Then, all the chairmen of the soviets are elected by the whole people. [applause] In the first place, traitors would not make it to there. The people see through them. In the second place, this would mean a strong executive and legislative power on a local level. We will know through whom we should act. At present one can rely on some soviets because privatization is going on there and the process of allocating land to peasant holdings is taking place. Already 1,500 farm holdings have been set up in Volgograd Oblast - 1,500 have been set up. All this has taken place because it is that sort of soviet. Soviet Chairman Makhradze says: I am not going to yield to the first secretary. I am not going to see him. Let him come and see me.

Immediately after the election of the president the election of chairmen of the soviets by a direct ballot should be announced. Then we would have reliable people. For the time being, we have [word indistinct] the idea—someone made a speech here—of having plenipotentiaries at grass roots in every soviet. The list already exists. The chairman of the supreme soviet would confirm the most reliable people directly, and they would carry out our policies and our laws—of the Russian Supreme Soviet—at the local level. [applause]

I do not agree that time has been lost on the transfer of land. No! Though we have only a month at our disposal we should make use of this month. We must make use of it. Does a law on small-scale agriculture exist? Yes. Does a law on ownership exist? Yes. Does a law on land and the reform of land exist? Yes. If we need another document regulating who should transfer the land—I understand that this is the issue which should be resolved: who must transfer the land and to whom?—we will decide this issue precisely on Monday or Tuesday by a joint decision of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and we will decide on the time of allocating a garden, an allotment, a holding, a farm holding to those who wish to acquire one during March and April. We will also decide on who will be held responsible if someone sabotages this. [applause]

The main thing that should be defined in the document is that an act on the use of land does exist. It should be defined that the acts on the use of land that have been issued are to be considered invalid by a certain deadline and that they should be re-registered by all land users. We shall make sure that it is secured. [Unidentified speaker from the audience interjects: "Only to your plenipotentiaries, Boris Nikolayevich, and to no one else."] [applause]

If that is so, then half of Russia's population will fail to get land because the first secretaries of the party rayon committees and oblast committees hold power there. It is not for nothing that the representatives of Democratic Russia in Krasnoyarsk Kray have taken the first secretary to court. This is what I call action. He has insulted the democrats. But in other places where the supreme soviet, chairmen, democrats are being insulted, there is silence. We should also be using such methods. Moreover, the procurator in Russia is now ours. He was not ours, but now he is ours. [applause] In other words, he will be acting according to Russian laws; by the law, but by Russian law. I was pleased when the Novokuznetsk miners said that they only recognize the Russian laws and no other. If such action is taken everywhere this would be a strong and powerful thrust. Of course, the democrats should now go to the people and explain everything. We are being criticized for private ownership—this should be explained. We are accused of disintegration of the Union. We should explain. As for the Army, and the things we are acused of—we should explain. They accuse us over the Baltics—let us explain that if this step is not taken, the Baltics will be occupied once again. This is what should be understood. [applause] After that, all the other republics will submit themselves.

Taking into consideration that I have still not got over my flu, today, as an exception, and for the first time, and only once, I would prefer not to answer the numerous questions submitted to me. I will keep them and answer them later. But not today. Today, I only want to thank you and once again call for the unity of all the democratic forces, for the creation of our united front, and, of course, for victory. Thank you.

Words 'Annoyed' Public

LD1103143291 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Vitaliy Gurov commentary]

[Excerpt] Boris Yeltsin's line has always been tough and intolerable to other positions on domestic problems. His own viewpoint is well known throughout the country, but public reaction to it ranges from understanding and approval to open resentment. His Saturday's address at a meeting of democratic movements annoyed the public

by its destructive calls for confrontation. Any situation benefits from a constructive approach and the Soviet Union is going through an especially difficult period. [passage omitted]

Remarks 'Reminiscent' of 1930's

PM1203090791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 91 Second Edition pp 1,2

[Article by Ye. Sorokin under the "In Place of a Commentary" rubric: "Democracy with an 'Iron Hand'?"]

[Text] At Moscow's Theater House last Saturday there was a meeting of Russian political movements which call themselves democratic. Such events have become commonplace during perestroyka, even a run-of-the-mill phenomenon. In conditions of pluralism, the conflict of different opinions and views, and a real multiparty system all movements must have the right and opportunity to freely express their positions.

In the contradictory and complex situation in which the country is now living, any rational argument in favor of the further development of the democratic process, the consolidation of all forces, and the improvement of economic life is now more valuable than ever before. It is natural that every party and sociopolitical organization today tends to have its own assessment of the processes and collisions occurring in society. I repeat, this is a usual, normal phenomenon which was emphasized, incidentally, at the 19th CPSU Conference and at the 28th party congress.

To be honest, this generally speaking unimportant event could have been disregarded had it not been for B.N. Yeltsin's speech at the meeting. You will agree that the very participation in the parties' meeting of the man who left the CPSU because he didn't want his occupancy of the post of the chairman of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet associated with his membership of the party is surprising to say the least. Boris Nikolayevich's speech was couched in such bellicose tones and was so confrontational that Radio Rossii was forced to make a number of cuts in its broadcast of it. For which the editorial board will be taken to task, I think, because B. Yeltsin really does not like it when the mass media do not broadcast his speeches live or in full.

Since, presumably, many people are already familiar with the edited version of the Russian leader's speech, I shall venture to restore the "excised" parts. For example, Boris Nikolayevich urged: "...Let us declare war on the country's leadership, which is leading us into a quagmire." A few paragraphs later he said: "And perhaps in some way it is also time for us, like the miners, to roll up our sleeves and and clench our fists." He called the center's policy "immoral" and "dirty."

Let us make allowances for the fact that B. Yeltsin, as he himself said, was "still suffering from flu." People say all sorts of things when they're sick.

The nonparty leader called for a powerful party to be patched together out of the "democratic" forces. Is that not, one wonders, so that he can lead it and at the same time abandon his phoney nonparty status, which has been called a mistake made by a tired and sick man? But why then did Boris Nikolayevich so zealously attack the first secretaries of CPSU kray and oblast committees who are at the same time chairmen of soviets at the corresponding level? "I want us to unite," he remarked, "so that we can form such a broad front that we could go on the offensive without qualms so as to reject only those who want today to remain oblast committee first secretary and oblast soviet chairman... We have a deadline—15 March. On 16 March the prosecutor's office will institute proceedings against each one."

How reminiscent all this is of that lamentable time, the thirties! Wasn't this how they sought out the "enemies of the people" then? They are just words, what do they mean: "broad front," "offensive," "declare war," "traitors?" Essentially B. Yeltsin has declared war on everyone: Both the center and the local organs. As a devotee of democracy and to some extent even a constitutional pedant, he states: "We are considering... having authorized representatives in each local soviet. There is a list already. The most reliable people are directly appointed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, they will implement our policy and our laws at local level." Excuse me, but what about the legally elected organs of power locally? Will they follow G. Popov's example and not issue resident's permits and identity cards? And then, who knows, will they follow the Moldavian parliament and declare the "authorized" representatives themselves persona non grata?

It is distressing, all of this—distressing and tragic. Such statements would ill become even a novice politician let alone an experienced one like Boris Nikolayevich...

B. Yeltsin went all out to flatter the miners and urged the "democrats" to learn from them and unite with them. I am afraid that this appeal might have left the miners scratching their heads. With whom are they to unite? With the Russian leadership, to which all their claims are henceforth essentially directed? The Union Ministry of the Coal Industry is still in existence, but a concern is going to be formed on its basis.

Of course the main question which B. Yeltsin raised was the conclusion of the Union treaty. After complaining that "a most powerful offensive has long been waged against us... once again there is persecution, dirt, and mud," he clearly decided to take revenge. He succeeded quite well, accusing the USSR president of deception and of juggling the facts. Since R. Khasbulatov has not signed the draft Union treaty and only the leaders of the chambers of the legislature have signed it, it should not have been published. For some reason he took even greater exception to the word "republic" in the treaty's title. The word should have been "state," he said, because "there is a great difference between state and republic." Shameful though it is even to think about it,

you cannot help wondering: Has Boris Nikolayevich actually read the draft? If he has, how could he not notice that its opening words are: "The sovereign states party to the treaty, expressing the will of their peoples..."

As B. Yeltsin himself says, he has many comments to make about the treaty. Fine.. After all, it is still only a draft treaty.

So, B. Yeltsin has declared a crusade against the center and the local organs of power. Perhaps he will try to establish peace in his own legislature at least, particularly after the political statement by six of its leaders urging the Russian leader to show common sense? I quote: "...Today people are urging me: 'Invite the six to see you. Talk with them, perhaps they will mend their ways.' These are enemies. You shouldn't embrace them, you should fight them. Even the women." This on the day after 8 March!

I am not talking about the impoliteness of such statements: That much is obvious to any unbiased person. It is shocking how far a confrontation can go if one's set aim is not the good of the people, not the strengthening of the Union and the improvement of all spheres of its life but one's own political pretensions.

War Remarks Not 'Slip of the Tongue'

LD1003201491 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Mar 91

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Artsibashev from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] It is really painful to speak of the situation in which our country, a great power, now finds itself. The people are exhausted, the economy is exhausted. The nerves of politicians and ordinary citizens alike could be said to be at the breaking point. History will dot the i's and answer the questions. But why did it all happen like that? Now we are at the threshold of the choice.

Will we preserve our fatherland at all, or will we blow it up and break it into little pieces? I am no pessimist. I am not whipping up passions. On the contrary, I believe in my people; I believe that for all the difficulties and obstructions, we will sort out our problems and reach a clear road, and, most important, we will preserve our motherland.

But what worries me is this: It turns out that this kind of outcome does not suit everyone. I stress, a peaceful outcome. Fresh sacrifices are being demanded of the people. A terrible word is in vogue—war. This time it has been heard from the lips of the head of the Russian legislature, Comrade Yeltsin, at a recent meeting with the country's democratic forces. Perhaps he made a slip of the tongue and said it in the heat of the moment? No, unfortunately, it was not in the heat of the moment, and he did not make a slip of the tongue. He said it concisously and deliberately. Here are his words:

Traitors of democracy, enemies, cannot be forgiven. They must be fought, even women. It is the decisive moment for combat action. We shall declare war. We shall raise our fists. We shall create a common front.

What can be said about these slogans? The world shuddered at the ethnic conflicts in our country. That is not enough. Now Russian must lash out at Russian. That has happened before. The soil of Russia has taken tens of millions of innocent souls, and Lord forbid there should be a repetition of the tragedy. But Yeltsin's own procurators and own judges and executors are now rolling up their sleeves. Lists have been compiled of reliable, and consequently also unreliable people, who it must be assumed will get short shrift. We have until 15 March, Yeltsin warned. On 16 March the procurator will institute legal proceedings against each one. This means that legal proceedings will be instituted against secretaries of party oblast committees and chairmen of the oblast soviets. This under the existing Constitution!

One would like to look these primitive democrats in the eye and ask them: Perhaps we will nevertheless forego the terror, gentlemen!

People want a peaceful sky above their heads. They want to live. The country is on the threshold of the sowing. If it is spoiled, gloomy times really do await us. It is time for democrats, Communists, and nonparty members alike, for all to understand that without harmony, civic peace, and constructive action, there will be no progress. It is very simple to heap the blame on someone for the failures of perestroyka. It is much more difficult to point out a realistic road toward recovering the economy and society overall. What is that 500 days program worth? Can you really spend decades ruining Russia and then resurrect it in about a year and a half?

There is no disputing it—the market and the peasant farms will bring sufficiency, but not soon. The market once made our country one of the great powers of the world, and our Russian peasantry fed not only its own huge country, but also half of Europe. But why stir up the past? Undoubtedly, the market must be introduced and the peasantry must be brought back, as Comrade Yeltsin says. But one must also think about how to ensure the necessary food products and goods for the people today. Promises alone are not enough for this.

It is not true that six years of perestroyka have passed in vain. during these years we have become quite different people. Speaking of the crisis, some people cunningly draw attention only to the negative side. But there is another side too—a positive and encouraging one. The people are beginning to see more clearly. The people are beginning to realize where it is being called. Its self-consciousness is growing. That means that not everything is hopeless, not everything is lost.

Radio Rossii Criticizes Vremya's 'Nervous Tic'

LD1103223491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2130 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Mikhail Kustov commentary]

[Text] I think that it is already time to introduce a permanent feature into our news sections provisionally entitled something like "Forty Five Minutes Around the 'Vremya' Program." The main CPSU ideological mouthpiece has acquired a nervous tic at the mere word, Yeltsin. According to the famous study by Pavlov—I mean the physiologist, not the premier—this is called a conditioned reflex. We say the word Yeltsin and in reply the "Vremya" program says "seize him," we say "democracy" and in reply comes "fascism," we say "the people" and in reply they say "separatists." We say "Russia" and in reply comes "an inalienable part of the USSR."

With regard to the frequency of its misrepresentation, today's edition of the "Vremya" program was, alas, no exception. Let us take the report from the USSR Supreme Soviet, for example. Deputy Shuvalov proposed discussing Yeltsin's speech at the meeting of the Democratic Forces of Russia at the Moscow Theater House. He directed a question to the procurator about the legality of Boris Nikolayevich's actions. Deputy Shuvalov's only argument was expressed in the following literary passage and I quote: "a violent call to overthrow legitimate authority." To any barely literate person—and our country, as is well known, is famed for its general, I would even say universal literacy—it should be obvious that Yeltsin has supposedly betrayed democracy. Is this laughable? No, in this instance there is no room for laughter.

Further on they show another deputy who makes insulting and dirty hints about the illness of the Russian Supreme Soviet chairman. Yet another misrepresentation.

Lazarev, the chairman of the Constitutional Supervision Commission, announces the abrogation of Russia's law from 20 June 1990 on the mechanism for the power of the people. This clearly establishes that combining state positions and positions in public organizations is not allowed. I am sure that this is the main thing which angered, first and foremost the party apparatchiks and their representatives in the country's Supreme Soviet. Lazarev's crocodile tears about the supposed violation of international acts and human rights was simply misplaced. In these acts not a word was mentioned about the rights of city party committee, obiast party committee and kray party committee secretaries. The objection could be made that party secretaries are also human beings, but listen, this category of human being has all the rights in our country at the moment.

Perhaps I am also getting my terminology wrong, but I believe that cardsharpers call misrepresentation a trick. There were single tricks and double ones, too. Cardsharpers, like horse thieves, when caught red-handed at this dirty deed, were simply beaten. I am, of course, not calling for the use of hands, but I am simply drawing your attention to the double tricks and the fifth ace in the political pack of cards of the Union legislature.

Radio Rossii Commentator Views Anti-Yeltsin Drive

LD1103170991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1300 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Nikolay Agayants commentary]

[Text] The nearer the date for holding the all-Union referendum, the first in the history of our country, the more the center tries to heat up public passions and the more furious, unceremonious and—I am not afraid of this word—mean become the attacks of the communist press and other orthodox media on the leadership of the new sovereign Russia and everyone whose views can be at variance, God forbid, with those propounded by the CPSU and the Russian Communist Party.

The campaign against Yeltsin, sometimes taking a surreptitious and sometimes an explicit form, has been waged since October 1987. Throughout this time it has been invariably joined by deputies of various ranks and by top state leaders, having now, it seems, reached its peak. One gets the impression that at present there is nothing more important for those in office to do than to slander and ultimately to oust the discontented chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, and to prevent him from becoming Russian president. This is not just an impression.

After all, at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Russian Communist Party, First Secretary Polozkov directly stated that our prime task is to reveal the essence of and the mechanism behind the actions of the anti-people and anti-state forces that have long been hiding under the cover of democrats; using ways and methods they have successfully learned from the arsenal of Western propaganda, they are trying to smear that which they used to call people to believe in, Ivan Kuzmich stressed.

These recommendations have not remained unnoticed. Just read PRAVDA, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, and GLASNOST. Watch official television programs and listen to the all-Union radio. The name of the heretic and troublemaker Yeltsin has almost been made a swear word there. He is being blamed for the disintegration of the economy, interethnic conflicts, our miscalculations in foreign policy, and so on. One is just left to wonder: How can this man who has been heading the RSFSR's leadership for less than a year manage to bring about all this? The question arises: Suppose Boris Niklayevich had not existed at all, whom would the Kremlin then have chosen to be its scapegoat?

The words of Voltaire come to mind: An honest man can be persecuted but not dishonored.

Incidentally, that was confirmed by the events of the past day, however much they may try to pass them over in silence or distort their meaning today, and whatever Panchenko, Kim and Yarin, deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, may say in their fervent loyalty. You will recall that in the latest news and on Mayak they exhibited their righteous anger in putting forward their accusations and quoting Yeltsin's speech out of context. Assiduously trying to persuade their listeners that the country is about to be placed in jeopardy by the opposition—this is their way of earning their living.

Yes, right before the referendum the anti-Yeltsin campaign is gathering ever greater pace. But just as one cannot find any drinking water in a muddy pool, one cannot find any truth in the flow of the demagogic phrases pronounced by the supporters of the socialist choice. Exploiting impermissible methods, inflaming passions at rallies, using destructive elements, and trying to inflate things and to seize power they operate, as is their custom, in terms of boring platitudes without any remorse whatever.

The campaign waged against Boris Nikolayevich has another very characteristic feature: Undisguised irritation and malice can be heard in the speeches of his political opponents. What is this all for? Have mercy. After all, everyone knows that there is no such thing as too much kindness.

Pro-Yeltsin Demonstration Held in Obninsk

LD1103204591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] If you were lisening to Radio Rossii yesterday, you will probably remember the on-the-spot reports by our corespondents on the democratic demonstrations that have taken place throughout our republic. Well, the night has passed, and the news is still coming in.

Today we heard some details of a meeting held in Obninsk, near Moscow. About 4,000 people took part—every second inhabitant of this town of physicists. A message of support for the president of Russia's Supreme Soviet was signed by about 2,000 citizens.

A resolution was passed, stating that if at an emergency session of the Russian deputies an attempt is made to elect Yeltsin—reelect him, of course, I'm sorry—the democratic movement of Obninsk calls on the labor collectives of our republic to stage a political strike of indefinite duration.

Prime Minister Silayev Addresses Lyubertsy Workers

LD1103210391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1340 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] Russian Prime Minster Ivan Stepanovich Silayev today met working people of the Lyubertsy carpet combine. The meeting by no means concerned production problems alone. I hand over the microphone to correspondent Sergey Omelyanchikov.

[Omelyanchikov] Those who heard my report yesterday on the Manezhnaya Square rally will probably remember my comparison of it with a raging sea. If one continues these cmparisons, then a steadfast rock is rising up from the raging sea of political passions. The Russian Council of Minsters has become this rock, to which it is still possible to reach out, hold on to, and save oneself. Of course, rallies and demonstrations are necessary. But we must not forget that the basis of our life is the economy, which, incidently, is what the Russian Council of Minsters is concerned with.

Today's visit by the Russian prime minister to the Lyubertsy carpet combine is not an ostentatious social call on the people, but a businesslike meeting to sort out utterly concrete problems. There are many problems at the combine, and probably the main one is that the enterprise could stop at any moment, due to a shortfall in raw material. Naturally, the conversation spilled over from the enterprise's problems to the problems of the whole republic.

[Begin Silayev recording] Of course, you have very interesting paradoxes. It [as heard] is needed by our people, and probably, even if you started making 10 times as much of it, it would nonetheless be insufficient. So why is it that in our country you work hard, there are no small number of other production collectives working well, yet everything is in short supply? Well, they say that earlier there was enough of everything, there was everything. Only not everyone could afford to buy a carpet. Now, this difference, the lag between production and the growth of wages, has led us to this result.

The way out is to make more. If you made more, two or three times as much, that still wouldn't help things. We need a lot of factories like yours. We have been making arms for too long. We must make them now, as well, but not in such quantities. For too long we have been investing everything in industry, machine tools, and yet you don't have enough: In oil and coal recovery, and we have been making too few consumer goods.

Abroad, today 75 percent of society is working, making consumer goods, and 25 percent is doing the rest—coal and oil recovery, and equipment. In our country it is the other way round. We are only doing 25 percent for consumption, and 75 percent is what does not directly go to the people. This is basically what our misfortune consists of today, what we are grappling with, actually, in order to seriously change the situation.

Well, a few words about your enterprise. Everything has been taken from you. We had that kind of system. I don't mean that critically. I am from the same system, as well. Therefore, you had no particular interest. Now, I understand, this year you have the opportunity of disposing of about 20 percent as you see fit.

In two or three years' time, you yourselves will manage all your products. That does not mean that there will be anarchy, that the state is not necessary, that you won't deliver to shops. It's just that there won't be anywhere for you to deliver.

But it's time already that you began to export, entered the foreign market. You have grounds for earning for yourselves yarn, wool, semifinished goods, and spare parts—that should be your question, and not the government's. For it to be yours, we should not take away from you what you earn. Well, this is the plan according to which we intend to work.

As far as our main problems and yours are concerned, the time is coming near, literally in the next few days, when a decree by the president will announce compensation payments and following this, the rise in retail prices on major foodstuffs and commodities.

I would like to say to you that in our budget, the increase on all foodstuffs—there are 14 main groups—will be compensated by us in full. Some are saying that this is deception, that this is not true, it is a put-up job. I want to say to you once again, this exists in our budget. But, well, full compensation on bread, on meat; full compensation for everyone, everyone, everyone, no matter how much they earn—today, miners earn a lot of money, but they cannot be thought of as a decadent class. It is their right. Likewise, your wages have also gone up, and that is quite right. Therefore, there is to be full compensation for all for foodstuffs, and the payment will begin here, in your place of work. You will know that this part is compensation in order to protect you against the price rise. That increment will go into your wages from the month of July.

You know that in the Russian Federation, as of 1 March, the smallest pension for pensioners is R100 [rubles], and in the Union it is R75. Nevertheless, we considered it necessary to have at least something for our pensioners—an increment of R60. So, our pensioners, let's say, receiving the lowest pension payment, will receive R100 plus R60. Correspondingly, for students, and so forth, for all categories as a whole, the average increment is R60.

We realize that, let's say, the whole state of affairs, the situation, depends upon you, upon the producers, and we consider it no minor matter to support all of you, all who create material benefits, to take no less trouble about you, about those sectors which will resolve the problem of the development of goods production, than about the poorly provided for strata. We want it to be like that, and think it necessary that this is how it should be. We do indeed want this to happen, and consider it essential. This will allow us to level out the economic situation, and the main thing, of course, is that it will enable us to raise the material interest [word indistinct] of the producer.

A few words about the peasant reform. I believe I should tell you about this. Not everyone understands this in the same way. Some think we have the idea of introducing the capitalist system, that we are destroying the collective farms. Well, first of all, that's not right. Just the opposite, we are planning to strengthen the collective and state farms, but we consider that without the introduction of land reform and the creation of possibilities for peasants to have their own land, and to grow on it whatever they think necessary, I [as heard] personally consider this to be (?the sacred) cause of our government. After all, we are not doing this out of love for some kind of capitalist ways, but because we have all come to the conclusion that we are unable to feed ourselves. Abroad, in any country, the 5-7 percent of rural population feeds the country; here, we have 23 percent of the Russian Federation living in the country, and we are unable to feed ourselves. Is this business?

On the referendum. You have to make a choice in a week's time. I would like to speak first of all about the Russian referendum. You can see that there is no order, no discipline; this prevents people from working, it is simply becoming dangerous for society, this lack of order. The democratic bases have brought certain fruits: One need not fear expressing one's view—we can see this for ourselves, (?sometimes to excess)—but nevertheless, in the last resort we can live without (?thinking that if you complain about something you'll) end up behind bars. All that is in the past, but at the same time there are elements demanding state rule, demanding at least some discipline and respect for authority. In a republic like the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], where we have 100 nations and peoples—we now have 16 ex-autonomous entities, which are now becoming republics within the Russian Federation, and a multitude of supreme soviets are appearing. As I see it, presidential rule is inevitable, essential. I call on you to vote for a system of presidential rule. It isn't a matter of this being a system a la Yeltsin, or a system a la Ivanov or Petrov. It is the people who will decide in free elections, and I don't think there will only be one candidate.

On the renewed Union. There has been a lot of talk about it, there is a lot that is not clear, and it is felt by some that everyone needs to live in the Union, within our republics. Nevertheless, times are such today when every republic needs to know about its contribution to the whole Union.

I must tell you that for many years the Russian Federation worked extensively for the Union as a whole. In the territory of Russia we have more than 90 percent of the forests, but we do not have enough timber. We do not have enough sawn timber for building; we do not have enough furniture; there is a lot of which we don't have enough, even though we produce a fantastic amount of timber. To a large extent it is because we export it to our neighboring republics. Yet today, some of our enterprises and towns have started to hold onto it—I'm not saying this to justify it—Irkutsk (?oblast), Arkhangelsk, in order to solve their problems, a storm of attacks and reproaches has broken over us saying that Russia is not

giving us its timber. Consequently, it gave up all its timber. Today we will continue giving it up, but the republics must know that if they are receiving timber from the Russian Federation, they must pay the account immediately, and (in return) we will receive what we, the Russian Federation, need. These are new relations within the Union. They are with the republics directly, and the Union must in essence help the republics to function normally.

But we do not need an army of the Russian Federation. (?We) are in favor of our having a single army. This is a function of the Union. We are not preparing to take all the railways, for example. They are Union arteries, they are a Union function, and there are many such functions. We are in favor of the whole Union structure, which is essential for the normal functioning of each republic of the Russian Federation. If we count what we have given each other in contemporary world prices, all the republics (?should pay more than) R4 billion to the Russian Federation. We are not saying: Pay us, but we do intend, working directly with the Union republics, to start to balance our budget. So the new economic relations, as stated today in the the draft of the new Union treaty, should be new in principle. Each republic, as a state in the Union, should use its natural wealth, resources, and labor fully in the interests of its people. That's how we present things. So to those who say that we want to destroy the Union, it is not we who have pushed away the five republics. Well, that is their business, of course. This is not normal, however, when economic links are disrupted. We are linked with them. We are linked with Armenia. We are linked with Georgia. We are linked with everyone. But, let's say, this is the business of the republics themselves. We intend to be in the Russian Federation, and as a whole, on this territory. We are not putting a question mark over our ruble. It is our Russian, genuinely Russian, ruble. If someone launches their own currency, then our own ruble, as it were, will be all the easier for us. But we are for a single ruble system.

I have looked in detail at this draft Union treaty. There are a number of issues where a more clearout formulation is required, reflecting the interests of each republic, including the Russian Federation. Therefore, I think that we will have to do some serious work on this treaty. [end recording]

[Omelyanchikov] The Russian prime minister also had to answer forthright questions, which are usually left for cadres.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified speaker] When will the bacchanalia with the so-called agreed prices end?

[Silayev] By the way, I also consider that an agreed price, even by its name, is insulting. Who agrees with whom? The customer who comes to the shop doesn't agree, but we say: You are buying things at an agreed price. In essence, it is a market price. You see, you and I have already raised all the wholesale prices, and you know this. Profitability levels have risen, and I consider that this was correctly done. But when this has been done, after all, retail prices cannot remian low when wholesale prices are high, as they used to be. How will trade function then?

[Second unidentified speaker] I haven't managed to get my meat ration for the whole quarter, but I have a family of four. I have to feed them.

[Silayev] Of course. I understand you. You see, a significant percentage of meat was purchased from abroad, unfortunately. This year, not 1 kilogram of meat is being bought. But we don't possess the hard currency. We want the Russian hard currency for oil, for timber, for gold, and for carpets to come here, and we could buy what we are short of. This is a temproary phenomenon. I understand you.

[Second unidentified speaker] Understood. [end recording]

[Omelyanchikov] So there you are. The life of our long-suffering republic is outlined through the life of each person, and an individual enterprise. Sergey Omelyanchikov, news serice, All-Russian State Television and Radio Company.

Russian Communists Call for Peace in Georgia

LD1103180491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 11 Mar 91

["Appeal by the Communists of Russia in Connection With the Events in South Ossetia"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 11 March. (TASS)—One cannot remain indifferent to the tragic events in South Ossetia, where bloodshed has been going on for several months now, says an appeal, distributed today from the recent joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Committee of the Communist Party of Russia, to the Supreme Soviet, Communists, and all working people of Georgia.

If this "local" interethnic conflict is not extinguished today, the document stresses, tomorrow it may draw other peoples into its vortex. That is why it poses a tremendous danger for the whole country. This cannot fail to provoke feelings of alarm and profound concern among the people of Russia.

The Communists of Russia call on the Supreme Soviet of Georgia and the people's deputies of South Ossetia to display political prudence and foresight, and immediately take all necessary steps to stop the senseless bloodshed; and to abrogate (or at least suspend until complete normalization of the situation) the decisions adopted in defiance of the will of the peoples that are aggravating interethnic relations.

The document expresses the sincere wish that all political parties and public movements of Georgia and South

Ossetia will seek and find ways leading to mutual understanding and cooperation and will restrain people from blind hatred and madness.

The Communists of Russia have appealed to Mikhail Gorbachev to use all the force of his authority and his full presidential power to put an end to the enmity, lawlessness, and violence and bring back peace and harmony to the villages and towns of South Ossetia.

Pithart Ends Visit to Russian Republic, Departs

LD0803171191 Prague CTK in English 1633 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 8 (CTK correspondent)—Czech Premier Petr Pithart ended his official visit to the Russian Federation and left here for home today.

During his three-day visit he conferred with his Russian counterpart Ivan Silayev about the expansions of economic contacts between the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation. They signed a joint statement as a basis for the development of bilateral cooperation.

Pithart also met Soviet Premier Valentin Pavlov to discuss bilateral trade exchange.

Bashkir Plenum Views RSFSR Referendum

PM1103120791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Zinovyev: "Bashkir Communists Urge People To Say 'No'"]

[Text] Ufa—The Bashkir RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party republican committee plenum has voiced a negative attitude toward the Russian referendum.

In the appeal it adopted to the Communists and all citizens of Bashkortostan, the plenum urged them to take an active part in the USSR referendum and to express themselves in favor of retaining he USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedoms of people of any nationality will be fully guaranteed. At the same time the plenum participants described the organization of the RSFSR referendum with the question, put to the vote, of the need to introduce the post of an RSFSR president elected by nationwide ballot as an unconstitutional undertaking leading not to unity and consolidation but to confrontation in our society. The plenum decided to appeal to the Bashkir Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium proposing that the question of Bashkortostan's refusal to take part in the Russian referendum be submitted for examination by the session of the republic's supreme organ of power, which opens 12 March.

Questions on Kamchatka Referendum Ballots Reported

PM1103114591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[SIBINFORM report: "Should Kamchatka Be Closed?"]

[Text] The Kamchatka Oblast Soviet Presidium has decided to hold a Kamchatka referendum 17 March. In addition to the ballots with the Union and Russian questions, the inhabitants of the peninsula will answer the question: Do you support the appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet to restrict the entry of citizens to Kamchatka? As is well known, the decision to close Kamchatka was taken by the USSR Council of Ministers 27 November 1990 without consultation with the local authorities and met with an adverse reception from the majority of the oblast's inhabitants, SIBINFORM reports.

Western Republics

Committee Breaks From Moldovan Communist Party

LD1203112791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0950 GMT 12 Mar 91

[By MOLDOVA-PRES correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev, 12 Mar (TASS)—The split in the Communist Party of Moldova that has been long developing recently turned into dissociation from the party by Communists of the "Democratic Platform." On 11 March, the coordinating committee representing that wing of the Communist Party of the republic came forward with a political statement.

The document stresses that all attempts by democrats to transform the Communist Party of Moldova from within into a democratic party have had no results. In connection with this, on the eve of the holding of the all-Union referendum on the question of the future of the Union, members of the coordinating committee announce their withdrawal from the CPM [Communist Party of Moldova] and categorically dissociate themselves from the activity of the Communist Party, consisting, in their opinion, of support for the Union referendum.

The coordinating committee, of which USSR People's Deputy Anton Grezhdieru is a member, has called upon its supporters to leave the ranks of the Communist Party of Moldova and to create a new democratic party.

Moldovan President Views Republic's Problems

91P50109A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 1

[Novosti Information Agency (IAN) Report: "Is It A Crisis Of Power?"]

[Text] "It is essential that the executive power in Moldova see reform through to the end," reported

Mircha Snegur, the republic's president. Appearing on national television, he insisted on strengthening his influence in solving the urgent political and economic problems in the republic. The president said that he is ready to seek a consensus in finding a way out of the crisis situation.

The economy of Moldova is experiencing a serious crisis. Many industrial enterprises are on the verge of stoppages due to a lack of raw material. Mircha Snegur reported that under these conditions, when the legislature and the government of the republic are virtually paralyzed, an immediate reform of the executive power is essential.

Local observers believe that a transfer of executive power into the hands of the president of Moldova automatically means retirement for the present government.

Caucasus

Armenia Reportedly Lifts Power Use Restrictions

NC1003113491 Yerevan International Service in Turkish 1845 GMT 8 Mar 91

[Text] Restrictions on power use were in force throughout Armenia last month because of an energy shortage. The power supply was cut to certain cities and districts for a specified period each day. In addition, television transmissions were reduced to three and a half hours a day.

These restrictions were lifted recently. We asked Hayenerko [Armenian Electricity Authority] what had prompted this move. Hayenerko officials told us by phone that the amount of gas entering Armenia through Azerbaijan has increased in recent days. It has become considerably warmer in Azerbaijan, and so the Azerbaijanis are not stealing as much of the gas allocated to us as they used to. In addition, we have been able to obtain supplies of fuel oil. Armenia, however, was again covered by a thick layer of snow in recent days.

Paper Explains Union Gas Supply Cut to Georgia

LD1103211291 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia, has accused the Union government of declaring an economic blockade against the republic by cutting natural gas supplies.

VESTNIK GRUZII, however, a semiofficial organ of the legislature, clarifies the words of the republic's leadership. The fact of the matter is that this republic has defaulted on a debt of 20 million rubles to the natural gas suppliers, namely the Stavropol Gas Production Association. The gas production association categorically demands payment of the debt, otherwise the supply of gas will be cut by half.

Georgia's Gamsakhurdia Addresses Abkhaz People

AU1103174991 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Georgian 0300 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Statement by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia, to the Abkhaz people; place, date not given]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots,

The brotherhood between Georgians and Abkhazians goes back to time immemorial. Our common origins in Colchis, the political affinity between our peoples and nations, and our common history and culture obliges us today to give considerable thought to the future fate of our peoples. [passage omitted]

We have survived many imperialist incursions. Neither the Romans nor the Byzantines, neither the Arabs nor the Turks have been able to break our brotherhood and friendship. The most perfidious and evil empire to confront us in the 19th and 20th centuries, however, has been the Russian empire, which has brought unprecedented misfortune upon our peoples. The Russian empire resettled a large part of the Abkhaz population in Turkey. It also abolished the Abkhaz principality and the kingdom of Georgia and had, as its aim, the complete assimilation and annihilation of our peoples. It saw that this could not be achieved through bloody repression and genocide. Therefore, it used the proven method of all empires [words indistinct] mutual confrontation between Abkhazians and Georgians. Despite this, however, as Nestor Lakoba [member of the Bolshevik revolutionary committee in Abkhazia that helped to defeat the Menshiviks in 1921] himself remarked, tsarism was unable to sow discord between the Abkhazians and Georgians. The present [word indistinct] communist empire has, however, unfortunately succeeded in (?this) by means of its own agents [words indistinct] so that the center can preserve its positions and (?influence) in Transcaucasia.

We respect the national and cultural rights of the Abkhaz people, our statehood, language, and culture, and Abkhaz schools and theaters. We are trying, in every possible way, to resolve controversial questions through dialogue. Unfortunately, however, the leaders of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] have not shown the necessary willingness to engage in dialogue. They have embarked upon the path of confrontation with us. They are manifesting separatist tendencies and are endangering peace on Abkhazian territory.

Today, a great fuss is being made in connection with the prefect we have appointed in Gali. As you know, in accordance with our laws, the leaders of an autonomous republic have to present candidates for the post of

prefect and we have to approve them. In accordance with this law, if the leaders of an autonomous republic do not present such a candidate, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has the right to appoint the prefect itself. In spite of our repeated requests, Mr. Ardzinba [chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR] has not come to Tbilisi, has not attended any sessions of the Presidium of which he is a member, and has not presented a candidate for the post of prefect. Therefore, we appointed the prefect for Gali. We have now given him a period of time in which to present other candidates but he is again stalling. The reason for this is that he has declared a boycott of our parliament and our policy regarding prefects and is seeking to preserve the communist system of government in Abkhazia. However, we should remind him that the communist system and the Soviet empire are today doomed and certain people are trying in vain to reverse the course of imperialist history. Furthermore, the peoples of the [word indistinct] USSR will throw off the yoke of communist dictatorship and public figures like Mr. Ardzinba will then be viewed as traitors of their own people.

Today, the whole world condemns Gorbachev's policy of repression toward the conquered nations and his acts of barbarism in Lithuania and Latvia. Therefore, no one can pin their hopes on Soviet tanks. The world also condemns the attempts by the center to create interfronts and national salvation committees, whose aim is to overthrow governments elected by the people. In this way, an interfront has been created today in Abkhazia that hopes for a repetition of the (?events) in the Baltic Republics while Ardzinba continually (?invites) the (?enemy's) army in order to provoke bloodshed in Abkhazia. He has already succeeded in bringing in internal troops [word indistinct] but he should remember that the world will condemn his action just as it condemned the national salvation committees in the Baltic Republics. In this way, Ardzinba wants to involve the Abkhaz people in a risky adventure that will only bring them shame and misfortune. Abkhazia's participation in the Union referendum on 17 March will likewise be risky for its people as the aim of this referendum is to stir up tension between nationalities, create opposition between the Georgians, Abkhazians, Armenians, Russians, and other nationalities in Abkhazia, and provoke bloodshed between peoples. Therefore, I call upon you not to follow the [word indistinct] Communists, the agent provocateurs of our historical enemy, but to boycott the Union referendum and to take part in the Georgian Republic's referendum on 31 March, which will be held in connection with the restoration of Georgian independence.

An independent Georgia will give you considerably more than a modernized Soviet empire whose aim is the assimilation and russification of all small peoples. A truly independent Abkhazia will exist in an independent Georgia. It will have genuine self-government just like it had when, for centuries, Abkhazians and Georgians were united in a single kingdom. Long live our historical brotherhood, unity, and independence! May the God of love and truth bless us.

With love and respect. Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Georgia's Gamsakhurdia Views Ethnic Conflict

AU1103155591 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 11 Mar 91 pp 191-197

[Unattributed interview with Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia; place, date not given: "Moscow Foments Conflicts"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. President, a civil war has been going on in Georgia for two months....

[Gamsakhurdia] It is not a civil war but a war of the Kremlin against Georgia, which was started in the town of Tskhinvali by Ossetian extremists, who are in the pay of Moscow.

[DER SPIEGEL] Ossetian and Georgian citizens are shooting at each other.

[Gamsakhurdia] It is not a civil war. The Ossetian and the Georgian populations are not standing face to face. They are extremists supported by Moscow, equipped with machine guns, missiles, grenade launchers, mines, and modern arms.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are Moscow's police troops not trying to keep the two hostile parties apart?

[Gamsakhurdia] Far from that, the units of the Interior Ministry are playing a double game: sometimes they help one side, then the other; but usually they help the Ossetians. Moreover, the central government does not even stop at direct intervention: All attacks by the extremists are supported by the Soviet Army, which supplies them with arms.

[DER SPIEGEL] In 1989 there were bloody clashes with Georgian Abkhazians and also with Azerbaijanis. Were these clashes also provoked by Moscow?

[Gamsakhurdia] Of course. As soon as we intensify our independence struggle Moscow foments ethnic conflicts and even openly threatens to do so.

[DER SPIEGEL] How does it voice such threats?

[Gamsakhurdia] On 25 February, the 70th anniversary of the occupation of Georgia, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev rang me, which was probably intended to have a symbolic significance. He asked me: "How do you feel? I would like to tell from your voice how you feel."

[DER SPIEGEL] The previous day seven Georgians were murdered in South Ossetia.

[Gamsakhurdia] This is why as a first reaction I said that my voice sounded like that of a man who had just lost seven close relatives. I would like to quote the dialogue that followed:

Gorbachev: You are still not willing to sign the Union treaty?

I: That is not only my position but that of my people.

Gorbachev: Do you know that Abkhazians and Ossetians did sign the Union treaty and will participate in the Union referendum?

I: They account for 140,000 people, while Georgia has a population of 5 million.

Gorbachev, after a longer interval: Think carefully about signing the Union treaty.

I: It is out of the question for us.

Gorbachev: Then prepare yourself for great difficulties in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Now you know who really needs the war in South Ossetia and why.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are there no Georgians who support the continued existence of the USSR and such a treaty?

[Gamsakhurdia] The overwhelming majority does not want it, which is why the Georgians will not participate in the referendum on the Union. We will hold our own referendum on 31 March.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why only after the Union referendum of 17 March?

[Gamsakhurdia] We cannot do it earlier, because in the mountains many streets are still impassable. Besides, we do not want to be told when to do it. After all, it is not really a question of our attitude toward the Union. In legal terms, Georgia is strictly speaking not part of the Union, because we never joined the Soviet state. Our people only have to answer a single question: Georgian independence—yes or no?

[DER SPIEGEL] Will you guarantee the Ossetians national minority rights when Georgia leaves the Union?

[Gamsakhurdia] The majority of the Georgian Ossetians sides with us and rejects the agents provocateurs. One hour ago I received an Ossetian delegation that wants to hold a hunger strike in Moscow against the desire for autonomy by the extremists of Tskhinvali. In Georgia the national minorities enjoy all rights. It is the Georgians who live under an apartheid-like regime in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. More than 10,000 Georgians are refugees in their own country.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Ossetians have mentioned 4,000 refugees. Nevertheless, they are denied autonomy within Georgia?

[Gamsakhurdia] Because they do not have a right to state autonomy. We cannot admit to becoming strangers in our own territories. Can you imagine Turks founding a republic of their own inside Germany? If they were ever to try to do, so you can be sure that advisers from Moscow are somehow involved.

[DER SPIEGEL] A South Ossetian leader, Tores Kulumbegov, was arrested recently. Did he confirm your suspicion of remote control?

[Gamsakhurdia] In the interrogations Kulumbegov claimed to be president of an independent Ossetian republic. In psychiatric clinics one often hears of people claiming to be Napoleon, Hitler, or Stalin and no one is surprised. Yet, in this case we know that Kulumbegov and Chachiyev, his accomplice, are agents in the pay of the KGB.

[DER SPIEGEL] What are you doing to separate Georgia from the Union?

[Gamsakhurdia] We have adopted a new Constitution, which has nothing in common any longer with the communist Soviet regime. The Soviet structures have virtually been dissolved, and the rule of the Communist Party is part of the past, its influence has been reduced to zero. The executive power is now in the hands of prefects and elected magistrates. A completely different social order is thus being established in a peaceful way.

[DER SPIEGEL] It does not meet with any obstacles?

[Gamsakhurdia] Only the maneuvers of the Moscow central authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are causing trouble. The Kremlin is trying to keep us under control with these hot beds of tension.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you coordinate your policy of independence with other republics anxious to leave the Union?

[Gamsakhurdia] We are trying to. Still, I have the impression that the situation in the USSR is like in a concentration camp. Everyone is trying to get out first as if others might take away part of his freedom. Hence, currently there is more competition than coordination. Nevertheless, we have identical positions as far as the Union referendum and our attitude toward Gorbachev are concerned.

[DER SPIEGEL] How does Georgia think it can survive economically outside the USSR?

[Gamsakhurdia] We are very anxious to set up economic ties with Western countries. Currently, we are still facing enormous problems here because Moscow has a strong influence in the West and we are isolated; the state borders are practically impenetrable. Yet, Georgia is a rich country. Just think of our raw materials, fruit, wine, and our possibilities in the sphere of tourism.

[DER SPIEGEL] Nevertheless, for one tonne of crude oil you would then have to pay 150 hard dollars instead of, currently, 23 weak rubles.

[Gamsakhurdia] That is true. We have little oil, but we have the world's largest reserves in the best-quality manganese. U.S. companies are now even ready to buy drinking water, of which we have plenty. We need major

investments, particularly for the development of tourism, and we have received offers from many countries.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you want to maintain economic contacts with the Union?

[Gamsakhurdia] We have most friendly ties with the Russian Federation and we get along extremely well with President Boris Yeltsin.

[DER SPIEGEL] The opposition of the "Georgian National Congress" has claimed that Yeltsin also represents imperialist ambitions—those of Russia and not those of the Soviet Union.

[Gamsakhurdia] You must not be deceived in this connection. One can neither speak of an opposition nor of a parallel parliament, but of a group of corrupt politicians who degenerated into criminals. The people do not support them but rather hate them.

[DER SPIEGEL] Although they have large armed units?

[Gamsakhurdia] No longer. We have almost completely disarmed them and arrested more than 100 leaders. Now they are claiming to be political prisoners, when in fact they were gangs of professional criminals who lived from robbing people, blackmailing them, and taking hostages. Only two out of 100 had regular jobs. The West will not accept these terrorists as political prisoners.

[DER SPIEGEL] But you have plans to set up a national guard yourself.

[Gamsakhurdia] We have already started but we must overcome great difficulties. No one supports us and we have to rely on the arms that we seized when we smashed those gangs.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where did the National Congress get its arms from?

[Gamsakhurdia] They bought them on the black market; moreover, they attacked Soviet soldiers almost everyday to take their weapons away, which is why the Kremlin has claimed that Georgia is preparing for an armed uprising. Thus, it was so important for us to stop those acts of provocation. As long as we do not give the Kremlin any reason for intervention its tanks will not be rolling here.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you sure that actions comparable to those in Lithuania and Latvia cannot recur here?

[Gamsakhurdia] An independence movement that fights without any arms cannot be defeated. The world of today can be impressed only by a high moral standard and steadfastness. Still, if agents provocateurs were to cause a confrontation with the Soviet Army, anything would be possible.

[DER SPIEGEL] The secessionist echo to his perestroyka has brought Gorbachev under pressure from the right.

[Gamsakhurdia] He is a rightist himself. For some time he pretended to be of the left, but he is one of the disciples of Andropov, one of the most sinister figures of the Kremlin. Now Gorbachev is using these hotbeds of unrest as a whip with which he is permanently trying to threaten us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are acts of violence not a danger to the independence movement?

[Gamsakhurdia] All these conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, in Fergana, and now in so-called South Ossetia and Abkhazia were inspired by the Kremlin. The peoples are always being agitated against each other so that Moscow can act as an arbiter and prolong its rule.

'Catastrophic' Shortages Reported in Tskhinvali

LD1103163391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1528 GMT 11 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 11 Mar (TASS)—There was intensive cross-fire [as received] last night in Tskhinvali and its environs. This was reported by the press center of the Emergency Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetia Soviet Socialist Republic. This time there were no casualties.

According to reliable information, pickets from illegal armed Georgian units are continuing to steal and drive Ossetian families from their homes. The Ossetian population has been driven out of 24 villages in the oblast.

The economic and food blockade in South Ossetia is continuing. There is a catastrophic shortage of food, medicines, and fuel in besieged Tskhinvali.

The growing flow of refugees from Ossetian villages in Georgia is becoming a great problem for North Ossetia. Approximately 13,000 refugees have already been registered here, including 7,000 children. Urgent measures are being taken in the republic to accommodate them and provide them with facilities.

At the same time, instances of threatening and warning telephone calls to inhabitants of Georgian nationality have recently become more frequent in Vladikavkaz. The headquarters warns on behalf of the law enforcement bodies of North Ossetia that every such instance will be investigated and the guilty parties will be strictly punished for whipping up interethnic strife.

Last night was relatively calm in Tskhinvali, according to the press center of the Interior Ministry of Georgia. [as received] There was no shooting or fire in the city itself and its environs. The situation in the village of Vanati in Tskhinvali Rayon has become complicated. A Georgian militia detachment was fired upon. Four staff of the law enforcement bodies were wounded.

Georgian Militia Attacked in Ossetian Village

AU1103171591 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Mar 91

[Text] It was relatively quiet in Tskhinvali last night. As reported by the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry, there was no shooting or fires in the city itself. The situation was more acute in the village of Vanati in the Tskhinvali rayon. A detail of the Georgian militia came under fire there. Four workers of the law enforcement organs were wounded.

Central Asia

Uzbek President on 'Civil War,' Union Treaty

AU0803192491 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 8 Mar 91 p 11

[Interview with Uzbek President Islam Karimov by Christian Schmidt-Haeuer; place and date not given: "Civil War Is Already Going On"]

[Text] [Schmidt-Haeuer] A few weeks ago, you warned the people's deputies in the Kremlin against a civil war and a "strong hand." Your concerns were confirmed. How do you assess the situation in the Soviet Union today?

[Karimov] Yes, I did indeed say that the country has reached a dangerous borderline behind which chaos, nationalist clashes, and civil war are beginning to show and that we do not have to find a "strong hand," but strong state structures, firm positions, and consistency in the implementation of the things that are planned in our country. The political, social, and economic situation is so serious that nobody has illusions any longer. If everything continues in the same way as before, we will hardly be spared the so-called strong hand. Regarding the civil war, it is already going on, especially in the Caucasus. Therefore, it may appear to be necessary "to turn the screws."

But there is also another, more reasonable road. Whether it will be taken depends on the farsightedness and the wisdom of our leadership, particularly of Mikhail Gorbachev. The center must at last unconditionally sit down at the negotiating table with the representatives of the republics. Sovereignty, about which we are talking so much today, is irreversible; it has already become a reality. However, the influence of all those in the center who do not consider sovereignty at all and who want to kill it is still strong. At first this may be successful, but then there will be an explosion. It will be so strong that the consequences are terrible to imagine. This is not understandable—it is a crime. Negotiations have to be started on the basis of sovereignty and all the proposals that were developed by the republics long ago. One has to agree that our country will indeed become a union of sovereign, equal states.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] How do you assess the policies of the leadership of the Baltic Republics?

[Karimov] I support the aspirations of all republics of the Union to achieve their real political and economic sovereignty. At the same time, I am of the opinion that the right to sovereignty has to be implemented without diminishing the interests of others and within the framework of the democratic process, international norms, and human rights. The fact that the leaderships of the Baltic Republics deviated from this course considerably contributed to the conflict. We deeply regret the tragedy that happened there and claimed human lives. However, in my opinion, the Baltic Republics tolerated very serious mistakes, since the rights of the people there were violated. The rights of anyone, irrespective of his nationality, who lives on this territory, in this region, must also be respected here.

The latest development indicates that the policies of the Baltic leaders are becoming more constructive and that they take the interests of different social and ethnic population groups into account. Only such a democratic road can lead to peace and harmony in these republics.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] What do you think of the employment of the Army and the special Interior Ministry units? What is your comment on the formation of the so-called salvation committees?

[Karimov] The questions that are connected with international relations and the republics' sovereignty cannot be solved by force. The Army must not be used—especially if it is not subject to the administrative organs. People who are determined to achieve sovereignty cannot be prevented by any form of violence—not even by the Army. I personally do not accept the use of force by the Army. In January of last year I was in Lithuania. I witnessed selfless striving for independence and freedom, so that I am convinced: These people cannot be stopped.

Now I come to the national salvation committees: I reject all that is unconstitutional, all that contradicts the democratic norms. There is still nobody who really knows who represents this national salvation committee.

I recognize the legal power. But it must ensure civil peace and political and economic stability, it must lead to a firm order and discipline and guarantee security, so that every man, independent of his nationality and denomination, can live and work, without having to worry about his children and relatives. The toleration of even the smallest injustice permits the temptation to violate everything. This is very dangerous. Think of recent history, the revolution of 1917, when the slogan "The end justifies the means" was valid. The physical extermination of those who held other views started. The establishment of several anti-constitutional committees is actually a repetition of our history. It is time to learn from our mistakes.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] Do you think that having presidential regimes in individual republics is an appropriate means to find a way out of the crisis?

[Karimov] In my opinion, the introduction of a presidential regime is a form of dictatorship because it eliminates the constitutionally elected governments and the democratic institutions; it completely ignores the expression of the people's will. Therefore, in common parlance, a presidential regime has to be "measured seven times and cut one time."

When the so-called cotton scandal started in 1983, hundreds of people, "servants of the people," came to us to conduct investigations and did what they liked. At that time, the republic was first shocked and terrified. Then the situation calmed down somewhat and events were assessed. The next stage was general indignation. An active counteraction was initiated. If the leadership had not intervened at that time—in 1989—and taken preventive measures to stabilize the situation, an irreparable development would have been possible. These preventive measures were: the positive answer to religious questions, the toleration of traditional popular customs that have existed here from time immemorial, and the allotment of land. At that time we sought a dialogue and even took the initiative ourselves. I comment on this in such great detail in order to underline once again: Actions result in counteractions. Conflict situations, especially such explosive ones, may only be solved in a peaceful way, by a dialogue—not by a monologue.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] How do you assess Boris Yeltsin's reactions during the critical development in the Baltics—his considerations about a separate Russian army, his appeal to the Russian soldiers not to shoot at Soviet citizens, and his joint statement with the Baltic Republics?

[Karimov] It seems to me that when the tragic events took place in Lithuania, Boris Yeltsin's reaction was impulsive, more emotional than reasonable. And the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic gave the impression of being emotional by its appeals to the United Nations and the Russian soldiers. In my opinion, this reaction was not well-considered. When emotions gave way to reason, Yeltsin's steps became more acceptable. However, he recently proved to be as emotional and hotheaded as we Orientals.

The demand for the creation of a separate army is the result of Yeltsin's emotional period. His next steps showed that the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic does not have such intentions. If an army were to be created in Russia, tomorrow separate armies would also be established in the republics bordering on Russia. And this would not only mean clashes between individual groups of people, but between military forces that represent different republics. I do not doubt that Boris Yeltsin and his comrades now understand this.

The question about an army of our own was also raised at the session of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan that has just been concluded. However, the proposal did not get the required absolute majority. The objection was made that if an army were established in a republic, five armies would be immediately formed in our region. Not even one of our republics can manage to maintain an army of its own and to equip it with its own technology. In our country there must be uniform armed forces that ensure a reasonable defense capacity of the Union.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan prepared an alliance treaty on the basis of international law that is open to every other interested Soviet Republic. Is the accession of Uzbekistan, the largest non-Slavic republic conceivable?

[Karimov] Irrespective of the way in which this agreement is disguised—it is nothing but the attempt of the larger and potentially stronger republics to force their conditions on the others. The signing of such a treaty means the disregarding of our interests because if these republics sit down at the negotiating table, they will, of course, discuss their interests. The invitation to the other republics to accede to this treaty seems to me to be a gesture of the strong people's goodwill: Sign it if you want it; leave it alone if you do not want it.

I know that in this respect the other Central Asian republics are of the same opinion as Uzbekistan. My friend, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, was too hot-headed on this question. Since the sovereignty of the republics is not yet a real fact, it seems to be premature to talk of a treaty on the basis of the norms of international law. However, Uzbekistan strives for the development of horizontal relations between the republics under mutually advantageous conditions. We are prepared to conclude treaties and agreements. They may be the basis of the economic part of the Union treaty.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] Your friend Nazarbayev stated: "Why do we have to persuade those who do not want to sign the Union treaty?" Do you agree with him?

[Karimov] We ought not to drag anybody into the Union by his ears. However, there are still open questions. Six republics cannot or do not want to sign the Union treaty for various reasons. The other republics are not withholding their signature because they are against the Union or the federation. The draft that was presented to us contains many unclear points and contradictions. Even more importantly, it ignores the interests of the republics. It seems to me that we will agree with President Nazarbayev that all those who want to join the Union have to commit themselves. And all those who do not want this should sit down at another table.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] What will be the fate of the Union treaty in light of topical events?

[Karimov] When we discussed this problem the last time, Nazarbayev and I made the proposal to talk primarily about the obstacles in our mutual relations.

There is above all the property problem. What is the property of the Union and what belongs to the republics? Gorbachev accepted this proposal. But the people who do not want to lose the central power wanted to convince us that there is no property of republics, but only of enterprises. However, any property must be bound to the territory and administered by specific structures, which are either bound to the republic or to the Union. I am aware of this as an economist.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] In Uzbekistan bloody nationalist clashes with the Turkish minority, the Meskhetian Turks, took place in 1989. What are the causes and how can the tensions be reduced?

[Karimov] The tensions no longer exist today. Regarding the events of Fergana and the conflicts in other parts of our republic, for example, in the area of Tashkent: They were the consequences of many unsolved socioeconomic problems that accumulated over decades. In addition, there is the historical injustice that was done to entire peoples under Stalin, among them the Meskhetian Turks. In addition to Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and Ingush, 150,000 Meskhetian Turks were also deported to Uzbekistan. For decades, they lived side by side with Uzbeks and other peoples in our country. Then perestroyka was initiated in the country. The USSR Supreme Soviet condemned the historical injustice. After A we did not say B. We told the whole world about this injustice, but we did not propose any ways to repair it. Thanks to better organization and greater determination, the Crimean Tatars achieved successes in their struggle for the return to their old territory. The leaders of the Meskhetian Turks, who live in the north Caucasus, not only organized demonstrations, but also made their compatriots intolerant of the local population and thus they triggered off an avalanche.

However, I do not want to claim that this was the main reason. For 45 years we lived here together and nobody ever made the demand in Uzbekistan that the people who were resettled here have to leave. Though it may sound paradoxical, however, the processes of glasnost and democratization created a situation in which everybody can say and do what he wants. People gradually began to understand that by democracy, everything is permitted. The former leadership of the republic did not show the vigilance required to prevent the events.

[Schmidt-Haeuer] Today the Soviet republics—including Uzbekistan—want ties of their own with foreign countries. How do you assess relations with Germany from this point of view?

[Karimov] I would like to say that the opportunities for cooperation are used to an extraordinarily small extent. However, the changes that are taking place in the USSR and Germany open up new opportunities between the states and also at the level of individual laender, cities, and companies. There will be private property in Uzbekistan—we already proclaimed this. I am in favor of mixed enterprises and of the establishment of foreign banks here. I would like to propose that groups of experts from various fields come to us. It is my wish that solid, de-ideologized relations will develop.